Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Mid-Year Geopolitical Outlook (June 25, 2018)

by Bill O’Grady

(Due to the Independence Day holiday, the next report will be published July 9.)

As is our custom, we update our geopolitical outlook for the remainder of the year as the first half comes to a close.  This report is less a series of predictions as it is a list of potential geopolitical issues that we believe will dominate the international landscape for the rest of the year.  It is not designed to be exhaustive; instead, it focuses on the “big picture” conditions that we believe will affect policy and markets going forward.  They are listed in order of importance.

Issue #1: America’s Evolving Hegemony

Issue #2: Rising Western Populism

Issue #3: Rising Authoritarianism

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The 2018 Geopolitical Outlook (December 18, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady

(N.B.  This will be the last WGR of 2017.  Our next report will be published January 8, 2018.)

As is our custom, we close out the current year with our outlook for the next one.  This report is less a series of predictions as it is a list of potential geopolitical issues that we believe will dominate the international landscape in the upcoming year.  It is not designed to be exhaustive; instead, it focuses on the “big picture” conditions that we believe will affect policy and markets going forward.  They are listed in order of importance.

Issue #1: The Big Picture

Issue #2: China Deleveraging

Issue #3: European Politics

Issue #4: North Korea

Issue #5: South American Populism

Issue #6: The Middle East

Issue #7: U.S. Domestic Politics

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The 19th Party Congress (October 2, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady

On October 18th, the Communist Party of China (CPC) will meet for the 19th Party Congress.  China’s leadership for the next five years will be determined at this meeting.

In this report, we will offer a background on China’s government, focusing on the difference between de jure (what is the official structure of China’s governance) and de facto (how it really works).  From this discussion, we will examine the likely developments from this meeting and what they will mean for China and the world over the next five years.  As always, we will conclude with potential market ramifications.

China’s Government (Official Version)
China’s government has a parallel structure.  The CPC operates alongside the government of China.  Since the CPC is the only political body in China, the governance of China is dominated by the CPC, but there are elements of power that are separate from the party.  For example, Xi Jinping is both the President of China (head of government) and General Secretary of the Central Committee (head of the CPC).  He is also the Commander in Chief of the People’s Liberation Army.  There exists a National Party Congress (as noted below, the most powerful body in China, at least in theory) and a National People’s Congress, which is the primary legislative arm of the government.  The President has a strict legal limit of two five-year terms, while the General Secretary’s term limit is based on tradition.  In theory, a General Secretary could remain in that role after relinquishing the presidency.  This extended control of the CPC hasn’t happened since Mao Zedong,[1] who remained in control of the party from 1943 until his death in 1976.  Deng Xiaoping brought order to the transition of power, and since then General Secretaries have held office for 10 years, consisting of two five-year terms.

China’s most powerful body is the National Party Congress.  It meets every five years; in 2012, it had 2,268 members.[2]  Its primary job is to elect the Central Committee.  The Central Committee, which had 376 members in 2012, elects the General Secretary, the Politburo and the Standing Committee of the Politburo.  The Politburo consists of 25 members and is the executive body of the CPC.  The Standing Committee of the Politburo has seven members, all of which are also members of the Politburo.  The Central Committee meets annually, while the Politburo meets monthly and the Standing Committee of the Politburo meets weekly.

Thus, in theory, the most powerful body in China is the National Party Congress.  The second most powerful is the Central Committee, followed by the Politburo and the Standing Committee of the Politburo.

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[1] Mao was referred to as “Chairman of the Central Politburo” or “Chairman of the Central Committee.”

[2] As a point of reference, the CPC has 85.13 mm members out of a population of 1.4 bn, roughly 6.2% of the population.

Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Mid-Year Geopolitical Outlook (July 10, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady

As is our custom, we update our geopolitical outlook for the remainder of the year as the first half comes to a close.  This report is less a series of predictions as it is a list of potential geopolitical issues that we believe will dominate the international landscape for the rest of the year.  It is not designed to be exhaustive; instead, it focuses on the “big picture” conditions that we believe will affect policy and markets going forward.  They are listed in order of importance.

Issue #1: The Political Fragmentation of the West

Issue #2: North Korea

Issue #3: An Unsettled Middle East

Issue #4: A Resurgent Russia

Issue #5: China’s Financial Situation

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Gordon Dilemma (August 12, 2013)

by Bill O’Grady

Robert Gordon is a well-known economist who teaches at Northwestern University.  He was a member of the Boskin Commission that assessed the accuracy of the CPI and is also a member of the National Bureau of Economic Research, the body that dates business cycles.  Part of his research has focused on long-term economic and productivity growth.

In August 2012, he published a working paper suggesting that U.S. economic growth was “over.”[1]  Gordon’s thesis is that the first two industrial revolutions, the first starting in 1750 in England and the second in 1870 in the U.S., were so remarkable that nothing else has had a similar impact.  Although Gordon does acknowledge a third revolution, the computer and internet revolution which began around 1960, he suggests the impact pales in comparison to the earlier two revolutions.

From there, Gordon argues that the jump in growth that occurred from the first two revolutions will not likely be repeated, meaning that growth will slow down to the pre-revolutionary trend.  That isn’t to say that growth will become non-existent.  Instead, growth will slow to around 1.5% per year permanently.

The geopolitical impact of such a slowdown would be significant.  The global superpower generally is dominant in both the military and economic spheres.  It will be difficult for the U.S. to maintain such dominance with such slow growth.  Not only will fiscal restraints develop because of this slow growth, which will make military budgets problematic, fulfilling the reserve currency role and the global importer of last resort function will become nearly impossible as well.

In this report, we will discuss Professor Gordon’s thesis, examine the geopolitical impact if he is correct and offer some criticisms of his thesis.  We will conclude with potential market ramifications.

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[1] NBER Working Paper 18315, “Is U.S. Economic Growth Over?  Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds,” Aug 2012.