Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Ukraine War at Six Months: Some Reflections (September 12, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady | PDF

On February 24, Russian forces entered Ukraine.  Despite warnings from U.S. intelligence about an invasion, the general consensus was that Moscow was merely threatening to act.  Thus, when Russia invaded, Europe was mostly caught by surprise.  Much of what followed was also unexpected.

As we reach the six-month mark of the conflict, we believe it’s worth taking some time to discuss what has surprised us about the war so far, some of the key risks going forward, and the most likely outcome of the conflict.  We will also touch on the lasting changes this war will cause and one important narrative that will likely lose its power.  We will close with our usual look at market ramifications.

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Note: There is no accompanying Geopolitical Podcast this week.
Previous episodes are always available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Storm Warning (September 6, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

Throughout this year, there has been much talk (and confusion) about recession.  Officially, the National Bureau of Economic Research is the formal arbiter of recession.  This private group of economists assesses when there is a broad-based decline in economic activity and when that activity recovers.  It then tells us when the recession began and when it ended.  It’s important to note that it can be months after the recovery is underway that the recession is made official.  The NBER isn’t making real-time calls on the business cycle.  Thus, it’s never wrong, but it isn’t timely, either.

In the absence of an official designation, economists (and others) offer their insights as to whether the economy is in recession.  A common rule is that two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth signals a recession.  As rules go, it’s not a bad one as every time we have seen this measure met, a recession was usually underway.  But we have also had recessions where this rule was not triggered.  It’s also important to note that the historical data has been revised numerous times, and it is possible that we could see one or both negative quarters reversed.  Since the beginning of the year, a parade of pundits and economists have weighed in on the topic.  Our take has been that conditions are deteriorating, but we aren’t in recession…yet.

However, evidence is rapidly accumulating that a recession is on the horizon.  Since the business cycle is so important to financial markets, we use a wide variety of sources to update us on business conditions, some of which are protected by copyright.  Although we cannot disclose them publicly, we do note they are signaling a downturn.  We also have ones we can share and others we have created ourselves.  The following are a couple of useful charts.

The yield curve is considered the most reliable signal of the business cycle available.  Every inversion, where short-term interest rates rise above long-term interest rates, has preceded a downturn.  However, this statement does not delineate “which” yield curve should be the determining one.  After all, there are numerous permutations of yield curves available.  To resolve this issue, we have created an indicator that uses 10 different yield curves[1] and counts them as they invert.  Over the past 45 years, when seven curves have inverted, a recession always follows.  Currently, all 10 have inverted.  On average, a recession occurs in roughly 15 months with the fastest occurring in just eight months.

The following chart combines two indictors from the New York FRB and the Atlanta FRB.  The former (the red line on the chart) uses the yield curve, while the latter works off GDP (the blue line).  The New York FRB signals a recession with a reading greater than 40, whereas the Atlanta FRB trigger is a reading over 30.  Neither is signaling a downturn at the moment, but both are quite close to a recession signal.

Our best estimate is that a recession will likely be evident by late this year or, more likely, in Q1 2023.

The chart below shows weekly Friday closes for the S&P 500.  The lower line shows the index value compared to the previous peak.  The variance with recessions is notable.  In three of the four deep recessions, declines of around 50% occurred.  In normal recessions, the declines were usually less onerous, although the 1970 and 2001 recessions had rather sizeable pullbacks.  Most of the time, recessions coincide with weaker equity markets, but the degree of weakness varies.

In general, odds favor a normal recession (shown on the above chart with gray bars).  Deep recessions (shown with blue bars) tend to be characterized by unusual situations.  For example, the 1937 recession was caused by premature and excessively tight monetary and fiscal policy when the Fed raised rates and the Roosevelt administration tried to run fiscal surpluses.  The 1973 recession had an oil and geopolitical crisis.  The 1981 recession was characterized by extremely tight monetary policy to end persistent inflation, and the 2007 recession had a financial crisis.  Currently, the financial markets are not expecting any of these outcomes as monetary policy is expected to pivot quickly in response to a decline in growth, inflation is expected to moderate, and no financial or geopolitical crises are anticipated.  Obviously, vigilance is required, because bad recessions tend to be “black swan” sorts of events and the downside would be significant.  Given current geopolitical tensions and disruptions to supply chains, there is certainly a case to be made that the expected recession has the potential to be a deep one.  However, the more likely outcome is a milder downturn for equities.

With a 20% decline already recorded, there has been some discussion that a recession is already discounted.  Although this outcome is possible, we think that the earlier pullback was more of a reflection of the removal of extreme stimulus.  Thus, another “leg” lower when the recession arrives is more likely.  Currently, we think a drop to 3500 would not be unreasonable.

