Weekly Geopolitical Report – The U.S.-China Balance of Power: Part II (January 25, 2021)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

In Part I of this report, we provided a comprehensive overview of how China and the U.S. see their key interests and goals.  We believe those understandings will have a big impact on how the two sides compete with each other in the coming decades.  In Part II this week, we provide a head-to-head comparison of U.S. and Chinese military power.  In the following weeks, Part III will examine the relative economic power of the two sides.  Part IV will describe their diplomatic positions around the world.  Finally, Part V will dive into the opportunities and threats for U.S. investors.

To compare two military powers, you need to resolve many issues.  For example, should you compare only the two countries’ own forces?  Or should you also count the forces of any allies that might fight with them?  If so, should you discount the allies’ forces because of problems like limited joint training or domestic political concerns that might make them reluctant to fight?  Our method will focus on the two sides’ total national forces, on the assumption that even though a U.S.-China conflict would probably be fought in the waters off China’s coast, assets currently deployed in theaters such as Europe or northwestern China could theoretically be brought to bear on the fight if needed.  For each country, we first discuss the overall resource base available to support military forces.  We then discuss the quantity and quality of each country’s land, sea, air, space, and cyber forces.

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Weekly Energy Update (January 25, 2021)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

The report was delayed due to the Martin Luther King Jr. holiday.  Here is an updated crude oil price chart.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Commercial crude oil inventories unexpectedly rose 4.4 mb, when a decline of 1.3 mb was forecast.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 11.0 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.8 mbpd, while imports declined 0.2 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 0.5%.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s rise is normal (although it seemed to surprise most analysts).  If we follow the seasonal pattern, inventories will rise about 10% into mid-April.  That situation should be factored into the current price but the anticipated rise in stockpiles isn’t a positive for the market.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $44.83; using the euro/price model, fair value is $70.97.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $56.43.  The wide divergence continues between the EUR and oil inventory models.

In geopolitics, we continue to watch with great interest the situation with Iran.  The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA led Iran to violate its restrictions on enriching uranium.  It has also moved further toward acquiring a domestic nuclear weapon.  The incoming Biden administration has signaled it would like Iran to return to the constraints of the JCPOA; we have doubts Iran will accept this program, fearing that a future administration will withdraw again.  We note the U.S. has shifted Israel from the European command to Central command.  For years, the U.S. put Israel under the supervision of the European command to avoid upsetting the Arab states.  From an operational standpoint, it makes more sense for Israel to be in Central command and now that several of its Arab neighbors have normalized relations with Israel, the emerging alliance structure in the region should benefit from the switch.

  • Islamic State is returning.  It claimed responsibility for two suicide bombings in Baghdad.  This group has shown remarkable resilience.  Although the U.S. and other allies seemingly eliminated the group a couple of years ago, if efforts are not maintained, it has the habit of re-emerging.
  • Venezuelan oil is under sanction by the U.S.  China is putting additives in Venezuelan oil to mask its origin and transferring cargos at sea to avoid sanctions and acquire Venezuelan crude, “laundering” the shipping documents through Swiss shipping companies.  According to reports, Venezuela accounts for 50% of China’s oil imports.

On the policy front, we are seeing the following developments:

In alternative energy, we continue to see investment flows and batteries dominating the news.

  • Hydropower has also been a mixed bag for environmentalists.  On the positive side, the facilities create reliable electric power with no carbon emissions.  On the negative side, dams change the environmental characteristics of the rivers where dams are built.  Some dams were built long ago for flood control or navigation.  Investors are looking at these old, smaller dams as offering the potential for hydropower, installing generators and using the existing facilities to create clean power.
  • Batteries remain the key bottleneck in expanding alternative energy.  Wind and solar, by their very nature, create intermittent flows of electricity.  Electricity is difficult to store; conventional flow management usually relies on flexible excess capacity (peaking power) fueled by natural gas or stored water systems.  This report offers some parameters on how cheap battery storage would have to be to replace conventional energy sources.  To fully replace conventional, storage would need to cost $20 kWh.  Current storage is around $175 kWh.  However, if the target is 95%, the report suggests $150 kWh will suffice.
  • Meanwhile, the race to build a better battery for EVs continues.  The concept of a solid state battery that would allow for multiple recharges, longer range, and rapid recharging is the current rage.
  • Of course, the mini nuclear reactor remains an interesting alternative.  Researchers in the U.K. are making the case that fossil fuel use will continue without an expansion of nuclear power. (An aside: a smart lobbyist for the oil and gas industry would fund anti-nuclear groups.)
  • Clean-tech firms’ equities continue to outpace oil and gas stocks.

