Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – Forecasting Financial Stress (December 5, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

[Note: The podcast that accompanies this report will be delayed until 12/12. Also, this report will go on holiday hiatus following today’s report; the next report will be published on January 16, 2023.]

One of the challenges of market strategy is the problem of financial stress.  In colloquial terms, the “Fed raises rates until something breaks.”  The problem is that the “something-breaks” event is difficult to predict in terms of when.  There are numerous financial stress and conditions indices that suggest rising financial tensions.  These tell us when conditions are such that problems might develop, but they don’t help us much with when a problem is likely to emerge.

This chart shows the Chicago FRB’s National Financial Conditions Index (CNFCI).  A reading of zero shows normal conditions, while any number less than zero implies favorable conditions.  Before mid-year 1998, financial conditions were highly correlated to the fed funds rate.  Since 1998, the two series have become almost entirely uncorrelated.  In 1998, the U.S. passed the Financial Services Modernization Act, often named for its authors, Senators Gramm, Leach, and Bliley.  This act changed the nature of the financial system as it was mostly bank-financed prior to this legislation.  The 1998 act allowed other financial participants to engage in lending and other bank-like activities.  Essentially, the U.S. financial system became money market-financed after 1998.

This change was designed to improve the efficiency of the financial system, but it also changed the “lender of last resort” function of the Federal Reserve.  Before 1998, if the FOMC raised rates, financial conditions deteriorated, but that problem could be easily addressed with rate cuts.  But note that after 1998, the fed funds rate became ineffective in either improving or weakening financial conditions.  The 2004-09 period is the best example of this problem as the FOMC raised rates with little impact on financial conditions.  Once a crisis developed (shown as a jump in the CNFCI), it took very aggressive rate cuts and promises to keep rates low for a long period of time before conditions improved.  Something similar developed in 2020 around the pandemic.

Currently, we are in a tightening cycle.  The CNFCI has increased but remains below zero. However, the worry remains that if the FOMC keeps raising rates, “something will break” which is represented by a spike in the index.  The notion of the “Fed pivot” is based on the expectation that as conditions deteriorate, the Fed will rapidly reverse policy tightening, which would be bullish for financial assets.  If something breaking is a prerequisite for the pivot, it would be useful to have some idea of when that might occur.

One way we attempt to determine when a tightening cycle may be poised to end is to compare the fed funds target to the implied three-month LIBOR rate from the Eurodollar futures market.

LIBOR rates represent funding costs for money market lending.  In general, because this collateral or the counterparties are not necessarily guaranteed by the government, it is reasonable to expect that the LIBOR rate should exceed the fed funds target.  And, as the top line of the chart indicates, most of the time it does.  However, on occasion, the spread inverts.  We have placed vertical lines on the above chart showing when these inversions have occurred.  Inversion suggests that the financial markets have assessed that the FOMC has raised rates enough and should either stop raising rates or consider cutting them.  In the 1990s, during the Greenspan Fed, rates were cut quickly when this spread inverted.  And, for the most part, he supervised a long expansion and even the 2001 recession was considered rather mild.  Contrast that with the Bernanke Fed’s decision to hold rates steady for an extended period even though the Eurodollar/fed funds spread had become inverted.  The recession that followed was very deep and was accompanied by a financial crisis.

To further analyze the impact of the spread of the implied LIBOR rate to fed funds, we created the below chart.

The lower part of this chart shows the fed funds/implied LIBOR spread.  We have placed a purple line at the -40 bps level, and when this level is penetrated, it has tended to signal that a financial accident is more likely.  In the past two events, an inversion below the -40 bps line was followed by a crisis six to 12 months later.  We are not at that point yet, but if the FOMC moves the fed funds target up by 50 bps in mid-December, the chances increase that we will see the spread invert below this level.

The Fed has two formal mandates and one universal mandate.  Its two formal mandates are full employment and low inflation.  These are legislated by Congress and defined by the Fed, but all central banks exist to support the functioning of financial markets.  We are seeing conditions evolve to a point where the FOMC may need to stop tightening or even ease in order to address the universal mandate.  However, that may force the Fed to ease before it contains inflation.  We suspect that the Fed will probably attempt to bring down inflation while hoping to avoid a financial problem.  In fact, the recent signal that the pace of hikes will slow may be designed to avoid an “accident.”  By moving less aggressively, we surmise that the FOMC hopes it can still bring down inflation and avoid a financial crisis. Nevertheless, the chances of a financial accident appear poised to grow in the coming months.

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Weekly Energy Update (December 1, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices have been falling on fears of weaker Chinese demand due to COVID issues.  We note that the futures market structure has moved into contango, where the deferred contracts trade at a premium to the spot.  This is a bearish market structure.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 12.6 mb compared to a 3.1 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 1.4 mb, meaning the net draw was 14.0 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production was steady at 12.1 mbpd.  Exports rose 0.7 mbpd, while imports fell 1.0 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.3% to 95.2% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs later this month.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.  This week’s large draw takes inventories below the seasonal average, though perhaps the most important takeaway is that the usual seasonal pattern in inventory is breaking down.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2001.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $108.94.

