Asset Allocation Weekly (March 27, 2020)

by Asset Allocation Committee

We continue to monitor the path of the economy and markets as our expectations for a recession loom.  This week we will update our S&P 500 earnings forecast for 2020.

We use two components to build our forecast for S&P per share earnings.  First, we need to estimate GDP.  Normally, we use the GDP forecast from the Philadelphia FRB’s survey of economists.  However, under current circumstances, these forecasts are woefully out of date, so we are left to our own devices.  Any GDP forecast at present is mostly a guess; there isn’t enough data for March to project any sort of forecast for Q2.  Nevertheless, some estimate of GDP is necessary; our expectation for real GDP is a decline of 5.5% for the year 2020 with a strong rebound in 2021.  This will make the 2020 recession one of the deepest on record and the deepest yearly recession since 1946.  But, it will be short; our estimate suggests that Q2 and Q3 will be negative, with a positive Q4.

We take this forecast and calculate a nominal GDP number.  Second, we use a model to generate the S&P operating earnings margin relative to GDP.  It uses a series of variables, including unit labor costs, fed funds, NIPA profits/GDP, the euro, WTI, real net exports/GDP and corporate cash flow.  The one variable that has been of particular concern is the comparison of S&P 500 earnings/GDP compared to NIPA profits[1]/GDP; the modeled difference between these two variables has widened and, in the past, has signaled an eventual reversion would bring S&P earnings sharply lower.

The deviation line shows that when S&P earnings/GDP is elevated relative to NIPA profits/GDP, the two tend to correct during recessions.  Current levels are elevated; in a recession, history shows the two series tend to converge.

In our 2020 Outlook Update, we postulated that a recession would occur.  Our margin model shows that S&P earnings will fall to 4.5% of nominal GDP.  That lowers our estimate for 2020 S&P operating earnings to 127.00 per share.

Whenever we make a forecast, we try to determine where the most likely area of error can occur.  We note that in the last recession, the model forecast failed to capture the depths of the earnings decline.  And, in 2016, it didn’t fully account for the energy-related declines.  Thus, we may be underestimating the degree of earnings weakness that may occur.  But, for now, we will be using the 127.00 per share number for 2020, with the caveat that further downgrades are possible.

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[1] NIPA stands for “National Income and Product Accounts” and is the formal name of the GDP accounts.  As part of that accounting, the Commerce Department calculates corporate profits for the entire economy.

Business Cycle Report (March 26, 2020)

by Thomas Wash

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  We have created this report to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, which we plan to update on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

In February, the economic data was slightly weaker than the prior month but not enough to signal recession. The coronavirus spread from China into South Korea, which raised concerns of the impact the virus would have on the global economy. As a result, equities weakened and U.S. Treasuries rallied. That being said, manufacturing showed signs of a recovery as purchasing managers were optimistic that the trade deal signed in the previous month would finally lead to an improvement in orders. Additionally, the employment numbers were strong, suggesting that prior to March there was a lot of optimism about the economy. In this report, three out of the 11 indicators were in recession territory. The reading for February fell to +0.576 from +0.636.

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a recovery. On average, the diffusion index is currently providing about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for a recovery. Continue reading for a more in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing and refer to our Glossary of Charts at the back of this report for a description of each chart and what it measures. A chart title listed in red indicates that indicator is signaling recession.

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Weekly Energy Update (March 26, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA

Crude oil inventories rose 1.6 mb compared to the forecast rise of 3.0 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.1 mbpd to 13.0 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.5 mbpd, while imports declined 0.4 mbpd.  The inventory build was less than forecast due to a modest rise in refinery operations.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s report maintained the recent pattern of putting accumulations modestly above seasonal norms.  Inventories will be expected to rise steady into late May.  We will be watching this chart closely in the coming weeks for signs that inventories are rising abnormally due to the market share war described below.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $55.20; using the euro/price model, fair value is $50.09.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $50.96.  As we noted last week, the model output is less relevant unless Russia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) come to an agreement on supply.