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Asset Allocation Weekly (January 22, 2021)

by Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

In Charles Dickens’s novel A Tale of Two Cities, he writes, “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of light, it was the season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair…”  The paradox was designed to illustrate the different experiences of people living prior to the French Revolution.  In this week’s report, we discuss the paradoxical nature of this recovery.  Specifically, we focus on how consumer behavior may not be indicative of consumer sentiment.  We conclude by discussing how the Biden administration might structure policy to accelerate the recovery and how this direction could affect financial markets.

Even though this recession may have had a different origin than previous ones, this recovery appears to be telling a similar story.  With few exceptions, the higher income classes have consistently outperformed the bottom income classes.  For example, employment for high-income individuals has returned to pre-pandemic levels, while employment for low-income individuals is not only below pre-pandemic levels but has fallen in recent weeks.  It is highly likely that this discrepancy has contributed to the confidence gap between low- and high-income households.

The chart above shows the level of consumer confidence for high-income and low-income groups and the overall consumer confidence index since the start of the pandemic.  According to this chart, confidence among low-income groups has routinely lagged high-income groups.  This lag may be due to high-income groups having better information.  For example, the sharp increase in July may be related to the previous month’s hiring.  This notion is further supported by the steep decline in the following month as rising cases in July resulted in a slowdown in hiring.  It is also worth noting that this lag isn’t typically picked up in the overall index.  Hence, the overall index seems to mask pessimism of the low-income group.  This phenomenon is consistent with previous cycles as low-income individuals are typically the last to benefit when the economy enters into expansion territory.

That being said, there appears to be a mismatch between current sentiment and the present situation.  The share of low-income households reporting an improvement in their financial situation from a year ago was elevated throughout 2020, while the share of high-income households sunk.  This is likely due to a combination of high-income workers being forced to take pay cuts and low-income households receiving generous benefits in unemployment.  This trend is also mirrored in the flow of funds data in which the top 1% of households has seen a larger increase in checking deposits compared to the bottom 40% of households.  The boost in income for low-income individuals has likely supported domestic consumption as they are the only group spending more now than before the pandemic.

In a post-COVID-19 recovery, President Biden and his economic agenda should be aware that low-income households will likely suffer during the initial months of the economic expansion and refrain from fiscal tightening.  One of the biggest mistakes the Obama administration made was prematurely declaring that the economy had recovered.  In fact, the austerity that occurred during Obama’s second term likely created conditions for the GOP sweep in 2016.  To prevent a repeat of this mistake, the new administration will likely need to focus on those the economy has left behind, specifically low-income workers.  This likely means there will be more focus on jobs and less on tax reform.

Going forward, we expect that additional stimulus will be able to support consumption growth as the recovery gathers momentum.  The low-income households that receive the money will likely be able to find immediate use for the funds, which will benefit consumption and related companies.  Meanwhile, as the economy moves from recovery to expansion, it is likely that the top 1% will begin moving their savings into equities and other assets.  Nevertheless, it generally takes a year after an economy enters expansion before employment returns to pre-recession levels.  Hence, a great recovery for some people may still be a stressful recovery for others, so policymakers should keep that in mind when deciding whether to withdraw stimulus.

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Asset Allocation Quarterly (First Quarter 2021)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

  • The economic recovery is still in the early stages and we maintain that the expected path will be long and slow moving.
  • The Federal Reserve, along with other global central banks, will likely continue to be aggressively accommodative.
  • Another round of fiscal stimulus is expected, which should be positive for equities.
  • With the backdrop of an accommodative Fed and a low rate environment over the three-year forecast period, the weighting to equities is increased.
  • The prior emphasis on cyclical equities is augmented by a tilt to value over growth.
  • The prospect of a waning U.S. dollar in combination with a global economic recovery encourages an increased allocation to non-U.S. equities.
  • Exposure to precious metals is retained, though a portion was repositioned to a broader basket of commodities given the advantages they confer during an economic recovery.

