Weekly Energy Update (October 16, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Here is an updated crude oil price chart.  Prices remain rangebound.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Commercial crude oil inventories fell 3.8 mb when a 2.0 mb decline was expected.  The SPR declined 1.2 mb; since peaking at 656.1 mb in July, the SPR has drawn 15.3 mb.  Given levels in April, we expect that another 6.7 mb will be withdrawn as this oil was placed in the SPR for temporary storage.  Taking the SPR into account, storage fell 5.0 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.5 mbpd to 10.5 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.5 mbpd, while imports declined 0.4 mbpd.  Refining activity fell 2.0%.  Hurricane Delta affected this week’s data.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s data showed a small decline in crude oil stockpiles, which is contraseasonal.  Inventories tend to make their second seasonal peak about mid-November.  Tropical activity continues, which will affect the data for the next couple of weeks.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $43.91; using the euro/price model, fair value is $62.27.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $52.27.  The wide divergence continues between the EUR and oil inventory models.  As the trend in the dollar rolls over, it is bullish for crude oil.  Any supportive news on reducing the inventory overhang could be very bullish for crude oil.

Hurricane activity has affected production, imports, and refining this season.  We are at the point, in a normal year, when refinery maintenance usually ends and product production increases.  If this develops this year, it should support crude oil prices in the coming weeks.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

Refinery utilization is running well below normal due to the pandemic.  But we tend to track the seasonal pattern, which would argue for an increase in refining activity, which would lift crude oil demand.

The big news this week came from the IEA which released its World Energy Outlook for 2020.  Its forecast suggests that oil demand will peak around 104 mbpd by 2035, about 1.5 mbpd before the pre-pandemic estimate.  If the recovery ends up being slower than currently expected, due to delays surrounding treatment, the peak could occur sooner and be around 100 mbpd.  The delay scenario assumes that global GDP will not start to expand until 2023.  Even in the best scenario, global energy demand is facing its worst situation since the Great Depression.  The decline in air travel has played a role in the drop in demand.  Another reason for the depressed oil demand forecast is coming from the expansion of electric vehicles.  Europe is moving rapidly to force the adoption of battery powered cars.  The pandemic has also hastened the shift to renewables.  And, financing for oil projects appears to be becoming more difficult.  We note that the IEA report is generally in line with OPEC’s estimates.

(Source: IEA)

OPEC+ is facing a serious problem, even if President Trump is reelected.[1]  If a market for resources is facing extinction, the rational act would be to monetize the resource as quickly as possible.[2]  If the value of the resource is going to zero in the future, it makes sense to produce as much as possible in the short term before the “extinction date” arrives.  Although the Saudis are likely to signal that they will maintain output discipline for now, that may not hold in the future.  And for U.S. producers, a recent report suggests that aggressive fracking activity may have permanently damaged oil fields.  Although this could mean the loss of potential future output, if the scenario outline above is true, it may be perfectly rational to overproduce in the short run at the risk of lost long-term potential if that oil won’t be consumed in the distant future.  Meanwhile, bankruptcies among oil companies is up 21% from the first three quarters of this year compared to 2019.

One of the issues we have been monitoring is the divergence in the performance of energy stocks compared to the broad index.  The comparison of the energy sector to the S&P shows that, even taking oil prices into account, energy stocks are underperforming.

The chart on the left shows the performance of the S&P energy sector to the overall S&P; we have rebased the indexes to May 1986.  From 2005 to 2014, the oil sector outperformed the overall index.  Lately, the underperformance has worsened.  The chart on the right adds oil prices to the model.  As one would expect, the performance does improve.  But, over the past two years, the underperformance of energy stocks has worsened even with the stabilization of oil prices.  Until recently, if an investor was bullish on oil, they could capture some of the strength in oil prices by purchasing oil equities.  That no longer seems to be the case.  The models suggest there is something much deeper occurring in energy; energy companies are seeing weaker performance independent of oil prices.  This likely means investors are concluding that the future of conventional energy stocks is dismal and this is causing oil stocks to become less sensitive to oil prices.  And, given the forecast future of oil demand, the situation probably won’t get better.