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[1] Specifically, we use the 10/1, 10/2, 10/3, 10/5, 5/1, 5/2, 5/3, 3/1, 3/2, and 2/1.

Weekly Energy Update (September 1, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(The Weekly Energy Update will not be published next week.  The report will return on September 15.)

Crude oil prices remain under pressure on fears of a deal with Iran and weakening economic growth.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 3.3 mb compared to a 2.5 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 3.1 mb, meaning the net draw was 6.4 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.2 mbpd to 12.0 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.8 mbpd, while imports were unchanged.  Refining activity rose 0.3% to 93.8% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Clearly, this year is deviating from the normal path of commercial inventory levels although the past months’ inventory changes are more consistent with seasonal behavior.  We will approach the usual seasonal trough for inventories in mid-September.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2003.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.69.

With so many crosscurrents in the oil markets, we are beginning to see some degree of normalization.  The inventory/EUR model suggests oil prices should be around $64 per barrel, so we are seeing about $24 of risk premium in the market.

Market news:

(Source:  Bloomberg)

 Geopolitical news:

 Alternative energy/policy news:

       (Source:  Axios)

    • One factor driving the price of EVs higher is the goal of giving the cars the same range as a gasoline powered vehicle. However, when “fill up” of electricity can be done daily in one’s garage, an EV with a much smaller range might be more practical for everyday use and be cheaper to make.
    • We remain bullish on metals required in the conversion away from fossil fuels because it doesn’t appear that the demand is impossible to fill. At the same time, miners continue to find that local opposition is delaying the building of new mines for the materials required for batteries.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Agricultural Commodities in the Evolving Geopolitical Blocs (August 29, 2022)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

As regular readers of this report will know, Confluence has long predicted that as the United States steps back from its traditional role as global hegemon, the world will become much less globalized and countries will coalesce into at least two rival geopolitical and economic blocs—one led by the U.S. and one led by China.  In our report from May 9, 2022, we described the results of our recent study that aimed to predict which countries will end up in each of the evolving blocs.  Following that, in our report from June 6, 2022, we showed how key mineral commodities are unevenly distributed among the evolving blocs, and what that might mean for geopolitics and investment strategy.

In this report, we dive even deeper into the differences between the evolving blocs by looking closely at the international trade in key agricultural commodities within and between the groups.  We explore what those differences and relationships might mean for geopolitics going forward, especially regarding the rivalry between the U.S. and China.  We conclude with a discussion of the implications for investors.

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Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

Business Cycle Report (August 25, 2022)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

The Confluence Diffusion Index declined for the third consecutive month. The latest report showed that seven out of 11 benchmarks are in expansion territory. The diffusion index declined from +0.6364 to +0.3939 but remains above the recession signal of +0.2500.

  • Poor economic data weighed on financial market indicators
  • Goods production slowed due to a labor shortage and a decrease in business sentiment.
  • Labor conditions remain strong but show signs of softening.

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.

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Weekly Energy Update (August 25, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices remain under pressure on fears of a deal with Iran and weakening economic growth.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 3.3 mb compared to a 2.5 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 8.1 mb, meaning the net draw was 11.4 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.2 mbpd to 12.0 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.8 mbpd, while imports were unchanged.  Refining activity rose 0.3% to 93.8% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Clearly, this year is deviating from the normal path of commercial inventory levels although the past two weeks are consistent with seasonal behavior.  We will approach the usual seasonal trough for inventories in mid-September.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2003.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $106.51.

With so many crosscurrents in the oil markets, we are beginning to see some degree of normalization.  The inventory/EUR model suggests oil prices should be around $64 per barrel, so we are seeing about $24 of risk premium in the market.

Market news:

 (Source:  Strategas)

 Geopolitical news:

 Alternative energy/policy news:

(Source:  Adam Tooze)

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The Inflation Surprise (August 22, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

July inflation came in below expectations.  On a yearly basis, the market expected an overall rate of 8.7%, while the actual reading was 8.5%.  For core CPI, the actual was 5.9% compared to expectations of 6.1%.  Perhaps the most bullish part of the report was the monthly change, where the overall rate was unchanged compared to June and the core rose by 0.3% compared to expectations of a 0.5% rise.  This was the first monthly reading for the overall rate that was zero or less since May 2020.

The reaction of financial markets was swift and bullish.  The S&P 500 rose over 2% on Wednesday, August 10.  The dollar fell, commodities mostly rose, and the short end of the yield curve rallied.  Why the strong reaction?  The July data was the first time in months we have seen a modest rise in inflation and there is hope that we may be past “peak inflation.”  This hope may be fulfilled.  It’s clear the U.S. economy is slowing and there is evidence that supply chains are slowly improving.

