Daily Comment (November 11, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady, Kaisa Stucke, and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EST] It’s Veteran’s Day—thanks to all those who served.  The cash Treasury markets are closed but the futures are trading.  Equities are open all day.

BREAKING: Vice Chair Fischer said this morning that policy rates will rise more slowly and less high than in previous cycles.  This statement will be dollar bearish, Treasury and equity bullish.  However, in reading the speech, it isn’t clear if his statements reflect the election of Donald Trump.  Fischer’s speech is on the international impact of Fed policy; if trade is impeded, these international effects will change. 

It has been quite a week, to say the least.  Although it is early, there is a definite shift in market expectations.  We appear on the cusp of reflation.  President-elect Trump has figured out that no amount of stimulus will lift prices and reap the full benefits of growth until trade is restricted.  Thus, we have seen a sharp swing in Treasury yields.  Even though we would expect a retreat in yield during the next recession, it is likely that the secular bond bull market that began in the early 1980s is coming to a close.

The chart above shows the 10-year T-note yield from 1921.  Perhaps the most important issue to remember is that when the last secular bear market began after the lows were made in 1945, the next peak took 36 years.  It took eight years before yields doubled.  Although the regulatory environment is different, it takes a while for bond yields to reach really high levels.  Still, the tailwind for financial assets that this bull market represents is noteworthy.

Surprisingly, the other winner has been Britain.  The GBP swooned after Brexit and the selling accelerated after PM May indicated she was going to start the process of exiting the EU in February.  However, President-elect Trump has indicated he wants to rekindle the “special relationship.”  In addition, Trump has shown a special affinity for Brexit and views his own election as a continuation of the Brexit sentiment.  If the U.S. and U.K. press ahead with improving relations, it will give PM May leverage in her negotiations with the EU.

(Source: Bloomberg)

The chart above shows the GBP/USD exchange rate.  Note the sharp decline around Brexit and in October when the Article 50 announcement was made.  Over the past week, we have seen a steady rise in the exchange rate on hopes that Trump will have warmer relations with Britain than Obama had.

The Iranian government claims its oil production hit 3.9 mbpd last month, up 0.2 mbpd.  Outside sources dispute this number, suggesting Iran’s output was mostly steady with September.  Iraq also claims its production was 4.8 mbpd, about 0.2 mbpd higher than outside sources report.  It does seem that OPEC producers are trying to ramp up output in front of the November 30th meeting in order to claim a larger market share, which should mean that if production cuts materialize, the cuts will come from a higher base for individual nations.  These announced increases, even if they are exaggerated, will tend to weigh on oil prices.

There will be much to sort out in the coming weeks as all of us try to determine what the Trump election means for markets, the economy and society.  However, we feel pretty confident that reflation is underway.  How the markets and the Fed react to this phenomenon remains to be seen.  But, the steady decline to low inflation, which has been a consistent part of the landscape for over 35 years, is changing and it will mean a different world from what we have been accustomed to.  We believe it is manageable, but it will be different.

View the complete PDF

Daily Comment (November 10, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady, Kaisa Stucke, and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EST] The Trump rally continues this morning; so does the bond selloff.  Like all analysts, we are still trying to figure out how the Trump administration will govern.  To some extent, we are seeing a bit of “hope and change” being projected on the markets with assumptions of regulatory rollback and tax cuts for all.  Because Trump’s plans are not detailed, it is easy to cast hopes that many favorable changes will emerge.  There will obviously be significant changes but probably not as much as the current euphoria suggests.

Still, one trend that does seem to be emerging is that Trumponomics will likely be a combination of policies that could be profoundly stimulative.  Trump does appear to be planning a large fiscal stimulus that will include infrastructure spending coupled with tax cuts and tax reform.  The usual problem with such policies, beyond the expanding deficit, is that some of the stimulus is lost to imports.  However, if you couple the fiscal stimulus with trade barriers, there is less leakage and more growth.  Of course, there is a downside (isn’t there always!); the more trade is restricted, the greater the potential for inflation.  The Fed will likely react to rising inflation, although the degree of the reaction will be dependent on the composition of the FOMC.  The issue of Fed independence is critical to how strongly the central bank reacts.  If it reacts strongly, we could get a “Volcker dollar.”  If the Fed is restrained by political pressure, the dollar still rallies but not nearly as much as if rates remain accommodative.