On the unconventional front, we are seeing renewed interest in fuel cells.  Fuel cells have the reputation of being the future of energy and always will be.  We first reported on fuel cells in the mid-1990s.  With rising interest in carbon reduction, fuel cells, merely from improved efficiency, should be part of the mix.  Fuel cells run on hydrogen; the most used current source is from natural gas.  Although fuel cells don’t emit any carbon, natural gas does.  The “holy grail” for the industry is hydrogen from solar or wind.  On the other end of the spectrum, the U.S. is offering $160MM to fund research into small nuclear reactors.  Although nuclear power remains an anathema to the general public, it may be impossible to achieve zero carbon energy without it. 

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[1] Although we doubt a President Biden would be successful in returning to the Iran nuclear deal, the potential for a return of Iranian oil exports of 2.0 mbpd would be difficult for the cartel to manage.

[2] Hence the decision by Saudi Arabia to take Saudi Aramco public.

Asset Allocation Weekly (October 16, 2020)

by Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

Of all the different economic indicators published by the government and private entities, one of the least followed, but potentially very enlightening, is the Census Bureau’s monthly report on business inventories.  The report tracks the value of inventories on hand each month at the retail, wholesale, and manufacturing levels and compares those values to the amount of sales at each level.  The resulting inventory/sales ratio can help us predict business behavior in the coming months.  For example, if the inventory/sales ratio is higher than normal, it may mean firms are saddled with excess stockpiles and will cut prices or hold back on new orders to their suppliers.  When the inventory/sales ratio is lower than normal, it could portend increased orders and higher prices.  The inventory/sales ratio fluctuates over time because of changes in technology and management practices, but it can still provide important insights over the short term.

As shown by the heavy blue line in the chart below, the overall inventory/sales ratio fluctuated between about 1.35 and 1.40 during the five years leading up to the coronavirus pandemic.  When the pandemic shutdowns hit, many firms saw their sales plummet, leaving their inventories sitting on shelves in their shuttered stores or warehouses.  The overall inventory/sales ratio surged to 1.67 in April.  With the recent reopening of most of the economy, however, the overall ratio has now fallen to 1.33.  Since the current ratio is lower than in the recent past, it may suggest firms would be eager to rebuild their stockpiles if they became more confident that the economic recovery will continue.  Lean inventories may also encourage price hikes or discourage price cuts, helping to alleviate fears of excessively low inflation.

A close look at the detail in the chart is even more encouraging.  Note that before the pandemic, retailers typically carried $1.45 to $1.50 of inventory for every dollar of monthly sales.  In August, however, retailers had just $1.24 of inventory for every dollar of sales, marking their lowest inventory/sales ratio in at least 25 years.  If you’ve finally started to go out shopping again after the lockdowns, you may have noticed that many stores have very little inventory on their shelves.  In part, that may reflect retail managers’ lack of confidence in future demand.  It could also be partly unplanned, reflecting an inability to get new inventories because of supply chain disruptions or reduced financing by skeptical lenders.  In any case, it’s hard to believe retailers would keep their stockpiles this low when the economy returns to normal.  Rather, one would expect an eventual inventory restocking and strongly rebounding orders.

In contrast with the situation for retailers, factory inventories are a bit high compared with recent history.  Rather than carrying inventories worth $1.38 to $1.40 per dollar of sales, as they did before the pandemic, manufacturers recently had about $1.43 of inventory per dollar of sales.  That means that if retail restocking leads to a rebound in manufacturing orders, there could be a modest delay in new production (since the wholesale inventory/sales ratio is right at its recent average, we are ignoring it for purposes of this analysis).  All the same, it probably wouldn’t take long for the small excess in factory stockpiles to get used up.  Manufacturers and raw material suppliers might need to ramp up production quickly, which in turn could require faster hiring.  It’s probably too much to say the economy is a coiled spring ready to snap back to normal.  We still think it will take some time to get over the drag from the pandemic.  All the same, even a gradual normalization process could produce a big acceleration in factory activity, helping boost corporate profits and supporting further stock market gains.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – Back to the Future? Prospects for a New Cold War Against China (October 12, 2020)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

This edition of our Weekly Geopolitical Report explores the prospects of a new Cold War between the United States and China.  Based on the author’s personal experiences at the end of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, this report explores the various costs that would likely arise from a new Cold War and what those costs imply for investment strategy.