Is this optimism justified?  Although the news on inflation was positive, comparing the policy rate relative to CPI and unemployment suggests the FOMC still has a long way to go before achieving a neutral rate.

In the above chart, the independent variable is CPI less the unemployment rate.  The blue line shows the difference from the model’s estimation of what the policy rate should be based on the difference between CPI and unemployment.  Since 1957, the Federal Reserve has never conducted a policy this easy.  Although recent tightening has somewhat narrowed the gap, the FOMC needs to see either a rise in unemployment or a sharp drop in inflation.

Financial markets, in contrast, are anticipating an end to this tightening cycle.  Comparing the implied interest rate from the Eurodollar futures market, two years into the future, suggests the Fed will be easing in the coming months.

Eurodollar futures are already projecting a lower rate over the next two years.  We have not reached the extremes of earlier tightening cycles, but another rate hike of 50 bps will push the deviation into easing territory.

So, why the difference in the two models?  The financial markets are anticipating a change in economic conditions, either falling inflation, rising unemployment, or both.  Why?  In part, it’s because the financial markets are anticipating recessionary conditions.  For example, the yield curve has inverted.   The chart below depicts a study that looks at 10 different Treasury yield curves.  History shows that when more than six of these curves invert, a recession occurs, on average, in 15 months.  In July, eight of the curves inverted.  As an aside, note that it is common for these curves to steepen after the inversion but before the recession develops.  One should not take any comfort in fewer yield curves inverting once we exceed six.

What is unknown is how fast inflation will fall or unemployment will rise.  Our concern is that the financial markets are anticipating a rapid adjustment in the first chart’s indicator that may not be borne out by the data.  If that outcome occurs, the FOMC may tighten more than the market expects and maintain that tightness longer than anticipated.  That outcome would likely be negative for equities, but for now, hopes of falling inflation and an easing response from policymakers have lifted risk assets.  If this positive outcome fails to materialize, a downturn in risk assets is likely.

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Weekly Energy Update (August 18, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices remain under pressure on fears of a deal with Iran and weakening economic growth.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 7.1 mb compared to a 0.3 mb build forecast.  The SPR declined 3.4 mb, meaning the net draw was 10.2 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was steady at 12.2 mbpd.  Exports rose 2.9 mb, while imports were unchanged.  Refining activity dipped 0.8% to 93.5% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  Clearly, this year is deviating from the normal path of commercial inventory levels although this week’s outsized decline is consistent with seasonal behavior.  We will approach the usual seasonal trough for inventories in mid-September.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2004.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $104.45.

With so many crosscurrents in the oil markets, we are beginning to see some degree of normalization.  The inventory/EUR model suggests oil prices should be around $64 per barrel, so we are seeing about $24 of risk premium in the market.

Market news:

 Geopolitical news:

 Alternative energy/policy news:

  • With the Inflation Reduction Act now signed into law, a backlash against economists for pushing for a carbon tax is developing. To some extent, this makes sense as using other tools can be more politically popular.  However, from an efficiency standpoint, a carbon tax would still be a superior policy, but obviously, if you can’t get it passed, holding on to that policy to the exclusion of all others makes little sense.  What the bill is really all about is industrial policy.  Government shaping the economy is nothing new but is generally considered legitimate only in cases of clear market failure.  Since a carbon tax was never implemented, it really hasn’t been proven that a market failure exists.
  • There is great excitement in the environmental community over the new measures but one potential concern is the lack of workers to build out the plan.
  • Germany is extending the life of its three remaining nuclear power plants.
  • Any commodity activity disturbs something. Whether its drilling, ranching, farming, or mining, something or someone gets disturbed.  As demand for lithium rises, opposition to mining or brining has emerged.  Although such opposition may be overcome, higher costs are likely to result.
  • As we noted last week, the price of EVs continues to climb. Ford’s (F, $16.18) announcement of substantial price increases on its F-150 “Lightning” EV pickup is the most recent example of this issue.
  • There is growing evidence that the Arctic is warming faster than other parts of the world. The impact is difficult to estimate, but we would expect greater weather variability from this situation.
  • Much of the Midwest, parts of the Southwest, Florida, and the Atlantic coast could become subject to extreme heat events in the coming decades. But the real worry is heat in areas unprepared. The linked map shows the areas of installed air conditioning.
  • Hot weather just isn’t an inconvenience. The drought and warm weather is affecting industrial activity in Germany.  In China, power shortages, caused by hot weather, are causing car and battery plants to suspend operations.  Tech firms have also temporarily shut down.
  • Delays of utility-scale solar projects are steadily rising. These delays may be tied to trade restrictions which have recently been eased.
  • California looks ready to extend the life of the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant that was scheduled for decommissioning.
  • Increasingly, we are seeing an “all of the above” strategy in energy investment. Investing in renewables doesn’t necessarily preclude investing in fossil fuels.
  • Although wood burning is not necessarily environmentally friendly, it appears Germans are considering it in the face of rising fossil fuel prices. Wood pellets are also seeing rising demand in Europe and Asia.
  • This recent report from the Peterson Institute details China’s dominance in rare earths processing.