If this is the scenario, it will likely end secular stagnation for the U.S. but lead to much weaker global growth.  The boost to the U.S. economy will be profoundly popular with the populist classes, less so for the establishment, who will lose some of the benefits of globalization.  From a market perspective, we will likely see rising interest rates, a stronger dollar (the magnitude determined by Fed policy), stronger equities and weaker global growth and foreign markets (America First!).

Here is an interesting quote from Sen. Sanders.

Donald Trump tapped into the anger of a declining middle class that is sick and tired of establishment economics, establishment politics and the establishment media. People are tired of working longer hours for lower wages, of seeing decent paying jobs go to China and other low-wage countries…To the degree that Mr. Trump is serious about pursuing policies that improve the lives of working families in this country, I and other progressives are prepared to work with him. To the degree that he pursues racist, sexist, xenophobic and anti-environment policies, we will vigorously oppose him.

It isn’t much of a stretch to see the Warren/Sanders wing supporting much of what we have outlined above.  They won’t necessarily like the tax changes but will probably get behind the trade activity.  And, it should be noted that the president can do much on trade unilaterally.  Tax policy will be harder because it will need Congressional support.

In a surprise move, earlier this week, Indian PM Modi abolished the existing banknotes of INR 500 ($7.50) and INR 1000 ($15.00).  Thus, they are no longer legal tender, although they can be deposited into the banking system until December 30.  This is a big deal; 86% of the value of all cash in circulation is denominated in these bills.  This was done to undermine corruption and apparently prevent further counterfeiting.  He did say that new INR 500 notes will eventually be issued along with the creation of an INR 2000, probably with greater protections to prevent counterfeiting.  One of the potential outcomes from this decision could be an increase in gold demand.  India is the second largest consumer of gold, buying 848.9 metric tons of gold last year.  Uncertainty about the state of Indian currency might lead households to buy gold as a store of value, which is already a factor in gold demand.

U.S. crude oil inventories rose 2.4 mb compared to market expectations for a 1.5 mb build.

This chart shows current crude oil inventories, both over the long term and the last decade.  We have added the estimated level of lease stocks to maintain the consistency of the data.  As the chart below shows, seasonally, inventories tend to stabilize into the end of November and decline into year’s end.  Refineries are coming back from maintenance, which boosts demand.  Still, inventories remain quite elevated.

Based on inventories alone, oil prices are overvalued with the fair value price of $39.89.  Meanwhile, the EUR/WTI model generates a fair value of $45.64.  Together (which is a more sound methodology), fair value is $41.96, meaning that current prices are above fair value.  Most likely, the divergence from fair value is due to hopes of an OPEC deal that would boost prices.   The IEA warns today that non-OPEC producers are raising production, suggesting that Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan and Russia could raise output by up to 0.5 mbpd.  Given current OPEC output, cuts ranging from 0.8 mbpd to 1.3 mbpd will be necessary to bring output down to the target range of 32.5 mbpd to 33.0 mbpd.  With non-OPEC output rising, OPEC really needs to make credible cuts at the Nov. 30th meeting.  If it fails, oil prices could fall into the high $30s.