When I asked her if she had any trouble getting her ticket from St. Petersburg to Moscow to join me for the long weekend, she said, “No.”  Then, with a sly grin and a meaningful glance deep into my eyes, she added, “I just asked for help from a friend in the KGB who works for President Gorbachev.”  I suppose I grinned a bit, too, since she had just confirmed her association with Soviet intelligence, which I had suspected ever since we met in a hotel bar in St. Petersburg weeks before.  If I did let a grin slip out, it probably also reflected the irony of knowing how badly my office at the CIA was going to react to this forbidden dalliance when I got back to Washington.  But it was a beautiful, bright, crisp autumn morning in Moscow in September 1991, just after the attempted coup against Gorbachev, and I was still young.

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Asset Allocation Weekly (October 9, 2020)

by Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

Later this month, the European Union will begin auctioning off bonds to facilitate its economic recovery from the pandemic. In all, the EU plans to raise up to €850 billion over the next 5-7 years, with €750 billion still awaiting approval from the European Parliament. If approved, as we expect, the funds will be backed by the full faith and credit of the European Union members and will come in two parts, the Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) program and the Next Generation EU (NGEU) program.

The latter will be aimed disproportionately at supporting the most vulnerable and indebted countries within the union such as Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIPS). If successful, this program could provide these countries with a needed boost in consumption and income, something these countries have lacked since the start of the financial crisis.

Over the past few years, the GIPS countries were forced to run an export-focused growth model to help repay loans from their respective bailout agreements. This reliance on exports allowed GIPS to boost their internal savings, which made these countries more solvent. However, despite the improvement in internal savings, the removal of labor protections, fiscal protections, and higher taxes in these countries led to deteriorating living conditions and strained public spending. As a result, prior to the pandemic most of these countries were, by design, growing slowly.

In addition, by having an export-focused growth model, GIPS were sensitive to shocks to the global economy. When the pandemic hit, international travel and global trade collapsed. Lockdown and travel restrictions decimated tourism, which provides a significant source of revenue for these countries, and halted production of manufactured goods. Additionally, the drop in world growth has stunted the demand for global exports. Although the world economy has started to recover, it is unclear when global trade and travel will normalize.

With citizens unwilling to undergo additional austerity and GIPS lacking monetary independence, the recovery fund will likely ease some political angst, which has led to increasing populism in Europe. Even before the pandemic, GIPS were struggling to find ways to appease their citizens who have grown tired of constrained growth. In fact, it is possible that if the EU didn’t ease some of its restraints some of these countries would have withdrawn from the EU and the Eurozone. Fears of political unrest that could undermine the integrity of the EU led the richer northern European nations to agree to the bailout package.

This new spending will allow these countries to boost investment in infrastructure projects, healthcare, and digital technology. Additionally, the fund has also set aside money to invest in green technology. Given the lack of consumption over the past few years due to the restrictions of deficit, these countries have been limited in their ability to invest in their respective economies. The €750 billion of funds, of which €390 billion will be used as grants, will likely provide a notable boost in GDP.

The funds are expected to be disbursed in 2021 and in 2022. In the meantime, countries have access to the €100 billion SURE program to help support local businesses and provide unemployment benefits. That being said, assuming the money from the recovery fund is used wisely, we expect the stimulus could make European equities attractive as we believe that years of austerity have led to a lot of pent-up demand in the GIPS countries. As a result, consumer discretionary and real estate could be of some interest.

