Daily Comment (October 25, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady, Kaisa Stucke, and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] Overnight news flow was unusually low.  Earnings are generally coming in favorably as energy companies recover.  Equity markets remain relatively firm.

The new money market rules officially went into effect on Oct. 14th and, now that they are in place, the short-term money markets appear to be stabilizing.

(Source: Bloomberg)

Over the past year, the three-month LIBOR rate has increased by over 50 bps.  This is a significant tightening of credit which occurred due to changes in regulation.  As we have noted before, there were two notable changes to money market (MMK) rules.  First, for institutional prime money market funds, the net asset value (NAV) will no longer be fixed at $1.00 per share (meaning a money market fund could “break the buck”).  Second, prime and municipal money market funds can now temporarily halt withdrawals during periods of market turmoil, denying investors access to their cash for up to 10 days.

The new rules have led to a massive shift in money market fund allocation; over the past year, more than $1.0 trillion has exited prime money market funds and shifted to government funds, which do not have a floating NAV or any restrictions on access to cash.

We suspect that the flows away from prime MMK and into government MMK are probably close to ending.  What bears watching next will be the impact of projected FOMC tightening in December.

The chart above shows the spread between three-month cash deposit rates and the effective fed funds rate.  Currently, the spread is over 47 bps, the widest since the financial crisis.  If the FOMC raises rates and this spread is maintained, the market impact will be much stronger than the Fed probably expects.  In other words, the rate hike will be larger than it would have been prior to the change in regulation.  If, on the other hand, the spread narrows after the Fed raises rates, the market impact from Fed tightening will be less of an issue.  This is one of the factors we will be tracking after the next policy tightening.  Our expectation is that this spread is a permanent change due to the regulatory adjustments and so borrowing rates have already increased by 30 bps from a year ago.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Geopolitics of the Reserve Currency: Part 1 (October 24, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady

One of the more interesting developments in this presidential political cycle has been the near total abandonment of free trade.  Neither presidential candidate supports the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the topic of last week’s report.  The primary reason for this backlash against free trade is the fear that U.S. employment is adversely affected by trade.

Some of the earliest work in economics was on trade.  For example, the trade theory of comparative advantage was developed by David Ricardo in 1817.  With perhaps the exception of Marxism,[1] most economists assume that trade is positive for economies.  Most polls seem to suggest Americans still support free trade, but clearly the political class has concluded that supporting free trade is a risky stance.  So, how did we get here?

We believe that the general misunderstanding of the U.S. superpower role is behind the backlash against free trade.  In pure theory, it’s hard to argue against free trade.  Most economists adhere to the position that efficiency is an undisputable good.  However, the way trade works in the real world isn’t exactly how it works in the classroom.  Often, political pundits will contend that the growing rejection of free trade is due to the fact that the benefits are broad but the costs fall disproportionately on workers who are adversely affected directly by import competition.  Although this is a partial explanation, it is critical to understand that the global hegemon faces specific costs that are generally unappreciated.

In this report, we will begin with a narrative describing the use of the reserve currency in trade.  Next, we will offer a short history of the dollar’s evolution as a reserve currency.  In the next section, we will examine the reserve currency as a global public good, provided by the superpower.  Next week, we will discuss the economics and geopolitics of the reserve currency and, as is our usual fashion, we will conclude with potential market ramifications.

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[1] Some Marxists hold that trade is a form of imperialism and is another tool for capital to subjugate labor.

Daily Comment (October 24, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] Good ISM data from Europe (see below) lifted global equity markets.  Mergers are another factor affecting financial markets, with the biggest being Time Warner (89.48, +6.84) and ATT (37.49, -1.15).  This one is getting lots of political attention.  Donald Trump has already indicated that his administration would kill the deal.  Sen. Clinton’s campaign issued a statement calling for caution and scrutiny.  And, Sen. Sanders has come out saying “no way” would he approve the merger.  The persistent theme of populism v. establishment appears to be playing out in this merger.

On the election front, it is becoming a foregone conclusion that Donald Trump will lose in historical fashion.  We remain unconvinced.  Although we still expect Sen. Clinton to win, we suspect the vote will be much closer than current polls suggest.  However, we also warn that focusing solely on the presidential race runs the danger of missing major cultural, social and political shifts.  The country is dividing along populist and establishment lines.  Further evidence of this split comes from reports suggesting that House Majority Leader Ryan (R-WI) is facing a leadership challenge from the Freedom Caucus, the populist GOP House faction.  According to Forbes,[1] it is doubtful that the Freedom Caucus can muster enough votes to actually oust Ryan.  However, Ryan was never all that keen on the job anyway and has presidential ambitions.  Ryan, like his predecessor, will probably be forced to cobble together a voting bloc of establishment Democrats and Republicans to pass any legislation, and such moves will make him unpopular.  If the Freedom Caucus makes conditions difficult enough for Ryan, he may just resign, throwing the House into disorder during the lame duck session.