 

ECONOMIC VIEWPOINTS

The aggressively accommodative monetary policy of the Fed combined with the potential for a healthy round of further fiscal stimulus creates a favorable backdrop for risk assets, in our view. Although many believe that such policies make for a potential inflationary environment, and while we acknowledge that there may be an interlude that contains inflation toward the second half of this year, we find the probability to be low for persistent elevated inflation through our full three-year forecast period. Our expectations are that the ultra-low fed funds rate will continue well through the economic recovery and even into an expansion. In addition, we believe that the potential for the Fed to engage in a form of yield curve control is elevated. However, we think it is unlikely for the Fed to attempt to exert control of rates beyond the 10-year maturity, and consequently long bonds will become the principal reflection of investor risk appetite and inflation expectations.

While many have made the argument that the economic soil is becoming more fertile for inflation, given Fed intransigence, fiscal stimulus, pent-up demand created by the pandemic, and a waning value of the U.S. dollar, we believe there exists a tremendous amount of slack in the economy and that the slow and steady recovery in the U.S. will help to hold inflation in check.

The lack of inflation expectations for goods and services does not, however, extend to financial assets. The backdrop of a docile Fed, a solid, albeit slow, economic recovery, and an abundance of cash among the investor class produces solid prospects for inflation in risk assets, such as investment-grade corporate credit, equities, and industrial commodities. It is difficult to overstate the amount of liquidity that exists among investors. Not only is the nominal amount of retail money market assets near historic highs, but money market assets as a percentage of cash are at historically modest levels as rates are close to zero. Our belief is that investors have been reluctant to put assets to work stemming from concerns about the long-term economic effects of COVID-19 and the uncertain political environment. With a vaccine beginning to be widely distributed, the U.S. election season in the rear-view mirror, and the potential for further fiscal stimulus, we think it probable that cash assets will be put to work in risk assets.

Beyond the U.S., global central banks are following the Fed’s ultra-accommodative monetary policy playbook. The quarterly Bloomberg review of monetary policy indicated there is no major developed economy central bank that is expected to raise rates this year. Moreover, central banks of the larger emerging economies, including Russia, China, Mexico, and India, are expected to cut their benchmark interest rates further. Complementing easy monetary policies is more fiscal stimulus around the globe as countries contend with low inflation and high unemployment. In our view, the outgrowth of these efforts globally will be economic recovery and continuing low inflation.

STOCK MARKET OUTLOOK

As noted above, our expectations for risk assets are positive. The combination of fiscal and monetary stimulus, a recovering economy, low inflation, and an abundance of cash on the sidelines among investors sets an attractive stage for equities over our three-year forecast period. We believe that corporate earnings will recover in the near-term and expand toward the end of our forecast period. A docile inflation environment will help to buoy P/E ratios, thus we expect they will remain elevated.

While positive on equities overall, we recognize that all equities will not be treated equally. As the accompanying chart indicates, the disparity between growth and value stocks is close to an historic level. Although such a disparity can persist for an extended period, as it did two decades ago as well as over the past few years, we expect this gap to narrow over the forecast period. This is not to imply that growth stocks will rapidly retrench. The potential exists for companies categorized as growth simply to remain rangebound while value stocks advance. This would be the typical pattern established in the early through mid-stages of an economic recovery. Last quarter, we introduced an emphasis on cyclical stocks through sector overweights of Industrials and Materials and dedicated exposure to the housing segment in the strategies. This quarter, we further this emphasis by creating an overweight to Financials in lieu of Consumer Discretionary as well as introducing an overweight to value relative to growth at 60%/40% among all U.S. market capitalizations. Within the value category, we harbor concerns regarding energy companies as they are typically highly leveraged and currently have, and are expected to continue to have, difficulty in accessing the capital markets. This concern is mitigated by the fact that the Energy sector only represents roughly 2% of the large cap equity exposure in the strategies. In the Energy category, our preference is exposure to the underlying commodities as detailed in the Other Markets section later in this document. Among market capitalizations in the U.S., we favor small cap companies for the potential they offer in the recovery phase of the economic cycle.

Regarding non-U.S. stocks, not only is the stage set by the same economic facets of stimulus, recovery, no inflation, and global liquidity, but we expect them to also benefit over the forecast period through the combination of attractive relative valuations and the potential for a weakening in the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar. The EU’s intention to issue €850 billion in common bonds to fund its COVID-19 recovery program may make taxation and spending decisions permanent at the EU, and consequently allow the euro to be a complementary currency. We think the recent strength of the euro versus the U.S. dollar not only reflects the conclusion of Brexit uncertainty, but also the competitive nature of the euro for global trade settlement. A weakening U.S. dollar acts as a very strong tailwind for U.S.-based investors. Given these expectations, we have increased the exposures to non-U.S. stocks.

