Asset Allocation Weekly (July 17, 2020)

by Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

One of the burning issues about the current path of policy is its inflationary impact.  In other words, will the massive increase in fiscal spending and the Fed’s balance sheet lead to higher price levels?  To discuss this issue, we return to the equation of exchange:

M x V = P x Q

The money supply times velocity is equal to the price level times goods and services produced.  This equation is an identity; simply put, it will always be true.  But, the direction of causality of the variables comes from theory.  Classical economists and their philosophic progeny, monetarists, argued that V and Q were fixed, so changes in price levels were due to changes in money supply.  Keynesians and their most recent variation, modern monetary theorists, argue that Q can be below its capacity and V is variable, so increases in M may not necessarily lead to higher price levels but could result in a decline in V or a rise in Q.  Essentially, the Keynesians and their modern versions argue that if Q is below capacity, increasing M can boost the economy without triggering inflation.

The problem with both of the major theories is that there is a psychological element to the equation that tends to be downplayed.  The problem for the Classical construct is that even at full employment (Q) rising M might simply lead to falling V.  Complacency about future inflation or fears about the future growth path of the economy might lead households and businesses to simply hold larger cash balances.  Confounding the Keynesians is the potential outcome where P rises even with Q below capacity when M is increased if economic actors fear future inflation.  In fact, higher price levels can result even without a rise in M if V rises.  The most extreme case of this condition is hyperinflation, where V rises rapidly as households and businesses rush to convert cash to real goods that will hold their value.

Therefore, determining if there is an inflation problem from current policy is tricky because there is a psychological element that is difficult to estimate.  It is easy to measure money supply, output or price levels, but the psychology of velocity is hard to measure and potentially prone to sudden shifts.

Reframing the question can simplify this problem.  If a household receives a notable sum of money, let’s say, $10,000, what does it do with it?  If the householder fears future price increases, it would make sense to use that money to buy inventory.  In other words, they may take part of it to buy food, perhaps consumer durables, art, gold, or other items that might hold their value.  On the other hand, if there is little fear of future inflation, the household may be content to simply hold the cash as savings or place it in other financial assets.

One way to answer this question is to compare the money supply to gold prices.  If some money supply, say, M2, rises faster than gold, it would suggest that economic actors are not afraid of future inflation.  A rising ratio of M2/gold would be a positive signal for financial assets; on the other hand, a falling ratio would likely be bearish.  Now, it is possible that a contracting money supply could distort the measure.  The monthly change in M2 since 1959 has only been negative 4.4% of the time.  Over that same time frame, it has never been negative on a yearly change basis.

Anyone familiar with financial market history can note that equity markets tend to outperform when this ratio rises, but equities tend to suffer when the ratio declines.  The ratio captures that when the supply of money is rising relative to gold (the proxy for real assets), economic actors tend to put this excess liquidity into financial assets.  A declining ratio suggests a preference for real assets.

In general, the ratio has been mostly steady for the past four years.  Despite a rally in gold, the ratio hasn’t declined.  Put another way, we haven’t seen households and firms show significant inflation fears despite a massive increase in liquidity.  Gold prices have been mostly rising with M2 but not accelerating faster than the money supply.  And so, in a portfolio, gold has been acting as a diversification asset without unduly hampering performance.  As the Fed has boosted liquidity, funds have been going into both stocks and gold at a pace where neither has signaled a particular bias.  If inflation fears escalate, we would expect this ratio to decline and equity markets to show signs of weakness.  But, for now, easy monetary policy is supportive for both gold and equities.

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Weekly Energy Update (July 16, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Here is an updated crude oil price chart.  The oil market has stabilized at higher levels after April’s historic collapse.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories reversed last week’s unexpected rise, with stockpiles falling 7.5 mb compared to forecasts of a 1.8 mb draw.  The SPR added 0.1 mb this week.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 11.0 mbpd.  Exports rose 0.2 mbpd, while imports declined 1.8 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 0.6%, near expectations.

High negative readings continue for unaccounted-for crude oil, although they are higher than what we saw a few weeks ago.