View the complete PDF

Daily Comment (November 9, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady, Kaisa Stucke, and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EST] In an upset perhaps even exceeding Truman/Dewey, Donald Trump, a real estate mogul with no military or government experience, defied polls and betting sites, winning the Electoral College vote last night.  Although there are still some states that have not officially declared their results, Trump has secured 276 electoral votes, exceeding the 270 needed to secure victory.  Here are our thoughts:

The Political Impact

The establishment is deaf: In our taxonomy of the American political system, we recognize two categories and four blocs.  These are the establishment category and the populist category.  Within the establishment, there are two blocs, the rentier/managerial and the entrepreneurial/ disruptor.  Populists break down into left-wing and right-wing populists.  After WWII, the Roosevelt coalition was built on the rentier/managerial and right-wing populists.  That coalition began to break down in the mid-1960s due to attempts to include the left-wing populists and the inability of the economy to cope with inflation.  The Reagan coalition was the establishment category; they all agreed on deregulation and globalization for economic policy and wooed the populists on social concerns.  This coalition was less stable than the Roosevelt coalition because it relied on center-right or center-left political leaders to sway populists (the so-called “base”) to their positions.  The 2008 Financial Crisis signaled the end of Reagan’s coalition.  We are still trying to figure out what will emerge.

However, what is clear is that the populist classes won’t be satisfied with just social policies.  They want economic policies they favor, which will likely mean a retreat from globalization and deregulation.  Obama’s 2008 victory was completely misinterpreted by the establishment and the political pundits (and perhaps by the president himself).  In 2008, voters thought they were getting Bernie Sanders—instead, they got another establishment president.  Offered the same choice in 2012, they simply opted for the familiar.  However, the 2016 election was clearly a signal of revolt; Sanders nearly won and Trump shocked the political world by beating a well-funded and experienced group of GOP candidates.  We still believe that if Sen. Warren had run, she would have won decisively.  The electorate wants a populist that will create an economy to help the bottom 80% of households.  Expect to hear the pundits state that “this wasn’t Trump’s win but Hillary’s loss.”  We strongly disagree; although Clinton was a flawed candidate, the issue wasn’t her inability to campaign, it was that she didn’t have a message that resonated.  Remember, the electorate didn’t get what it wanted with Obama; it wanted a populist.  Instead, it got a center-left establishment figure from the rentier/managerial category.  Clinton’s decision to run as a continuation of Obama’s legacy was a mistake.

This is also why the polls and betting sites performed so poorly.  Polls can’t deal with preference falsification and betting sites are skewed by the size of the bets.  This is the third significant polling failure in the past six months.  Trump, Brexit and the Colombia referendum on FARC were all missed badly by the polling industry.

What do we get with Trump?  We believe a president has his greatest power in the first 18 months of his first term.  Once the midterms loom, the attention of Congress shifts and little gets done.  Usually, the president’s party loses power at the midterm (although this might not occur in 2018 due to the high number of Democrats up for election in the Senate) and little moves forward afterward.  We believe that immigration will top Trump’s agenda, with trade a close second.  Ending Obamacare will come next.  Fourth on the list will be fiscal spending with an emphasis on infrastructure.  Any openings on the Supreme Court will be filled with conservatives; there will be at least one opening and, given the ages of the justices, perhaps more.  These will consume political capital and attention.  Tax reform is down the list and will likely be less radical than currently proposed.  We would expect cuts in corporate taxes and no increases in tax rates on upper income households, but the cuts currently outlined probably won’t occur or will be less aggressive.  Elements of the GOP establishment will try to put tax changes at the forefront; we don’t expect their efforts to succeed.

Who is Trump’s cabinet?  Under normal circumstances, GOP figures would be lining up to take positions after being out of power for eight years.  However, Trump alienated much of the intellectual figures on the right.  Thus, he will have a smaller pool from which to derive his advisors.  For Secretary of State, former House Speaker Gingrich or Sen. Corker are likely choices.  Former Ambassador John Bolton is a possibility, although he would be out of step with Trump’s isolationist leanings.  Treasury will likely go to Steven Mnuchin, a vet of Goldman Sachs.  Defense will probably go to Sen. Sessions.  Lt. Gen. Flynn should get a national security post.  Former NYC Mayor Giuliani will likely become Attorney General.  Wilbur Ross could get Commerce Secretary.  Ben Carson or Florida Gov. Scott have been mentioned for Health and Human Services.  Harold Hamm is thought to have the inside track on Energy Secretary.  Myron Ebell has the inside on EPA, although he might be too controversial.  It isn’t clear who will get Chair of Economic Advisors.  Finally, there are reports that Reince Priebus could get Chief of Staff.