In the coming weeks, there are two key factors we will be monitoring.  The first is the recession’s impact on product demand.  So far, there is little evidence that demand is being affected.  We do expect that we will start to see consumption decline markedly in the near future.  Second, U.S. commercial crude oil storage is around 550 mb.  If commercial inventories rise to that level, price declines could become catastrophic because there will be nowhere for that oil to go.  We approached that level in 2017 but OPEC took action to prevent further declines in prices.  The government’s decision to add to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve will help in this area but we still worry that the lack of storage capacity could have a profoundly bearish effect on oil prices.

On the international front, the U.S. is pressing the KSA to end its price war.  We doubt Riyadh will change course, but we will monitor this development.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – On Optimization (March 23, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady

In our discussions of COVID-19, we have noted that part of the reason the virus has been so disruptive is because the world has adopted a stance that optimization is an unalloyed positive.  When I was in graduate school, I participated in a seminar with several professional private sector economists.  A question was posed about what the goal of economics should be, and the resounding response was “efficiency.”  On its face, that position makes sense; after all, who wants to be inefficient?  But the key is how efficiency is defined and measured.

There are two underlying issues that frame optimization.  The first is the broad number of variables that may be considered in optimization.  The second is that many actions designed to optimize suffer from the error of composition.  In other words, what is rational at the micro level may be irrational at the macro level.  Both of these factors are affected by globalization, thus making them appropriate for a geopolitical report.

One of the reasons COVID-19 has had such a drastic impact on the global economy is because companies and governments have optimized to a narrow set of factors and the lack of redundancies in the system has caused breakdowns in supply chains.  As we have watched this crisis unfold, we have been struck by the fact that much of the impact was tied to the drive for optimization.

In this report, we will examine the issue of optimization.  We will start by discussing the expanse of variables considered and why market participants tend to assume that slow moving variables are constant and thus they are vulnerable when they change.  An analysis of the error of composition problem will also be included.  We will conclude with market ramifications.

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Asset Allocation Weekly (March 20, 2020)

by Asset Allocation Committee

During the recent market tumult, gold has performed rather well, until lately.

(Source: Barchart.com)

This chart shows the nearest gold futures contract over the past year.  From mid-January, when reports of COVID-19 began to circulate, gold prices marched steadily higher, making an intraday high of $1,704.30.  Since then, this has declined by over $250 per ounce.  This drop is occurring despite a series of measures designed that would normally support gold prices, e.g., the return of zero fed funds, new quantitative easing, plans for massive fiscal spending, etc.

This is a chart of our gold model.  Fair value has increased to $1,529 per ounce and prices have dropped below that level.  We suspect the recent weakness is related to a rapid tightening of financial conditions.

This chart shows the Bloomberg Financial Conditions Index. A negative reading suggests higher levels of financial stress.  When financial stress rises to high levels, investors often are scrambling for cash, selling what they can and not necessarily what they should.  In other words, the investors may be selling gold to raise funds because it is a liquid asset.

Returning to the gold model chart, we highlighted the area in yellow that represents the 2008 Great Financial Crisis.  In the worst of that situation, gold also underperformed fair value.  However, once the liquidating stopped, gold began a multi-year bull market.  Although we are not necessarily expecting a similar move in prices, we do expect the aggressive expansion of liquidity via fiscal and monetary policy to create favorable conditions for gold in the coming years.

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Weekly Energy Update (March 19, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA

Crude oil inventories rose 2.0 mb compared to the forecast rise of 3.5 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.1 mbpd to 13.1 mbpd.  Exports rose 1.0 mbpd, while imports rose 0.1 mbpd.  The inventory build was less than forecast due to the rise in exports.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s report put inventory accumulation modestly above seasonal norms.  Inventories will be expected to rise steady into late May.  We will be watching this chart closely in the coming weeks for signs that inventories are rising abnormally due to the market share war described below.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $55.77; using the euro/price model, fair value is $53.14.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $53.26.  As we noted last week, the model output is less relevant unless Russia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) come to an agreement on supply.