Unaccounted-for crude oil is a balancing item in the weekly energy balance sheet.  To make the data balance, this line item is a plug figure, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t matter.  This week’s number is -768 kbpd.  This is a large number and suggests the DOE is still struggling to figure out what accounts for the missing barrels.  We suspect much of it is caused by the DOE overestimating production.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s data showed a decline in crude oil stockpiles.  We are well into the seasonal draw for crude oil.  By this time of the summer, we have usually seen a 5% decline in commercial storage.  The fact that inventories are mostly steady is a bearish factor.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $30.14; using the euro/price model, fair value is $53.25.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $40.42.  We are starting to see a wide divergence between the EUR and oil inventory models.  The weakness we are seeing in the dollar, which we believe may have “legs,” is bullish for crude oil and may overcome the bearish oil inventory overhang.

Gasoline consumption remains below average, but the recovery is unmistakable.

The oil and gas industry is facing a disinvestment movement from college and university endowments, driven by student activism.  In general, such movements tend to gain momentum when the cost of the action is low.  Current low oil prices make activism toward disinvestment relatively costless.  This action could become difficult to sustain if oil prices (and gasoline prices) rise in the future.

In light of last spring’s oil price collapse, the CFTC is getting involved in commodity ETPs.  The commodity regulator is pushing for greater disclosure of activity.  The ETPs were widely blamed for the negative prices for WTI (see the chart above) seen in April.

The recent rise in VAT in Saudi Arabia is calling into question the kingdom’s social contract.  For years, the House of Saud offered Saudi citizens a deal—the government would provide a deep safety net in return for not having a direct voice in how citizens are governed.  In essence, the Saudis created a rentier state that was funded from oil revenues.  In an attempt to diversify the economy in a period of low oil prices, CP Salman has moved to raise taxes to restore some of the lost revenue.  What remains to be seen is if common Saudis will tolerate “taxation without representation.”

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Shining a Light on Indexes: How to Help Investors Better Achieve Their Goals (July 2020)

A Report from the Value Equities Investment Committee | PDF

“What is the appropriate benchmark for your strategy?”

This is a question frequently posed to an investment manager. Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to gain a solid understanding of the strategy by examining the manager’s investment philosophy and how it is applied in the investment process, and, more specifically, how it is expected to perform throughout a full business cycle.

At Confluence Investment Management, our investment philosophy for the domestic value equity strategies was adopted in mid-1994 at our predecessor firm and continues to be implemented more than 25 years later. The approach is focused on understanding and valuing individual businesses with the emphasis on owning competitively advantaged businesses at attractive prices. It is a fundamental approach that views risk as losing money, or more precisely, the probability of a permanent loss of capital. Today, it is the foundation for all six of our domestic value equity strategies.

It is an approach borne from the belief that as investment managers we manage risk, not returns.  Returns are the byproduct of an investment process and how well it is deployed. Our philosophy and process are centered around individual businesses with the intent of owning a collection of superior entities in a concentrated manner and then allowing them to compound over long periods.

Our energy has never been focused on managing to a benchmark or index as it is not additive to the investment process. Furthermore, we do not view tracking error as a measure of risk. Quite the contrary, active investors should welcome tracking error as it is the only way to outperform an index. This is not to say that we are not mindful of the indexes; we are, and it is perfectly reasonable to compare us to an index. But it is equally important to understand how an index is constructed to better understand the applications and limitations when using that index as a benchmark to measure an investment manager.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – Why China and India Are Fighting (July 13, 2020)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

In a bizarre confrontation last month, Chinese and Indian soldiers fought a pitched battle in near total darkness high up in the Himalayan mountains.  If that wasn’t strange enough, the weapons used were merely fists, stones, police batons, and wooden clubs wrapped in barbed wire or studded with nails.  At least 20 of the Indian soldiers died, many after falling down steep mountain ravines or freezing to death in the cold.  An unknown number of Chinese troops also died.  In spite of the primitive weapons used and the relatively small number of casualties, the skirmish created a major crisis and risk of war between Asia’s two nuclear behemoths.

In this report, we explain how the confrontation came about and why it was waged in such a primitive way.  More importantly, we examine the tensions building between China and India and how the skirmish could cause them to spiral out of control.  We also outline how things could develop from here and the likely ramifications for investors.

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Asset Allocation Weekly (July 10, 2020)

by Asset Allocation Committee

Equity markets, to a greater or lesser degree, tend to reflect social and political trends.  After all, the mood of investors plays a role in the propensity to move money into stock markets.  Unfortunately, the impact of social or political events on equities tends to be a mixed bag.  The chart below shows over 120 incidents from 1896; some events were notable, while others had only a modest impact.