A couple of interesting trends appear to be developing in China.  First, the weekend NYT reported that the anti-corruption campaign is evolving into a loyalty policing campaign instead.  The CPC Central committee begins meetings today and part of Chairman Xi’s agenda is tighter control and management of the party.  Displays of loyalty are now being demanded.  Another element that appears to be emerging is that Xi is pressing for an end to mandatory retirement rules, which would allow his most trusted advisor, Wang Qishan, who runs the anti-corruption office, to remain in power.  Second, there are hints that Xi is also pressing for a third term as leader of China, breaking the tradition established by Deng.  The post-Mao rulers did not want to create another dynastic leadership structure and thus implemented an informal two-term limit.  Xi has not indicated who will succeed him, something that would be required over the next year if he does not intend to run for a third term.  Loyalty oaths would likely support the process of grabbing a third term.

Finally, Iraq is indicating that it will not participate in OPEC output cuts, citing the fact that it is engaged in a war with IS and needs all the revenue it can muster to defeat this foe.  With Iran refusing to participate as well, and Russian compliance doubtful, Saudi Arabia is facing the unpleasant prospect of returning to the role of swing producer which will effectively force it to lose market share.  If OPEC is unable to negotiate a deal, oil prices are vulnerable to a break into the $40 to $45 per barrel range.

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[1] http://www.forbes.com/sites/stancollender/2016/10/23/paul-ryan-could-be-ousted-in-3-weeks-throw-the-lame-duck-into-chaos/#6b6022c77bba

Asset Allocation Weekly (October 21, 2016)

by Asset Allocation Committee

The dollar has been strengthening over the past few weeks; we believe much of this appreciation is due to expectations of tighter monetary policy.  Fed funds futures suggest that there is a 60+% chance of a rate hike at the December FOMC meeting.  Although the FOMC is divided and there are prominent doves that oppose any tightening, the consensus on the committee seems to be leaning toward a 25 bps increase.  However, we also suspect that the next hike (following December) will be delayed for several months.  In other words, to placate the doves on the FOMC, Chair Yellen will need to promise a very slow path; to satisfy the hawks, she will need to raise rates in December.

There are at least four different ways to value currencies—relative inflation, relative interest rates, trade performance and relative productivity.  As a general rule, if any of the four performed consistently, the other three wouldn’t exist.  Of the four, relative inflation, so-called “purchasing power parity,” is the oldest.  Although most of the time it doesn’t give strong signals, it does tend to indicate when a currency pair is at an extreme.

This chart shows the purchasing power parity relationship between the dollar and the D-mark.  We use the legacy German currency and calculate its currency value based on its conversion rate at the time the euro was introduced.  We do this for two reasons; first, we have a consistent inflation history with Germany, and second, Germany is the dominant economy in the Eurozone, meaning the comparison with Germany is likely representative for the leading nations in the Eurozone.  In our opinion, parity models are only useful at extremes.  When the relationship becomes more than one standard error from parity, it tends to signal a problem with valuation.  Currently, the dollar is overvalued by more than one standard error.  There have only been two other periods when the dollar was stronger based on this measure.  And, we note that this degree of overvaluation has been in place since January 2015, indicating it has been overvalued for a rather long time.

It appears that this deviation from fair value is due to divergent monetary policy.  The spread between German and U.S. three-month LIBOR rates has widened in favor of the U.S.

These charts show the same data in two forms, a simple line graph and a scatter plot.  In 2014, as the markets began to discount future FOMC tightening, the LIBOR rate began to rise modestly.  At the same time, German rates fell sharply as the ECB tried to address deflation and weak economic growth; in fact, German three-month LIBOR remains in negative territory.

Although interest rate differentials are favoring the U.S., it is interesting to note that the explanatory power of interest rate differentials in the purchasing power parity model is modest at best.  In other words, in relation to the past 36 years, the current spread in interest rates should not be having this degree of impact.  The current spread is having an expanded impact mostly due to the current level of low rates.[1]

Complicating matters is that the U.S. three-month LIBOR rate has been rising due to changes in U.S. money market regulation.  There has been a sustained exodus of liquidity out of institutional prime money market funds and this has led to higher three-month LIBOR rates.  We doubt this level of LIBOR will be sustained over time, and so the U.S. side of the interest rate spread should ease.  In addition, German LIBOR rates have been negative for the past few months.  We doubt the ECB will maintain negative rates much longer and instead use QE for monetary stimulus.  Thus, we would expect the spread to narrow in the coming weeks.

In addition, there has been a marked change in market expectations toward FOMC monetary policy.