Needless to say, our forecast for oil prices was reasonably accurate in terms of level but far too conservative in terms of time.  WTI has declined under $21 per barrel since our last report.  The combination of increased KSA supply and rising Russian output, combined with falling demand, is putting significant negative pressure on prices.  U.S. oil producers in the shale patch are already signaling layoffs.  The U.S. industry is more competitive and better hedged than in 2015; although bankruptcies are unavoidable, production will likely remain elevated for some time regardless of how low prices fall.

This chart shows WTI oil prices with U.S. crude oil production.[1]  We have highlighted the area from the peak in oil prices in 2014 to the peak in production in 2015.  The lag between these two periods was 10 months.  Thus, we would not expect any significant declines in U.S. output until late Q4 at the earliest.  If Russia and the KSA continue to fight for market share, oil prices will remain under further pressure for the foreseeable future.

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[1] The official DOE data has a two- to three-month lag.  The production data reported in the weekly data is an estimate from the DOE.

Weekly Geopolitical Report – Renewed Fighting in Idlib (March 16, 2020)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA

When financial markets get caught up in a crisis like the ongoing coronavirus panic, one underappreciated risk for investors is that they can get too distracted to notice other, longer-term problems that might be brewing.  That’s why we take such a disciplined approach to monitoring geopolitical, economic, social and market events all around the world.  While we continue working hard to understand the coronavirus epidemic and anticipate its trajectory, we’re also paying close attention to the latest flare up in the Syrian civil war.

In this week’s report, we discuss the Syrian government’s effort to finish off the last remaining rebels in the northwest part of the country, and we show why Turkey recently launched a counteroffensive against that effort.  We explain what the various players in the drama are hoping to achieve and how their actions could draw in outside forces like Russia and the U.S.  Importantly, we also discuss how the situation could produce another destabilizing migrant crisis for the Europeans.  As always, we conclude with investment implications.

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Keller Quarterly (March 16, 2020)

Letter to Investors

The last three weeks of financial market turbulence have been among the most harrowing I’ve ever seen.  To my memory it’s been a combination of October 1987 and October 2008, two months I’d prefer to forget.  While the stock market was dropping sharply and quickly, U.S. Treasury bonds were soaring almost as fast.[1]  In my last two quarterly letters I’ve noted the impossibility of seeing into the future.  I think we’ve now established beyond a reasonable doubt that neither we nor anyone else can forecast future events.  Within a surprisingly short period of time, the U.S. economy (and the global economy) has moved from a period of steady growth and low unemployment to a position of great vulnerability.  How did this happen?  Three things have quickly conspired to bring us to this point.  The first two were both new and invisible until quite recently.  The third was a known concern lurking out of sight (but always there in a long economic expansion).  These three causes of our troubles are:

  1. The coronavirus known as SARS-CoV-2, which produces a serious and sometimes fatal disease known as COVID-19, has spread around the world. This virus began in China in December 2019 and began moving across that country in the first two months of this year.  From there the virus moved east and west across the world (as almost all viruses do).  This virus has proven to be particularly dangerous because it is virtually as contagious as the common cold but has a mortality factor somewhat worse than seasonal influenza.  Our chief market strategist, Bill O’Grady, and his team have been tracking the path of this virus since January.  As it has neared the U.S. it has become apparent that it will cause an economic slowdown here, since the most effective way to combat this virus is social isolation, which translates to much lower economic activity.  Because the virus seems to have an arc of virulence roughly two to three months in length, it has been our view that the virus alone was not enough to cause a recession here or cause lasting economic damage.  Over the last week, that view has changed due to the second causal factor.
  2. An oil price war has broken out between OPEC, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the Russian government. Both governments are oil-dependent and thus benefit from higher (but not too high) oil prices.  This mutual goal has been frustrated in the last decade by increasing oil supplies from outside of OPEC and Russia, mostly from the United States.  In a meeting that concluded on March 7, the KSA tried to convince Russia to agree to a set of production cuts that would keep prices high.  Russia declined to reduce oil production and instead announced its intention to increase production to drive prices down.  The KSA has since also announced production increases.  These two petrostates appear to be intent on driving prices down in order to: a) maintain and grow market share in China, the world’s #1 importer, and b) reduce U.S. shale producers’ share of world markets by moving oil prices below their costs of production. Once relieved of the U.S.’s large oil production, they hope that prices will rise more permanently.  This is a high-stakes game, where the loser is the U.S. oil industry.  If the U.S. government cannot force the end of this price war quickly, the probability of a recession in the U.S. rises substantially when combined with the virus-related slowdown.  It so happens that right now the U.S. is vulnerable to a recession for a very ordinary reason, our third factor.
  3. Private sector debt always grows as an economic expansion ages. The reason for this is that investors and businesspeople become more bold as an expansion gets old.  The further a recession recedes into the rear-view mirror, the more people believe it won’t happen again.  Thus, they become bolder in their investments.  We are fortunate that, unlike 2008, the debt growth this time is not concentrated in the consumer sector like it was then.  Twelve years ago, residential mortgage debt was the big problem.  This time the debt problem is corporate debt.  This has been something we’ve been monitoring for a while.  Both our Market Strategy team and our Asset Allocation team have noted a heightened probability of economic difficulties in their recent publications.[2]  Much of this debt, especially that below-investment grade, is tied to the energy industry.  Thus, the price war in oil has increased the probability of financial troubles in the oil patch and on Wall Street.  Much of this debt is outside of the U.S. banking system.  Post-2008 reforms required U.S. banks to hold higher levels of equity capital and reserves, reducing their ability to lend.  The demand for debt capital grew, however, as both the economy and the energy industry grew.  Non-bank lenders grew dramatically over this decade to meet the demand for money, with the result that financial risk also grew.  The “staying power” of energy companies through this likely oil price “valley” is thus reduced by their debt loads, and the lenders who serve them could become impaired as well.

In my opinion, any one of these factors would have been unlikely to produce a recession.  For instance, factor #2 did occur just five years ago, when oil prices declined from near $100 per barrel to about $30 over 15 months.  While the oil industry suffered its own recession, the U.S. avoided a general recession.  The coincidence of all three of these factors within the same short time frame raises substantially and quickly the probability of a recession.

Bill O’Grady publishes every Friday an Asset Allocation Weekly report that is appended to the end of the Confluence Daily Comment.  This past Friday Bill published one of the most important pieces he’s ever written.[3]  In this report Bill explained why, within the space of a week, the probability of a recession this year has risen from low to high.  In a lengthier 2020 Outlook Update published today we explain how the three factors noted above have changed our base case for the year to one of recession.[4]  The sharp sell-off in the stock market and the rise in the treasury bond market were not simply due to panic about the coronavirus.  We presume that we were not alone in ratcheting up dramatically our expectation of a recession last week.  The result is that the U.S. stock market, basis the S&P 500, has dropped 27.0% from its top-tick on February 19 to its bottom tick on March 12.  It presently stands at 2711, or 20.1% below its high.  Bill’s work (in the AAW report noted) indicates a likely low of about 2300, which is 15.2% below our current level.  This estimate presumes a recession of normal length and depth, which is our current expectation.  Given that estimate, the market would appear to have, in a period of about three weeks, sold off roughly two-thirds of what we would have expected for the entire cyclical bear market.  This is consistent with market behavior over the last few decades, wherein market discounting for rapid changes in expectations has become an extremely quick affair.

What is Confluence doing?  Confluence provides both equity strategies (utilizing individual stocks) and asset allocation strategies (utilizing exchange-traded funds, or ETFs).  Our equity strategies are fully invested strategies with low turnover, which we believe provide long-term investors (those with a greater than five-year time horizon) the best opportunity to build wealth.  We do not asset allocate within an equity portfolio, which means we do not target cash to “time the market.”  We don’t do that because we deem it impossible to do so successfully and consistently.  This means that our equity portfolios do usually decline in price when the general market heads south.  Our goal is not to sit out bear markets, but to survive them by owning shares in companies that not only survive recessions but come out of them with stronger competitive positions.  For long-term taxable investors, this strategy is especially valuable, in our opinion.