(Source: https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-dows-tumultuous-120-year-history-in-one-chart-2017-03-23)

What is notable about this chart is that some factors can be bullish, such as the creation of the assembly line or the introduction of the internet.  Some events would seem to be negative, but the impact is fleeting, whereas other negative occurrences have a much more significant impact.

The U.S. is experiencing a wave of civil rights protests similar to what occurred in 1968 (#73 on the above chart).  On its face, civil unrest would seem to be a negative factor for investor confidence.  However, at least initially, the widespread protests may lead to a policy response that is supportive for equity prices.

One of the effects of the 1968 civil unrest was the Humphrey/Hawkins Full Employment Act.  The law required policymakers to strive for full employment.  In fact, the bill had four policy goals—full employment, a balanced fiscal budget, a balanced trade account and price stability.  As anyone with a modicum of formal economic training can note, these four goals are not necessarily consistent.  In other words, achieving full employment and price stability or a balanced budget may not be possible.  Therefore, policymakers had to decide which goal was preeminent.  The bill was passed in 1978; by the time it was enacted, concerns about full employment had been supplanted by inflation worries so the bill never really lived up to its sponsors’ goal of full employment.  However, it is this bill that requires the Fed chair to semiannually travel to Capitol Hill to talk about monetary policy and the economy.

Forty-two years after the passage of Humphrey/Hawkins, there is growing evidence that the Federal Reserve is focusing on employment, especially minority employment.  Spearheading the effort is Atlanta FRB President Bostic, who recently penned a letter on racism.  But, beyond what the Federal Reserve system can do with its own hiring and its regulatory power over lending, there is a question about what monetary policy can do about this issue.  After all, setting interest rates is a blunt policy instrument.  In his recent press conference, Chair Powell noted that minority unemployment had declined markedly before the pandemic, but has risen since the recession occurred.  In his opinion, the best way to boost minority employment is to foster a strong labor market.

This chart shows the unemployment rate for African Americans and Caucasians.  The rate for the former is persistently above the latter, but what is notable is that the longer an expansion lasts the narrower the difference between the two series becomes.  If the Fed is serious about reducing African American unemployment, one of the important policy goals would be to extend the expansion as long as possible.

To some extent, this is nothing new; monetary policy isn’t designed to end an expansion prematurely.  But, this information signals to investors that the Fed has yet another reason to preserve an expansion, which is supportive for equities—unless it becomes apparent, at some point in the future, that the FOMC would be willing to allow inflation to rise above target to preserve the expansion.  In general, for the past 33 years, major declines in equity markets have been tied to recessions.  That is true, in part, because the Federal Reserve has earned inflation-fighting credibility.  It remains to be seen whether what we are observing now represents a more notable shift away from inflation suppression.

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Weekly Energy Update (July 9, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA

Here is an updated crude oil price chart.  The oil market has stabilized at higher levels after April’s historic collapse.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose well above market expectations, with stockpiles rising 5.3 mb compared to forecasts of a 3.0 mb draw.  The SPR added 0.6 mb this week.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 11.0 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.7 mbpd, while imports rose 1.4 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 2.0%, much higher than expected.

High negative readings for unaccounted-for crude oil continues, although it is higher than what we saw a few weeks ago.

Unaccounted-for crude oil is a balancing item in the weekly energy balance sheet.  To make the data balance, this line item is a plug figure, but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t matter.  This week’s number is -765 kbpd.  This is a large number and suggests the DOE is still struggling to figure out what accounts for the missing barrels.  We suspect much of it is caused by the DOE overestimating production.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s data showed a rise in crude oil stockpiles.  We are well into the seasonal draw for crude oil.  The continued rise in inventories is bearish for prices.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $27.81; using the euro/price model, fair value is $52.56.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $40.29.  We are starting to see a wide divergence between the EUR and oil inventory models.  The weakness we are seeing in the dollar, which we believe may have “legs,” is bullish for crude oil and may overcome the bearish oil inventory overhang.

Gasoline consumption remains below average, but the recovery is unmistakable.

As the first chart shows, oil prices have recovered rather nicely from the epic collapse in April.  However, as prices have firmed, trouble is brewing within OPEC.  Saudi Arabia is threatening another market share war if smaller OPEC producers fail to meet the production reduction pledges.  Will Riyadh follow through?  We doubt it because it would disrupt U.S./Saudi relations.  At the same time, the Saudis would probably prefer to keep prices lower for longer to crush higher-cost producers and gain market share.  They just can’t figure out how to do that and maintain good relations with Washington (as an aside: the KSA may have an incentive to renew the market share war with a Biden presidency as it is less likely the Biden administration would ride to the rescue of the U.S. oil industry).