Overall themes of a Trump presidency: We look for “America First” to be the guiding principle.  As we will discuss in next week’s WGR, we expect Trump to be a Jacksonian (using Mead’s archetypes), which is essentially isolationist unless provoked.  Putin and Xi would be well advised not to make overt moves that make America look weak.  Russian planes that buzz U.S. warships risk being shot down and Iranian vessels that harass U.S. warships in the Persian Gulf will likely be sunk.  On the other hand, a steady encroachment into the South China Sea, Eastern Europe or the Fertile Crescent will be tolerated.  Trump will discover that trade barriers are a bit like “whack-a-mole,” in that putting tariffs on one state means other nations try to fill the gap.  Still, we expect trade barriers and “administrative guidance” against firms that have moved jobs offshore.  Technology and the substitution of capital for labor will likely become the best way to control labor costs.

Market Issues

Watching the Fed: With fiscal spending likely and tax cuts possible, along with restrictions on immigration and trade barriers that will decrease efficiency, inflation becomes more likely.  As we have noted before, in our opinion, globalization and deregulation were key in containing inflation.  Although the latter should mostly remain in place, the former will come under threat.  The key issue is the reaction of the FOMC.  We have had an independent Federal Reserve since 1951, although one could argue that it was compromised by Nixon in 1971 and not restored until Volcker in 1978.  Trump has been critical of Chair Yellen.  It is probably safe to assume Trump would prefer accommodative policy (he just didn’t like it for Obama/Clinton).  There are two governor vacancies on the FOMC that Obama never filled.  Trump will likely fill these and, if/when he does, it will give us an idea of what sort of monetary policy he favors.  The GOP establishment would tend to favor hawkish policies; after all, they are creditors and prefer low inflation and higher rates.  However, Trump’s core supporters are populists who are debtors; they would like more accommodative policy.

Here is one of the key issues we will be closely watching—does the Fed lean against the inflationary impulses that will probably emerge from a Trump administration and risk the central bank’s independence?  Or, will it bend to Trump’s position and allow reflation?  Another way of putting it is this—will we get the Fed of the 1970s of Burns and Miller, or the Fed of the late 1970s of Volcker?  If it’s the former, bond yields will rise, the dollar will sink and commodity prices will increase.  If the Fed stands against these inflation impulses, the dollar will rise, bond yields will remain contained and commodity prices will fall.  Although the outcome remains to be seen, our first impression is that we will get a version of the Burns/Miller FOMC.  It’s what the bulk of the country wants.

In the short run, we are seeing spiking bond yields, a mixed dollar (commodity currencies are down sharply, the yen is higher, the euro is steady), a jump in gold and lower equities (but, off their worst levels of the session).  We will have more in the coming weeks on positioning but, initially, we view Trump’s policies as bond bearish (more fiscal spending) and neutral to bullish for equities (health care, materials and defense should shine).  Foreign investing is much more problematic if the U.S. becomes less trade friendly.  Commodity prices and the dollar will depend on the Fed.

View the complete PDF

Daily Comment (November 8, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady, Kaisa Stucke, and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EST] There isn’t much more we can add on the election at this point.  It appears the financial markets have discounted a narrow Clinton win, but we would still not be shocked to see Trump prevail.  We have been concerned about the reliability of polls and betting sites in this election due to political polarization.  There is a pretty good chance we will know the outcome when we publish tomorrow, although even that outcome isn’t certain.  Given that the financial markets expect a Clinton win, if she does meet expectations, we would not expect a major market reaction.  On the other hand, a Trump win will likely lead to a short, but sharp, equity selloff; most analysts put this in the 5% range.  We are less sanguine and would expect something closer to 10%.  However, the drop shouldn’t last too long.

