Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The Inflation Adjustment for Social Security Benefits in 2027 (November 16, 2026)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Even for dedicated, successful investors who have built up a substantial nest egg, Social Security retirement and disability benefits can be a vital part of their financial security. For many people, Social Security benefits are the only significant source of income in advanced age. On average, these benefits account for about 30% of retired people’s income and more than 6% of all personal income in the US. One aspect of Social Security is especially important in today’s period of elevated price inflation: By law, Social Security benefits are adjusted each year to account for changes in the cost of living. In this report, we discuss the Social Security cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for 2027 and what it implies for the economy.

In mid-October, the Social Security Administration announced that Social Security retirement and disability benefits will increase 3.6% in 2027, bringing the average retirement benefit to an estimated $2,170 per month (see chart below). The increase will bump up the average recipient’s monthly benefit by approximately $75. The benefit increase was right in line with expectations, given that it is computed from a special version of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) that is widely available. The COLA process also affected some other aspects of Social Security, although not necessarily by the same 3.6% rate. For example, the maximum amount of earnings subject to the Social Security tax was raised to $192,300, up 4.2% from $184,500 in 2026.

Media commentators often fret that the Social Security COLA could be eroded by rising prices in the following year or that the benefit boost could provide a windfall if inflation decelerates. In truth, the COLA merely aims to compensate beneficiaries for price increases over the past year. It is designed to maintain the purchasing power of a recipient’s benefits based on past price changes, while any changes in the coming year are reflected in the following year’s COLA.

The inflation-adjusted nature of Social Security benefits is also important for the overall economy. Since so many members of the huge baby boomer generation have now retired, and since more people are drawing disability benefits than in the past, Social Security income has become a bigger part of the economy (see next chart). Social Security retirement and disability benefits now account for more than 5% of US gross domestic product (GDP). Having such a large part of the economy subject to automatic cost-of-living adjustments helps ensure that a sizable share of demand is insulated from the ravages of inflation, albeit with some lag. If Social Security income were fixed, a significant portion of the population would see their purchasing power drop more sharply, which might not only reduce demand but could also spark political instability. The added benefits in 2027 will help support demand, although they will also probably keep inflation somewhat higher than it otherwise would be.

Finally, it’s important to remember that an individual’s own Social Security retirement benefit isn’t determined by inflation alone. The formula for computing an individual’s starting benefit is driven in part by that person’s wage and salary history. Higher compensation will boost a retiree’s initial retirement benefit, which will then be adjusted by the COLA over time. As average worker productivity has increased, average wages and salaries have tended to grow faster than inflation. The average Social Security benefit has therefore grown much faster than the CPI. Over the last two decades, the average Social Security retirement benefit has grown at an average annual rate of 3.6%, while the CPI has risen at an average rate of just 2.6%. In sum, Social Security benefits provide a key source of growing purchasing power that helps buoy demand and corporate profits in the economy.

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – What “Real” Interest Rates Are Telling Us (October 5, 2026)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

One of the most important concepts in economics and finance is the “real” rate of return on an investment. The real rate is calculated by subtracting the rate of consumer price inflation from the nominal interest rate, bond yield, or price gain and dividends on a stock. If the nominal return on the investment is more than the rate of inflation over a specific holding period, the asset owner would have increased his or her purchasing power (before taxes). In contrast, even if the nominal return on the investment is positive, it can be less than price inflation. In this case, the asset owner’s purchasing power will have fallen. Expected nominal returns and inflation therefore can have a big impact on the demand for a particular asset. From a broad economic perspective, they can also affect the overall rate of investment and economic growth.

The chart above shows the Federal Reserve’s benchmark short-term interest rate in both nominal and real, inflation-adjusted terms, as well as the 20-year average of the real rate. For each month shown, the real rate is calculated as the nominal fed funds rate less the change in the consumer price index for the year ending that month. In simplistic terms, an investor could consider the real fed funds rate to be relatively high and restrictive to the economy when it is above its long-run average of -0.8%, whereas it could be considered low and accommodative when it is below average. As shown in the chart, the Fed’s attack on post-pandemic inflation lifted the real benchmark rate to its highest level since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC).

Following the pandemic, Fed policymakers were never able to get inflation back down to their target despite keeping real rates high for an extended period. They nevertheless let the real fed funds rate decline to a virtually neutral level in early 2026. This was probably one reason why investors began to sense that the central bank would be forced to start hiking the fed funds rate again, as it finally did in mid-September. As shown at the rightmost edge of the chart, the real fed funds rate is now rising again as the policymakers renew their commitment to lower inflation. The question is whether the real fed funds rate is now high enough to bring inflation down to target. Based on past inflation-righting episodes, we think it remains too low. Absent political pressure to keep rates low, we would therefore expect even more rate hikes.