BOND MARKET OUTLOOK

Expectations for low inflation and an aggressively accommodative Fed lead to our subdued view of the bond market over the three-year forecast period. As noted earlier, the potential exists for the Fed to exert a form of yield curve control whereby the Fed would announce its intentions to buy enough bonds of a specific maturity in order to contain rates within a particular target. Although we believe such a policy could be effective in stabilizing rates out to the 10-year maturity, the long bond would become the measure of inflation expectations. Moreover, research suggests that when yield curve control is used in combination with forward guidance and quantitative easing, it could lead to a lower and flatter yield curve.

Corporate bonds have enjoyed a dramatic narrowing of spreads since spiking in March of last year. Currently, spreads for investment-grade corporates are approaching the tightest levels experienced this century. Although we believe there is some room for further tightening, the risk/return trade-off for corporates with longer maturities makes them relatively unattractive. In contrast, the bond market environment we envision should be more constructive for mortgage-backed securities (MBS). As rates declined, prepayment speeds for MBS increased, lowering returns for investors. With rates at current levels, the likelihood for them to remain low over the forecast period, and continued purchases of MBS by the Fed as part of its unlimited quantitative easing program, we are more constructive on MBS than we have been over the past few years.

At this point, allocations to bonds are confined to strategies with income in their titles. Treasuries are overweight and corporate exposure has been lessened and restricted to intermediate maturities or shorter.  Although still slightly underweight, exposure to MBS was increased in the latest strategy realignment. For strategies designed to generate tax-exempt income, all long-term municipal bond exposures were eliminated and replaced with ladders of target maturity municipal bond ETFs.

OTHER MARKETS

REIT exposure is retained in strategies where income is an objective as it affords a varied source of income. The increased weight of cell towers and data centers in the index has offset weakness seen by the office, retail, and hospitality segments.

Gold is retained in the strategies as an important diversifier for heightened geopolitical risk and as a hedge against the potential for global currency debasement. However, a portion of the prior gold allocation was repositioned into a broad basket of commodities that contains a majority weight to energy components such as crude oil, natural gas, and heating oil as well as industrial metals. As noted previously, while we are constructive regarding the price of energy as the global recovery takes hold, the inaccessibility of capital markets for energy production companies encourages our exposure solely to the energy commodity components. A position in silver remains in the strategies designed for growth as we believe it is risk appropriate and its industrial uses make it attractive for an economic recovery.

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Asset Allocation Weekly (January 15, 2021)

by Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

Rare events can be difficult for financial markets to accommodate.  In general, prices in financial markets, which are the sum of estimates about the future, take a while to settle on the impact of something that doesn’t happen often.  The recent pandemic, 9/11, the Great Financial Crisis, etc. are all examples of rare events.  Rare policy events are also important and often are reactions to geopolitical, medical, or market disruptions.

It appears that we are seeing a rare event now.  And, it’s not the pandemic, although it was a policy reaction to it.  There is evidence to indicate that we are seeing currency debasement, a situation where the central bank increases available cash to the economy well in excess of what is needed to facilitate the purchase of goods and services.

The chart on the left shows the yearly growth in the M2 money supply, while the chart on the right shows M2 velocity, which is calculated by dividing the money supply by nominal GDP.  One of the tenets of monetarism is that sound monetary policy will yield steady velocity.  Rising velocity can signal inflation if real GDP isn’t growing.  Major declines in velocity are generally caused by excessive money growth.

Excessive money growth is defined as currency debasement.  Monetarism would argue that currency debasement will yield inflation.  But that outcome isn’t necessarily true.  It all depends on where the excess liquidity finds a home.  Determining the path of this excess liquidity is, arguably, the prime task for the next few years.

One important clue as to where this liquidity will travel is, who holds it?  The Federal Reserve’s Distributional Financial Accounts offer a clue.

This chart shows the total cash holdings[1] based on income class.  The top 10% hold about 65%, the middle 40% hold around 32%, and the bottom 50% hold the remaining 3%.  Not only is most of the cash held by the richest Americans, but they have been increasing their holdings, as the above chart shows.