This chart shows the spread between the fed funds target and the two-year deferred Eurodollar futures contract.  The latter shows the market’s projection for future three-month LIBOR rates.  For much of the past two years, Eurodollar futures were projecting a terminal rate for fed funds of 1.50%; that has now declined to around 75 bps.  Simply put, the financial markets expect perhaps one or two more rate hikes over the next two years.  If this is all we get, we would expect the rate differentials between Germany and the U.S. to steadily contract.

It is worth noting that the current strength of the dollar appears based on the policy spread in 2014-15.  If so, once the market adjusts to a lower terminal fed funds target, we would expect some dollar weakness to develop.  In the second half of next year, a USD/EUR of 1.25 (a USD/DMK of 0.6410) would be likely.  A weaker dollar would be supportive for equities and commodities and bearish for debt and foreign equity markets, although this weakness would be partially offset by stronger foreign currencies.  In addition, emerging equities usually strengthen relative to developed markets when the dollar weakens.  Thus, in our asset allocation models, we have been slowly adding commodities and emerging equities to portfolios.  If the dollar weakens in 2017, we would likely build on these initial positions.

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[1] Since 1970, the average spread between the U.S. and Germany is 69 bps, suggesting the current spread of 119 bps is rather wide.  However the standard deviation is 235 bps, meaning the current spread is within the normal range.

Daily Comment (October 21, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] The dollar is higher this morning on speculation that the Fed interest rate policy will diverge from the easy monetary policies implemented in Europe and Asia.  The dollar rose yesterday and the euro fell as investors interpreted ECB President Draghi’s comments as an indication that stimulus policies will continue.  The dollar rose to its highest level against the euro since March.  As the chart below indicates, the dollar index, in general, has been rising since reaching its most recent low in the beginning of May.  Central bank policy divergence alongside relatively strong domestic economic growth have squeezed the dollar higher.  In turn, the higher dollar will likely dampen domestic exports.

(Source: Bloomberg)

The currency also reached a six-year high against the yuan after the PBOC weakened its daily reference rate by the most since August.  The chart below shows the onshore yuan rate (the chart is in yuan per dollar, so a higher reading means a weaker yuan).

(Source: Bloomberg)

We would like to take a closer look at yesterday’s Philadelphia Fed business outlook index.  The overall level weakened to 9.7 in October from 12.8 the month before, beating estimates of 5.0.  Details of the report reveal a generally improving picture, with new orders and shipments improving for October.  Additionally, the six-month forecast indicates an expansion of almost all measures.  The chart below shows the six-month average of the index, a more stable measure of manufacturing health.  The average continued improving in October, coming in at +4.1.

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Daily Comment (October 20, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] ECB President Mario Draghi is giving his press conference as we write this.  The ECB maintained its benchmark lending rate at zero, the deposit rate at -0.4% and the asset purchases at €80 bn a month.  Draghi said that the central bank expects interest rates to remain at presently low rates or lower.  He was asked if the committee would consider lowering rates in December, which Draghi deemed to be possible if the data calls for it, especially the strength of the economy and inflation.  Updated economic projections are also due for the ECB’s December meeting, thus providing more color on the effect of the current interest rate and stimulus policies.

The current ECB QE program is slated to end in March 2017, and what’s interesting is that Draghi indicated that there was no discussion during this week’s meetings of continuing or extending the stimulus program.  At the same time, Draghi said that he would not expect an abrupt end to the QE program, but that a tapering is more likely when the Governing Council decides to withdraw stimulus.  The stimulus package will be maintained until there is “a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation” consistent with the ECB’s inflation aim.  Inflation has remained mild in the Eurozone, having remained below the central bank’s target rate of 2.0% since 2013.  The chart below shows the annual change in the headline CPI and the ECB’s target rate.  Although CPI has picked up modestly recently, it still remains below the target rate.

The bank expects inflation to move close to the target rate by early 2019.  Given the lack of inflationary pressures and the ECB’s own inflation expectations, we would expect the QE program to remain in place until at least 2019.

Markets were expecting these outcomes; despite an initial drop in European equities, risk markets have bounced back.  The chart below shows the intraday chart of the euro, which spiked initially when the press conference started but has moved lower since.

(Source: Bloomberg)

Additionally, the chart below shows the EuroStoxx 50, which fell after comments from Draghi that the future of the stimulus package was not even discussed, but equities have rebounded since.

(Source: Bloomberg)

Regarding the U.S. presidential race, the third and final debate was held last night.  The debate focused on immigration, the Supreme Court and the Second Amendment.  It is unclear whether either candidate was able to persuade the undecided voters.

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Daily Comment (October 19, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] It’s a relatively quiet morning on the macro front.  Chinese data came in on forecast to slightly weaker than expected.  While GDP rose 6.7% annually, as expected, industrial production rose 6.1% annually, weaker than expected.