What about real, inflation-adjusted yields on longer-term debt instruments? The chart above shows the nominal and real yields on 10-year US Treasury obligations as well as the 20-year average real yield of 0.4%. Since 10-year Treasury yields serve as the benchmark for many other long-term debt instruments and investment projects, such as residential mortgage rates or stock purchases, high real yields can have significant impacts on overall demand in the economy and the financial markets. The chart shows that real 10-year yields in the post-pandemic inflation fight weren’t nearly as out of whack as the real fed funds rate. For example, they never went as far above 2.0% as they did before the GFC, which probably helps explain why economic growth remained too strong to bring down inflation. Nevertheless, after falling to their long-run average in early 2026, real 10-year yields are now rebounding quickly. We believe that real yields could continue to rise in response to factors such as fears of future energy prices, strong debt issuance by artificial intelligence firms, and worries about rising federal budget deficits and debt. If real 10-year Treasury yields move above roughly 2.0%, we suspect they could begin to weigh on economic activity and meaningfully slow the AI investment frenzy.

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The PCE Makeover (August 3, 2026)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The Federal Reserve’s preferred gauge of price inflation is set for a methodological update, as the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) is expected to implement revisions to its price index for Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) as early as September. Early estimates suggest the changes will modestly lower measured PCE inflation, potentially easing the path toward the Fed’s 2% target by reducing the index’s sensitivity to the AI-driven stock market rally.

The timing is notable. As shown in the chart below, the Fed has failed to achieve its inflation objective over the past five years, and a downward shift in the index could finally make the target more attainable — both mechanically and in perception.

The revisions to the PCE price index, scheduled for incorporation in the September 30 release, aim to better align the index with actual household spending patterns. Key changes include updates to core inflation calculations and modifications to several categories that have disproportionately influenced recent readings, namely legal services, portfolio management, and computer software and accessories.

The most consequential adjustments are likely to come from portfolio management and software-related components. The BEA will revise its software price index — an area that has been distorted by the surge in AI-fueled demand — by incorporating a broader set of prices, including video game software and web hosting services. This change is expected to lower measured inflation by roughly 0.1 percentage points.

In parallel, the treatment of portfolio management services will shift away from a fee structure tied to assets under management and toward a measure based on firm revenues relative to services rendered. This adjustment is expected to reduce inflation by an additional 0.2 percentage points. Legal services will also be revised, with greater reliance on producer price data, though the impact there is likely to be more modest.

These changes are small but important, since these components have contributed disproportionately to volatility in the core PCE index. While the components account for roughly 4% of the core PCE index, they represent just over 1% of the core consumer price index, underscoring their outsized influence. Their growing weight has amplified swings in measured inflation, complicating the Fed’s effort to return inflation sustainably to target following years of overshooting.

The divergence largely reflects differences in weighting methodology. PCE weights adjust dynamically with shifts in consumer spending, and in recent years, portfolio management services have captured a larger share of expenditures amid rising retail participation in financial markets. At the same time, the recent surge in demand for computing and software has increased the relative weight of technology-related categories.

As a result, the PCE price index has become more sensitive to equity market dynamics. The chart above highlights the close relationship between rising asset prices and the growing influence of these components, suggesting that a portion of recent inflation pressure has been indirectly linked to strong market performance. This relationship has not gone unnoticed by Fed Governor Miran, who has suggested that a strong stock market should not count toward inflation.

These revisions will likely lower recent PCE inflation readings, implying that the Fed may have been closer to its 2% target than previously estimated. The most meaningful adjustments stem from changes to portfolio management and software-related categories, which should moderate the influence that the AI-driven surge in equity and software prices has had on the index.

However, this comes with a trade-off. By dampening the sensitivity of these components, the index may become less responsive to downside moves in asset prices. In the event of a correction, particularly if the AI rally were to reverse, the disinflationary impulse flowing through these channels could be more muted.

In short, the revisions may bring measured inflation closer to target, but they do not necessarily make underlying inflation easier to achieve or sustain at that level.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Excess Capacity and Policy Change (June 8, 2026)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA  | PDF

A key challenge of the big-picture, top-down investment analysis that we do at Confluence is tracing the real-world impact of a country’s economic policy initiatives. Whether policymakers are trying to boost economic growth, bring down price inflation, or achieve another goal, our aim is to figure out if the reform will be successful and the unintended consequences, be they positive or negative. Our ultimate objective, of course, is to determine the implications for financial markets and investment strategy.

One thing we’ve noticed is that many strategists attempting top-down analysis make overly simplistic assumptions about the likely effect of specific policy changes. They often ignore the fact that the same policy can be wildly successful or unsuccessful, depending on the pre-existing economic structure or conditions in place at the time. In this report, we show that one vital issue is the level of excess capacity in an economy. Many vaunted reforms in history were successful only because they were implemented when the economy had plenty of excess capacity to accommodate them. Many then conclude that those reforms would always be successful no matter what. We caution here that a deeper analysis is required to really understand any reform’s success and its financial market implications.

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