The asset allocation of the top 10% is heavily allocated in equities.  The lower classes have the majority of their assets in real estate.  Although we don’t know for sure where the cash held will go, it’s a safe bet that it will go somewhere.  After all, the whole point of currency debasement is that cash is losing value.  In the absence of inflation, the likely path will be into other assets.  Since the bulk of the cash is held by the top 10% of households, it’s a reasonable assumption that the most likely path will be into equities.

In future reports, we will elaborate on why, at least for the next year or so, inflation is less likely to become a problem.  But one key reason is that most of the liquidity is held in the wealthiest households and these households tend to use their excess liquidity on financial assets.

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[1] Cash is the total of checking, time, and money market deposits along with allocated cash holdings of life insurance.

Weekly Energy Update (January 14, 2021)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Here is an updated crude oil price chart.  Prices are continuing to march higher.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Commercial crude oil inventories fell 3.2 mb, in line with industry forecasts.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was unchanged at 11.0 mbpd.  Exports fell 0.6 mbpd, while imports rose 0.9 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.3%.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the annual seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  This week’s decline was typical, but we are about to embark on a period of rapid seasonal increases.  If we follow the seasonal pattern, inventories will rise about 10% into mid-April.  That situation should be factored into the current price but the anticipated rise in stockpiles isn’t a positive for the market.

Based on our oil inventory/price model, fair value is $46.25; using the euro/price model, fair value is $71.97.  The combined model, a broader analysis of the oil price, generates a fair value of $57.68.  The wide divergence continues between the EUR and oil inventory models.

The DOE has released its Short-Term Energy Outlook.  For the most part, the government is looking for mostly steady prices this year.  The most uncertain element of their forecast is U.S. production.  Their forecast calls for 11.0 mbpd; we have doubts that this level will be achieved due to environmental/policy issues we discuss below.

One energy theme we are watching with great interest is the divergence between the price of energy commodities and their underlying equities.

This chart shows a model of the S&P Energy Sector Index relative to WTI and the S&P 500.  For the past 18 months, energy equities have underperformed relative to not just overall equity values but to oil prices as well.  Although the index has shown signs of recovery, note that it is still not outperforming overall equities and oil prices.

It is normal for the underlying equities to exhibit at least some degree of sensitivity to commodity prices.  Changes in commodity prices send signals to companies in the industry; for example, rising prices let producers know that conditions are favorable to increase output.  Obviously, falling prices indicate the opposite.  However, the decision to change production levels is affected by more than just the price of the commodity.  It is also affected by interest rates, regulation, the availability of capital, infrastructure, and expectations of the future.  To some extent, the last item may be the most important.  If companies see a rise in prices as being mostly temporary, they may not react.

As the “greening” of America proceeds, it is sending signals to fossil fuel energy producers and the industries that support oil and gas production.  The future isn’t rosy; transportation electrification and environmental regulations suggest future demand will likely be less than what it would have been otherwise.  Therefore, oil and gas companies are already in the process of adjusting to this changing market environment.  Here are some of the items we noted this week:

  • For years, drilling in the Arctic Wildlife Refuge has been a goal of producers and an anathema to environmentalists.  The U.S. finally opened parts of the region for development and held an auction for reserves.  The bidding was mostly a bustThe state of Alaska provided most of the bids.  Banks have little interest in financing the project and oil companies see two problems.  First, the public relations optics of drilling in the region are unfavorable.  Thus, the hurdle price of investing is likely very high.  Second, if oil demand is going to decline in the future, there is a significant risk that this investment could become stranded.  In other words, just about the time oil starts to flow, it won’t be needed.
  • Financing for oil projects is becoming difficult to find.  The government is trying to force banks to fund projects, but banks are not really interested.  Some of this reluctance to invest is due to credit issues.  But this situation highlights one of the problems our divided political situation has caused—investing has become riskier because policy can vacillate broadly from administration to administration.  Thus, for a bank, funding drilling today might be acceptable only to become a violation at some point in the future.  Thus, finding financing, especially for long-term projects, has become more difficult.
  • Environmentalists are focusing on pipelines.  It can be difficult to stop drilling projects as these are often intrastate so state governments can facilitate production.  And, trying to reduce consumption at the endpoint is a sure-fire way of becoming unpopular.  This is why carbon taxes, arguably the most effective way to deal with climate change, really hasn’t gained traction.  This makes pipeline policy critical.  Pipelines cross multiple jurisdictions and involve the federal government, giving activists multiple venues to prevent distribution.  For example, pipeline projects out of Appalachia are becoming difficult to complete.  Last summer, the Atlantic Coast pipeline project was abandoned due to legal hurdles.  The Mountain Valley project is due to be completed this year but is also facing litigation.  The lack of pipeline capacity effectively strands natural gas projects.
  • The Biden administration is expected to tighten rules on methane emissions, which will lift the cost of oil and gas production.  Smaller companies are not planning on investments to reduce methane emissions or flaring, at least in Texas, which could reduce their production if new rules are adopted.  However, in Kansas and Oklahoma, surveys suggest some interest, although environmental investment is still not widespread.