We got a plethora of data from China overnight (see below).  We want to highlight a couple of items.  Exports (in USD) were weak, falling over 7%.

(Source: Bloomberg)

This chart shows the yearly change in Chinese exports along with the 12-month moving average.  Since January 2015, we have only seen two months with positive readings and the yearly average has been negative all year after steadily declining last year.  China’s export sector is suffering and it’s showing up in two other numbers, the exchange rate and reserves.

(Source: Bloomberg)

This chart shows the CNY/USD on an inverted scale.  As China’s exports began to falter last year, China has been guiding its exchange rate lower.

Foreign reserves have been weaker as well.

(Source: Bloomberg)

In October, China’s foreign reserves fell $45.7 bn.  As the chart shows, the pace of the decline has slowed to some extent, but most of that slowdown probably occurred due to tighter regulations on capital flight.  However, falling exports will tend to lead to a weaker currency and a steady decline in foreign reserves.  With less growth coming from exports, China will be forced to either live with slower growth or use other means to maintain growth.  This may mean more investment (and debt) or, with luck, rising consumption.  Although it may be too soon to tell, we do note that the Xi regime fired its finance minister, Lou Jiwei.  Mr. Lou was an outspoken reformist figure who supported economic restructuring.  Removing him could signal that Chairman Xi intends to maintain the investment model.  The firing was a surprise, although we do note he was approaching retirement age and it was highly unlikely he would have been reappointed.  The fact that Xi decided to fire him rather than allow him to retire suggests the leadership of the CPC wanted him removed, probably for a less independent replacement.

View the complete PDF

Weekly Geopolitical Report – Inflation Targeting: What’s so special about 2%? (November 7, 2016)

by Kaisa Stucke, CFA

Speaking at the Boston FRB conference on October 14th, Fed Chairwoman Janet Yellen indicated that Fed officials are considering the benefits of running a “high pressure economy.”  This sparked speculation that the central bank would allow its inflation target to temporarily exceed 2% as the labor market and aggregate demand improve.

The Fed’s dual policy mandate calls for the central bank to maximize employment and maintain stable prices.  The central bank has designated a target of 2% as its inflation goal, but has not identified a policy target for employment levels.  Optimal employment levels change over time given the cyclicality of labor markets, so it makes sense to keep a moving target for the labor market.[1]  But why did the Fed choose to specify an explicit 2% inflation target?

This week, we will take a closer look at the reasons behind the Fed’s 2% inflation target.  We will also review the historical data and academic research that support this optimal level of price increases.

View the full report

____________________________

[1]The Fed does target a natural rate of unemployment, which is unemployment arising from all other sources except fluctuations in aggregate demand: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/NROU.

Daily Comment (November 7, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady, Kaisa Stucke, and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EST] We are seeing significant market moves this morning, with equities and the dollar sharply higher but Treasuries and gold lower.  The proximate cause for the swings came from FBI Director Comey, who indicated in a letter to Congress that the newly discovered emails would not change the bureau’s earlier decision not to pursue prosecution.  Although the story of the emails remains to be told (how did they get copied to a “house” computer and what was Anthony Weiner trying to accomplish?), apparently there isn’t anything new here.  This doesn’t mean investigations have ended for the Clintons.  There is some interest in the activities of the Clinton Foundation that will likely continue.  However, there isn’t going to be anything in the emails that will affect this election.

We still think this election is probably closer than the polling data or the betting numbers suggest.  We note that early voting among Hispanics was very strong in Florida; at the same time, African American early voting in a number of states, including Michigan, is reportedly soft.  The University of Iowa’s Electronic Markets have partially recovered from the earlier Comey announcement.

(Source: Iowa Electronic Markets)

This chart shows the “winner take all” bet.  For example, the current bet on Sen. Clinton is just under 70 cents; if she wins, you would receive a dollar.  Last week, Clinton’s numbers plunged from 90 cents to around 55 cents, but have since recovered.

In the Senate, the same source is narrowly predicting a GOP House and Senate.