Yesterday afternoon, the Treasury International Capital (TIC) net monthly flows report was released.  The TIC report shows almost all international capital flows in and out of the country, including Treasury, bond, equity and other financial instrument flows.  Total net TIC inflows rose $73.8 bn in August compared to the $118.0 bn purchases seen in July.  At the same time, net long-term TIC flows, which mostly include Treasuries, rose $48.3 bn compared to the $102.8 bn.  Historically, long-term TIC flows increase alongside market volatility and falling international equity sentiment.  August’s moderating inflows indicate that international sentiment is improving as fewer investors are seeking the safety of Treasuries.

September domestic housing data disappointed this morning, with multi-family housing starts falling 40.8% annually (see below).  Despite continued strength in single-family starts, housing in general is shaping up to be a drag on economic growth.  The chart below shows the Atlanta Fed GDPNow series.  It does not yet include this morning’s housing data.  We would expect the weak housing data to add to the lower-trending GDPNow forecast.

The chart below shows the revisions and contributions to the forecast.  Before the starts data, residential investment was the second largest drag on the economy after net exports.

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Daily Comment (October 18, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] Equity markets are enjoying a strong morning as financial markets prepare for a modest credit tightening in December.  Chair Yellen’s recent comments about allowing the economy to run hot were somewhat offset by Vice Chair Fischer yesterday when he cautioned against letting the economy and inflation move too far above target.  Overall, our take is that we will get a hike in December and maybe one move next year.  If our outlook is correct, it would be supportive for U.S. equities as it would probably lead to a weakening dollar.  That probably isn’t the path in the short run, but should emerge later in 2017.

With the release of CPI data, we can update our versions of the Mankiw rule model.  This model attempts to determine the neutral rate for fed funds, which is a rate that is neither accommodative nor stimulative.  Mankiw’s model is a variation of the Taylor Rule.  The latter measures the neutral rate by core CPI and the difference between GDP and potential GDP, which is an estimate of slack in the economy.  Potential GDP cannot be directly observed, only estimated.  To overcome this problem, Mankiw used the unemployment rate as a proxy for economic slack.  We have created three versions of the rule, one that follows the original construction by using the unemployment rate as a measure of slack, a second that uses the employment/population ratio and a third using involuntary part-time workers as a percentage of the total labor force.

Using the unemployment rate, the neutral rate is now 3.55%.  Although this rate is well above fair value, it has dropped 27 bps over the past month as unemployment rises and the core CPI dips.  Using the employment/population ratio, the neutral rate is 1.31%, down 10 bps.  Finally, using involuntary part-time employment, the neutral rate is 2.87%, down 9 bps.  To some extent, the Mankiw models, based off the Phillips Curve, do suggest the FOMC is behind the curve but the degree of stimulus has actually eased over the past month.  Thus, the case for a rate hike has somewhat weakened, to an extent.  However, we don’t expect this will change expectations for a December hike.

Saudi Arabia is pricing its bond issuance this morning.  Although a successful bond issuance is neutral for oil prices, a case could be made that the kingdom is selling bonds to offset the loss of revenue that would come from cutting output, assuming prices don’t rise.  Of course, if the demand curve is more elastic than expected, we could see the revenue loss reduced.  We do note that, historically, commodity demand curves are price inelastic in the short run, meaning that a price cut leads to a loss of revenue.

As noted below, China’s borrowing is increasing at a rather fast clip.  There is a lot of commentary emerging on China’s debt growth and its sustainability.  We have deep reservations about China’s ability to grow at 6% without expanding debt to dangerous levels.  Perhaps the one saving grace for China is that the government can more easily assign potential losses because it’s a dictatorship.  Debt growth of this magnitude is bullish for global growth in the short run, but not in the long run.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The TTIP and the TPP: An Update (October 17, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady

In January 2014, we first discussed the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).[1]  Both pacts have moved from obscure trade proposals to highly controversial political issues.  In this report, we will begin by discussing the nations involved.  We will examine overall details of the proposals, focusing on how they are different from traditional trade agreements.  From there, we will present an analysis of the controversy surrounding these proposals.  A look at the geopolitical aims of the agreements will follow and the likelihood that these treaties will be enacted.  As always, we will conclude with potential market ramifications.

The TTIP and the TPP
The TTIP will include the U.S. and all the nations of the EU.[2]  The TPP, which initially started with four nations, Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore, has expanded to 12 nations.[3]  Taiwan expressed interest in the TPP last year, but it is unclear whether the current configuration is comfortable with engaging in the age-old dispute over Chinese sovereignty.  South Korea has also decided to hold talks about joining the TPP group.  Conspicuous in its absence is China.

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[1] See WGR, The TTIP and the TPP, 1/27/2014.

[2] Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the U.K.

[3] Australia, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, U.S., Vietnam, Chile, Brunei, Singapore and New Zealand.