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Weekly Energy Update (October 8, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Here is an updated crude oil price chart.  The recent dip in prices remains, although we are seeing some recovery.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Commercial crude oil inventories rose 0.5 mb when a 1.2 mb decline was expected.  The SPR declined 8.8 mb; since peaking at 656.1 mb in July, the SPR has drawn 11.7 mb.  Given levels in April, we expect that another 7.1 mb will be withdrawn as this oil was placed in the SPR for temporary storage.  Taking the SPR into account, storage fell 0.6 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.3 mbpd to 11.0 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.9 mbpd, while imports rose 0.6 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.3%.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s data showed a small rise in crude oil stockpiles, which is normal.  Inventories tend to make their second seasonal peak about mid-November.  Tropical activity continues, which will affect the data for the next couple of weeks.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $42.66; using the euro/price model, fair value is $62.36.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $51.61.  The wide divergence continues between the EUR and oil inventory models.  As the trend in the dollar rolls over, it is bullish for crude oil.  Any supportive news on reducing the inventory overhang could be very bullish for crude oil.

Distillate consumption rose this week but remains well below average.  We are also in a period where consumption tends to rise as (a) households top off their home heating tanks, and (b) shipments for Christmas begin to rise.  If we don’t see sizeable demand building in the coming weeks, it will add to evidence that the economy’s recovery is stalling, something the FOMC has been warning about for the past few weeks.

One of the problems with our currently divided political system is that policy vacillates between extremes.  That makes investment planning difficult.  In the resulting vacuum, state governments, working in concert, are establishing their own regulations and protocols.  This week, a group comprising power supplies and traders, facilitated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, met to examine the concept of carbon pricing.  Utilities are starting to face different state regulatory environments and the goal of the meeting is an attempt to create a common set of guidelines.  Carbon pricing would give utilities and regulators a tool to manage emissions.  If carbon pricing goes forward, not only would renewables benefit, but nuclear power would also have a chance at recovery.  Last week, we noted investment in mini-reactors.  The U.K. is offering a £2.0 billion subsidy to help develop the technology.

With the election looming in less than a month, the energy industry is attempting to understand the impact of a change in governmentAlthough Biden’s policy ideas are far from concrete, it does appear that some federal lands won’t be available for lease.  There is a divide developing between the larger oil companies that are able to absorb the costs of new regulation and smaller firms that probably can’t.  There are some other potential effects.  President Trump did manage to bring some order to the oil markets by getting the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to stop oversupplying the oil market.  He also has gotten the Chinese to buy U.S. oil as part of the Phase I trade agreement, which has actually forced the KSA to give up market share in China, at least for now.  A Biden White House would probably not have gotten involved, leading to lower oil prices.  And, if Biden is able to bring the U.S. back into the JCPOA, Iranian oil would begin to flow again, putting OPEC+ in a very difficult spot.  In addition, environmental rules, such as those affecting endangered species, would likely see greater enforcement.

The pandemic, as we have been documenting, has had an adverse effect on the oil industry.  Rising oil company bankruptcies could lead to state governments being forced to absorb any environmental costs of abandoned wells.  So far, oil industry employment has not declined significantly; however, as the chart below shows, since 2000, oil prices have tended to lead employment by about a year and a half.  Thus, we would expect employment to fall rapidly next year into 2022.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – Erdoğan’s Leadership and the Turkey-Greece Dispute: Part II (October 5, 2020)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

In Part I of this report last week, we took a deep look at Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s perspectives, goals, power, initiatives, and constraints.  We examined how his primary aims are to regain Islam’s place in global society, seek redress for the way Islam and Turkey have been treated by the West, and make Turkey an independent, respected, and dominant power in the Middle East.  We also showed that Erdoğan has a solid domestic political base to carry out his plans.  In Part II, we will discuss how the latest reflection of Erdoğan’s program is his effort to make Turkey a player in developing the newly discovered, rich natural gas fields of the eastern Mediterranean Sea.  Since that initiative could lead to a confrontation with other countries, we also explore the potential implications for investors.

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