Democrats are proposing climate change policies that would bring zero emissions by 2050 and electric-only cars by 2035.  We see little chance this actually becomes law as whoever is in the White House will be wrestling with high unemployment instead.

China has been absorbing crude oil at a fast pace, taking advantage of low prices.  However, this source of demand may be waning in light of reports that China’s oil storage is nearing capacity.  This storage issue is colliding with China’s pledges to buy U.S. energy as part of the Phase One trade deal.  It is becoming increasingly unlikely that China will meet its pledge.

Natural gas prices continue to languish despite summertime temperatures in much of the U.S.  It’s not just domestic demand that is a problem; global consumption of LNG is down as well.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Geopolitics of the Eurobond (June 29, 2020)

by Bill O’Grady | PDF

(N.B.  Due to the Independence Day holiday, the next report will be published on July 13.)

A global hegemon provides two broad categories of public goods.  The first is security.  A successful hegemon enforces some degree of global security as it has the ability to project power globally.  This power projection ostensibly prevents regional wars from becoming world wars.  Another way of thinking about hegemony is that if a world war occurs, it is evidence of hegemonic failure.  In addition to war suppression, the hegemon’s global reach gives it the capability to secure sea lanes, which facilitates global trade.

The second public good is financial.  The hegemon provides the reserve currency which enables global trade and investment.  The reserve currency nation must have two characteristics to be a successful provider of the reserve currency.  First, it must be willing to run persistent current account deficits.  It is through trade that the rest of the world acquires the reserve currency. Persistent current account deficits put great strain on the labor markets of the hegemon and require a strong commitment from the reserve currency nation to absorb these imports.  Second, it must have deep financial markets and an instrument that is considered safe and widely available so nations that accumulate the reserve currency can use this instrument to hold this saving until it is needed for trade or direct investment.

If the U.S. is going to be replaced as a hegemon, the successor will need to fill these two roles.  Currently, there is no nation that is capable or willing to fully provide these public goods.  However, it is not impossible to consider a situation where a partial replacement occurs.  Such outcomes have occurred before.  By the late 1800s, Britain realized that it could not defend any of its colonies in the Western Hemisphere from a determined American attack.  The U.S. economy was too well developed and its navy and army too large; the costs of defending Canada, for example, would have been excessive.  So, quietly, the British ceded regional hegemony, at least in terms of security, to the U.S.  That allowed Westminster to focus on the other growing threat, Germany.  In the current environment, the U.S. could cede a sphere of influence to China.  It is arguable that the U.S. would like to see a regional hegemon arise in the Middle East to allow America to reduce its security burden there as well.

Something similar could occur on the reserve currency front as well.  Some economists, notably Barry Eichengreen, have argued that there is the potential for multiple reserve currencies.  Although we have had doubts about this possibility, recent developments have led us to consider the possibility that the euro could become a serious competitor for the dollar as a reserve asset.  That doesn’t mean the euro would replace the dollar as the reserve currency, but it would mean the euro could be a parallel reserve currency and offer competition to the dollar.

The most recent development that could create potential competition for the dollar’s reserve status is the proposed new financial instrument designed to fund Europe’s recovery from the pandemic.  The proposal evolved from a plan developed by Germany and France to create a €500 billion recovery fund.  European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen expanded the proposal, increasing it to €750 billion.  But the key element of the proposal is a specific bond backed by the full faith and credit of the European Union.  The bond service would be tied to several EU-wide revenue sources, including a proposed digital tax, a carbon border tax and fees on transportation.

The proposed plan still requires approval by all members of the EU.  The “frugal four”—Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden—could still scuttle the proposal.  But, Germany’s support is a reversal of its longstanding opposition to EU debt mutualization and will probably be enough to sway the opposition toward accepting the program.

The prospect of debt mutualization creates competition for the dollar’s reserve status.  The EU doesn’t fulfill the other requirements for hegemony; its military strength has atrophied, and it has not shown a willingness to run persistent current account deficits.  Nevertheless, a mutualized debt instrument does make the euro a much more attractive currency for reserve purposes.

In this report, we will examine why an alternative reserve currency might be attractive for several countries.  An analysis of why Germany has changed its position on debt mutualization will follow.  As always, we will conclude with market ramifications.

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