The bottom line is that we are likely to see supply constrained in the future due to environmental regulation and changes in investing time horizons.  A similar path is emerging to what coal has seen over the past 15 years.  What this means in the short run is that we are likely to see a disconnect between oil and gas equities and the price of the underlying commodity, which favors the latter.  In other words, as economic recovery takes hold and demand improves, supply will be constrained by the factors noted above.  If our analysis is correct, this means the prices on oil and gas will rise much higher to generate a supply response.  But, in the end, the investing thesis is that owning the commodity will likely prove to be a better path than owning the associated companies.

On the alternative energy front, we are starting to see utilities invest in large-scale battery projects.  Utilities are building battery storage to solve the problem that alternative energy creates—what do you do when the sun doesn’t shine, or the wind doesn’t blow?  California is the home of a couple of large projects.

  • We continue to monitor reports on modular nuclear reactors.  Although resistance to nuclear power remains elevated, achieving significant carbon reduction without nuclear energy will be difficult without serious changes in economic and social activity.  For off-grid facilities, diesel generators are the current norm.  Engineers are investigating the use of small modular nuclear reactors to replace diesel for electricity.
  • Texas now generates more electricity from wind than it does from coal.
  • The FT editorial page is suggesting that we are approaching a tipping point on transportation electrification.
  • General Motors (GM, USD, 48.78) announced the introduction of a new electric delivery van.
  • Although electrification continues to grab headlines, don’t “sleep” on hydrogen.  We note growing efforts to use wind energy to separate hydrogen from water.  Hydrogen could be used in cars through fuel cells but could be most applicable for aircraft.  Batteries are heavy, limiting their effectiveness, but fuel cell/hydrogen aircraft engines may offer nearly carbon-free flying.

In geopolitics, the controversial Nord Stream 2 pipeline appears closer to completion.  The U.S opposes this project and will likely try to use additional sanctions to prevent it from opening.  The blockade on Qatar was recently lifted by Saudi Arabia.  Interestingly enough, Qatar has indicated that it won’t change its relations with Iran.  Qatar’s Iranian ties were one of the factors behind the decision to deploy the blockade.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The U.S.-China Balance of Power: Part I (January 11, 2021)

by Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(Note: Due to Martin Luther King Jr. Day, our next WGR will be published on January 25.)

We’ve often written in these reports that one of the most important challenges of the 21st century will be the geopolitical tensions generated as China strengthens and comes into ever greater competition with the U.S., even as the U.S. wavers in its commitment to its traditional role as global hegemon.  In early 2019, we introduced our readers to the concept of the “Thucydides Trap,” which describes the heightened risk of war when a rising power comes into conflict with an incumbent hegemon (see our WGRs from January 28 and February 4, 2019).  Naturally, great-power warfare is a nasty business with plenty of potential ramifications for investors.  Given the global scale of interests and the multiple dimensions on which the U.S. and China compete, even tensions short of combat could affect investors.

In order to stay on top of the evolving opportunities and risks, we continue to deepen our research into the U.S.-China competition.  This multi-part report aims to assess the current balance of power between the two sides and what that implies for how the competition may play out in the coming years.  In Part I, we provide a comprehensive overview of each side’s key interests and goals, which will say a lot about how the two sides use their power over time.  In two weeks, Part II will provide a head-to-head comparison of U.S. and Chinese military power.  In the following weeks, Part III will examine the relative economic power of the two sides, and Part IV will describe their relative diplomatic positions around the world.  Finally, Part V will dive into the opportunities and threats for U.S. investors.

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