(Source: Iowa Electronic Markets)

If this is the outcome, it would be a situation of gridlock, pretty much what we have now.

The market reaction to this news is rather striking.  Perhaps the most interesting is the dollar’s movement.  The dollar fell after the earlier Comey announcement, which struck us as a bit odd.  First, Trump wants to aggressively move against foreign trade, which would, if successful, lead to a smaller trade deficit.  The trade deficit (or, more accurately, the current account deficit) is the supply curve for dollars.  A narrower deficit shifts the supply curve toward the origin and, assuming a normally sloped demand curve, leads to dollar strength.  In addition, if Trump were to get a large fiscal spending package through, it would likely push up interest rates (this is what boosted the dollar in the Volcker years).  Thus, the dollar’s weakness appears to be due more to uncertainty rather than based on policy.

In other news, the FOMC appears to be on track for a December rate hike.  Current odds from the fed funds futures show a 76% likelihood.  Much was made over the rise in hourly earnings, which is up to 2.8%.

This chart shows the overall hourly earnings data with the hourly earnings growth for non-supervisory workers.  Although the two series are tightly correlated, it is worth noting that wage growth for the latter actually fell to 2.4% from 2.7% in September.  If wages for non-supervisory workers remain depressed, it would suggest the FOMC should move slowly because wage pressures are not all that strong.

Finally, OPEC is claiming a victory of sorts, with leaders indicating that the cartel has agreed to use outside sources to determine production levels.  Most nations prefer to use their own output numbers which they skew to their liking.  For example, when quotas are being set, they want to indicate they are producing more so they can claim a higher quota (or cut back less when production is being cut).  On the other hand, when output compliance is being questioned, they want to say they have lower output.  According to reports, cartel members have agreed, in principle, to use outside sources.  In practice, this could be difficult because there is often disagreement among various reporting groups.  Without using an average or some adjustment mechanism, it would not be surprising to see states use different sources to their advantage.  Thus, the news is progress but it is still unclear if the Saudis will cut without participation from Iraq and Iran.

View the complete PDF

Daily Comment (November 4, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady, Kaisa Stucke, and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] Given this morning’s hefty economic releases, we will keep our opening comments short.  Equity markets are trading sideways to higher following this morning’s release of the October employment report (see below).  Some of the highlights from the report include an improving unemployment rate and better than expected wage growth.  Although October payroll gains were weaker than expected, September numbers were revised strongly higher, with the two-month net change surprising to the upside.  Additionally, the U-6 unemployment rate, the broadest measure of unemployment, fell to its lowest level since April 2008 as did the median duration of unemployment.  The dollar is trading higher this morning as the data likely supports a December Fed hike.  Market expectations are calling for an 80% likelihood of a hike at the next meeting.

This week’s domestic oil inventories rose 14.4 mb, well above market expectations of a 1.6 mb build.  The chart below shows the current level of crude inventories, the prior year’s levels and the five-year average.  We are currently higher than the prior year and well above the average.

The inventory increase was caused by a jump in crude imports, which rose 2.2 mb, and a decline in refinery utilization, which fell 0.4% to 85.2%.

View the complete PDF

Asset Allocation Weekly (November 4, 2016)

by Asset Allocation Committee

With the elections coming next week, it seems like a good time to look at how markets have historically performed during election cycles.  We will compare the current election cycle against previous cycles.

The blue line in the chart above shows the indexed market return for the period 1928-2015.  To create this average cycle, we use the weekly returns of the S&P 500 Index starting with the first week of the election year through the end of the fourth year of the presidential term.  The weekly dataset begins in 1928.  The average gain in the first year of the cycle is about 6%.  By Q3 of the second year of the cycle, the average return of the S&P 500 is approximately 13%.  Equity markets move sideways to lower into late Q3 of the third year and then, on average, stage a strong rally into the last year before the election cycle begins anew.  The rally that begins in year three is a fairly well documented phenomena; politicians want to be re-elected and thus create policies that boost growth and, on average, lift equity prices as well.  We have added the S&P 500 performance for the current cycle, indexed to the first Friday close of 2016 (red line).  Although the market has been volatile, its performance has been close to average since the dip in Q1.