While we always emphasize company quality according to specific and proprietary guidelines, as the probability of a recession rises, we test each position again regarding its survivability in the sort of recession we anticipate.  Any companies that concern us are removed and replaced, even if bought in recent months.  In other cases, shares of outstanding businesses we do not own because of prohibitively high valuations become available to us at what we consider to be bargain prices.  Thus, again, we will sell shares of companies we consider to be lesser businesses and replace them with what we believe is a quality upgrade.  Investors are sometimes troubled when we sell a stock in a down market, even at a loss, but when we do so we have the eventual economic recovery in mind.  The goal is to put the portfolio in an optimal position to benefit from that recovery.  As a wise old investor once said, “The goal in a falling market is to own tennis balls rather than tomatoes.”  Economies and stock markets do recover.  We aim to both give up as little as possible on the downside and to pick up as much as possible on the upside.

Confluence’s asset allocation strategies take a medium-term view of investing, that is, a three-year forward time frame.  In an era when changes in market prices occur quickly and severely as economic outlooks change, asset allocation is an investor’s best tool to protect oneself.  This is a preventative, rather than tactical, maneuver, but it’s by far the most effective.  An investor should set a balance between asset classes that fits his or her risk profile when markets are tranquil.  After markets have adjusted dramatically, such as at present, it makes sense to reevaluate the asset allocation.  If an investor’s risk profile is unchanged, it makes sense for most investors to rebalance the asset allocation.

For clients in our asset allocation and balanced strategies, an investor, with the counsel of their financial advisor, can select the appropriate asset allocation at the outset.  If personal circumstances change, the asset allocation can be changed by giving us instructions.  Otherwise, we manage the asset allocation according to our investment team’s outlook.  When markets move dramatically, the rebalancing occurs automatically in our asset allocation and balanced portfolios.

Given an increasingly dour outlook in recent quarters, we increased the relative duration and investment quality of our fixed income allocations and have increased our allocations to gold in those strategies for which commodity allocations are appropriate.  These allocations have cushioned some, but not all, of the downside in the equity allocations.  At some point in the economic cycle, we expect to reverse some of those moves.  Until that time, rebalancing asset allocations will still occur.

Regardless of the strategy, our investment teams are attentive to the rapid changes that have occurred and are occurring.  As noted above, we cannot forecast the future, but new and, sometimes, unexpected changes are par for the course.  When dramatically new challenges occur, we react accordingly, if necessary.  We encourage you to stay in touch with the changing investment landscape by reading our Daily Comment and other publications on our website.

We appreciate your confidence in us.

 

Gratefully,

Mark A. Keller, CFA
CEO and Chief Investment Officer

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[1] This is a reminder, by the way, of the value of utilizing both stocks and bonds in a portfolio.

[2] 2020 Outlook: Storm Watch (12/19/2019); Asset Allocation Quarterly (Q1 2020)

[3] Asset Allocation Weekly (3/13/2020)

[4] 2020 Outlook Update: Storm Warning (3/16/2020)

2020 Outlook Update: Storm Warning (March 16, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady & Mark Keller | PDF

Summary—High Probability of Recession:

  1. The economy is facing three simultaneous problems:
    1. A public health crisis—COVID-19 and the economic impact of containing it;
    2. An oil price war and a regional economic slump;
    3. Rapidly rising financial stress caused by (a) and (b) along with underlying unresolved issues.
  2. We estimate the odds of recession are now 80%, although there is a slim chance the economy avoids a recession.
    1. There is very little economic data to confirm the economic slump, but the anecdotal evidence is near overwhelming;
    2. Given the timing of economic reporting, clear evidence of a downturn won’t be available for several weeks;
    3. This report will update our thoughts on how the next few months will unfold.
  3. The content of this report:
    1. An overview of how recessions look compared to expansions;
    2. A discussion of the three threats the expansion faces;
    3. The market impact of these three threats.

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