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The Devil Is in the Details (August 8, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

U.S. policymakers used deregulation and globalization to corral inflation from 1966 to 1982.  Unfortunately, that policy was at odds with America’s superpower role, which required the U.S. to act as global importer of last resort.  If the U.S. didn’t consume all the goods the world wanted to sell to Americans, the world economy would face a liquidity crisis.  Policymakers addressed the issues of containing inflation and providing global liquidity by deregulating financial services, which made it easier for households to borrow money.  Although deregulation and globalization slowed real income growth, the ability to borrow allowed households to absorb global imports, holding the international system together.  After 1995, this lending was increasingly attached to residential real estate, which was considered safe.  Sadly, one of the key economic imbalances that was revealed during the Great Financial Crisis was excessive household debt.  Since the crisis, the economy has been trying to address this debt overhang.  There has been some progress as household debt peaked at 129.4% of after-tax income in Q1 2008 but fell to 84.4% in Q1 2021.  Since then, it has risen to 96.5%.

Although policymakers haven’t targeted this issue, we believe that addressing this debt situation is not only key to improving the health of the economy, but the austerity required to reduce debt may be a factor behind political polarization.  The last time the U.S. had a similar debt issue was in the late 1920s when the Great Depression was the resolution, although the situation wasn’t fully addressed until WWII.  From a financial perspective, WWII finally resolved the private sector debt problem by placing that debt on the public balance sheet.  The debt relative to the size of the economy was reduced on the public balance sheet through financial repression.

One of the difficulties in discussing debt is proper scaling; in other words, how do we know when debt is “too high”?  Economists often use nominal GDP or some sort of income measure to scale debt.  The problem is that both GDP and income are “flow” data, meaning that they measure a quantity calculated over a period of time, while debt is “stock” data, which is a level at a specific time.  In terms of debt, income or GDP may or may not tell us much about the ability to service the debt.

Accounting often creates ratios that measure stock or flows.  For example, assets divided by liabilities are two stock numbers that give us some idea about the balance sheet of a firm or household.  Clearly, if the assets exceed liabilities, it suggests solvency.

From 1970 to 1990, American households had more cash than debt.[1]  After 1990, household leverage rose, peaking with debt exceeding cash to the tune of nearly $6.0 trillion.  The difference narrowed after the Great Financial Crisis by more than 50%.  The huge injection of fiscal aid to households during the COVID-19 pandemic finally led to cash exceeding debt for the first time in three decades.

So, have we resolved the household debt problem?  Perhaps, but the Federal Reserve’s Distributional Financial Accounts, which examines household balance sheets by income, suggests that the debt situation hasn’t necessarily been fixed.

We divide households into three groups: the top 10%, the middle 40%, and the bottom 50%.  The top 10% has seen its cash levels rise relative to debt for most of this century, but this difference widened dramatically during the pandemic.  Since the upper income brackets were mostly excluded from direct cash payments, it’s likely that this group liquidated appreciated assets.  We do note that all three classes took on more debt, but in the case of the top 10%, the cash accumulation far exceeded these new liabilities.  The middle 40% saw cash rise relative to debt into Q1 2021, but over the past year, liabilities grew modestly relative to debt.  However, for the bottom 50%, net debt continued to rise even with the influx of pandemic transfer payments.

We don’t have a data series by income prior to 1989, so we can’t compare what occurred during and after WWII, but, given the high marginal tax rates of that period, we suspect that the lower income classes saw their balance sheets improve.  What can we take away from the above chart?  First, as interest rates rise, consumption may fall since the bottom 50% increased their leverage during the pandemic.  Consumption will then have to come from the upper 50%.  Second, given the massive cash balances of the top 10%, asset prices could find support in the coming months.  Although higher cash yields from rising interest rates might keep this cash on the sidelines, we suspect this level of cash will eventually find its way into the equity, commodity, and debt markets.  This flow may depend on signs that the FOMC is near the end of its tightening cycle, but once such a catalyst emerges, the conditions for a strong financial market recovery are in place.  The great unknown, of course, is which market the potential flows will favor.

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[1] This dataset, from the FRB’s Financial Accounts of the U.S., includes households plus non-profits that service households.  Thus, strictly speaking, this isn’t just households, but data suggests the non-profit contribution is relatively minor.