To further analyze the data, we break the historical data into four categories: incumbent Democrat president, incumbent Republican president, new Democrat president and new Republican president.  We define incumbent as a consistent party in power.  For example, this means we had a Democratic incumbent from 1936 through 1951, which encompassed both Roosevelt and Truman.  Similarly, we had an incumbent GOP from 1984 through 1991 which included Reagan’s second term and Bush’s only term.

As the chart shows, markets have had the best outcome when an incumbent Democrat wins.   A new Republican president tends to track an incumbent Democrat until the year after the election, then underperforms.  A new Democrat has historically been the worst outcome for the market (excluding the late 4th year rally).  The current cycle is mostly following the incumbent Democrat/new Republican averages, suggesting that the equity market isn’t offering significant insights thus far.  However, it does imply that, regardless of the outcome on Tuesday, we will likely see a recovery into the New Year in that we will either have a new GOP president or an incumbent Democrat president.

Although most analysts are assuming a Clinton win based on polling, this analysis does suggest some equity market trepidation as we are currently underperforming both of the most probable outcomes.[1]  This underperformance could reflect the volatile nature of this election season or expectations of monetary policy tightening in December.  However, given the usual electoral pattern, we would not be surprised to see a stronger equity market into at least the first half of next year.

View the PDF

_________________________

[1] It is possible a third party could win, but highly improbable.  The most likely outcome is either an incumbent Democrat or a new Republican.

Daily Comment (November 3, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady, Kaisa Stucke, and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] First, we would like to congratulate the Chicago Cubs on ending their 108-year championship drought.

A panel of London judges decided overnight that the U.K. must hold a Parliamentary vote before triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty to start the two-year process to withdraw from the EU.  The ruling hinged on the fact that Brexit would lead to a change in domestic law without Parliament’s approval.  The final court ruling will come from the country’s Supreme Court next month.  This complicates PM May’s intent to unilaterally start Brexit by March of next year.  As shown in the chart below, the pound rose on the news as investors await PM May’s response on whether she will have to alter her Brexit plan.  It is likely that the debate will move to the Parliament for a vote, but May had indicated earlier that enough MPs support triggering Article 50 that she believes the vote would pass in favor of the measure.

(Source: Bloomberg)

Separately, the Bank of England also released its rate decision.  The bank maintained rates at 0.25%, as expected, after lowering them in August on speculation that the Brexit vote would adversely affect the country’s growth.  The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) projections now forecast higher inflation, with the CPI rising to 2.0% early next year and 2.5% by 2019.  The chart below shows the annual change in the U.K.’s headline CPI, which rose to 1.0% in September from 0.6% the year before.

(Source: Bloomberg)

Interestingly, the MPC removed language from its communication signaling another possible rate hike this year.  In fact, the bank said that there are “limits to the extent to which above-target inflation can be tolerated,” implying that it could move its benchmark interest rate in either direction based on economic conditions.  The committee also revised its short-term growth rate higher, while revising the long-term growth rate lower.  The bank is concerned about the inflationary pressures on household spending and political uncertainty surrounding Brexit.  Volatility is likely to remain elevated leading up to the Supreme Court ruling, ensuing Parliamentary vote and Brexit negotiations.

The Egyptian central bank said that it would allow the country’s currency, the pound, to float in response to a persistent dollar shortage, which has depressed economic growth.  The country will end exchange rate controls and hike interest rates.  The country has a dual objective in ending exchange controls.  First, it is hoping to attract foreign capital flows back into the country.  Political uncertainty following a series of uprisings had alarmed investors, who pulled funds out of the region.  We note that capital controls for foreign investors remain in place.  Second, the policy change could help the country secure an IMF loan.

The Egyptian equity market rose, shown in the chart below. Additionally, Egypt’s bond yields fell.

(Source: Bloomberg)

View the complete PDF