 Refinery runs are elevated as refiners take advantage of favorable crack spreads.

(Sources:  DOE, CIM)

 Market News:

  • This is a major week for global oil markets. On December 5, the EU is expected to implement its sanctions on Russian oil exports, specifically targeting the insurance and financing infrastructure of the oil trade.  Tied to these sanctions is U.S. support for a price cap.  The goal of the EU sanctions is to cut Russian oil from world markets and undermine Russia’s ability to conduct the war in Ukraine.  The goal of the price cap is to allow some level of Russian oil flows but at reduced prices.  So far, Moscow says it won’t sell oil under the price cap system.  In addition, the EU hasn’t been able to decide on a price since more hawkish nations want a low price, while others, who are less hawkish, want something closer to the market price.
    • The consensus is that the price cap won’t work because, generally speaking, a consumer can’t usually dictate what the price of a product will be. As consumers, we may decide not to buy at a given price, but we can’t go to the seller and simply set the price.  After all, if we could do that, it would literally be a “free world”!  However, if a buyer has market power, then they can influence the price that sellers can get for their product.  OPEC+ is worried that the price cap mechanism will be turned on them, and that the cap could evolve into a “buyer’s cartel.”  That is a risk, but we doubt that will occur.  In this specific case, however, Russia is deeply vulnerable to the sanctions and cap.  Why?  Russia is dependent on foreign tankers and especially foreign insurance and financing to move oil.  Russian ports can’t handle the largest crude carriers and the supply of smaller vessels is tight. Also, despite its best efforts, Russia has not been able to duplicate the existing insurance and financing system for oil sales, which reduces the number of tankers available to carry Russian oil.  That doesn’t mean there are not rogue carriers, but they are not big enough to matter much.
    • The U.S. wants the cap because it fears that the EU plan will result in a spike in oil prices. It wants to keep Russian oil flowing but reduce the revenue Russia receives.  If Russia holds to the policy that it won’t honor the price cap, it could easily find itself in a situation where it is forced to close in production, and once shut in, that production may be lost indefinitely.  If that occurs, oil prices could jump.
    • It should be noted that Russia is finding fewer takers of its oil, and the Urals benchmark price has fallen to around $52 per barrel. So, even without a cap, the expectations of one seem to be having an impact.
  • Although OPEC+ was making noises about cutting production in the face of weak prices, it looks like the cartel is more likely to maintain current production targets.
  • Tensions within the ruling coalition have led Norway to delay any new oil and gas leases until 2025, a blow to European energy supplies.
  • As diesel prices soar, the “magic” of markets is starting to work. Consumption is easing, and refining operations are increasing, causing inventories to lift.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

  • However, this good news may still not be enough for New England to escape high prices and shortages.
  • Europeans have been complaining that the U.S. is profiting from the war in Ukraine[1] by pointing at the massive price differential between U.S. and EU gas prices. However, it turns out the profiteers are European.  Most LNG sold by the U.S. is based on the Henry Hub price, the benchmark for the CME futures contract.  Currently, that’s set at 115% plus $3.00 of the benchmark price.  However, the actual price in Europe is far higher; for example, a $6.00 per MMBTU price at the Henry Hub translates to a €32.59 MWH price.  European utilities are buying at that price and reselling the gas at nearly €119 MWH.
  • As global demand weakens and supply chains begin to improve, freight rates are falling rapidly, but that isn’t the case with oil tanker rates. High demand and the scramble to secure transportation before EU sanctions on Russian oil are in place are sending rates to record levels.
  • Japan is warning that global LNG supplies are sold out “for years,” but what they mean is that most LNG is sold on long-term contracts. That’s how the infrastructure for LNG is usually financed — a project aligns buyers on long-term contracts at a set price to pay for the build-out of the project and then sends the gas to the buyers regardless of the spot price.  Japanese buyers report that there are no long-term contracts available before 2026, meaning that the “marginal molecule” is being sold at spot rates.
  • Germany and Qatar have agreed to a 15-year supply deal for LNG.
  • There is growing evidence that the Middle East has reached oil capacity limits and shale oil production has not reacted to high oil prices as it has in the past. However, one bright spot for additional barrels is coming from deep-water offshore projects such as Brazil and Guyana.
  • Western Canada is seeing a jump in natural gas production and could become a significant supplier of LNG to the Asia-Pacific region.
  • Despite having what appears to be ample generating capacity, China suffers from regular blackouts. The reasons are complicated but involve the lack of market pricing and  regional distrust, which then leads to excess capacity construction.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:


[1] Among other general complaints.

[2] In fact, French President Macron is visiting the U.S. this week and subsidies are expected to be discussed.

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Business Cycle Report (November 29, 2022)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

The Confluence Diffusion Index fell further into contraction territory in October. The latest report showed that five out of 11 benchmarks are in contraction territory. The diffusion index declined from +0.1515 to +0.091, below the recession signal of +0.2500.

  • Hawkish Fed expectations weighed on financial indicators
  • Production indicators are weakening due to a decline in business sentiment
  • Hiring is slowing but the labor market remains strong

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is in recovery. The diffusion index currently provides about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for recovery. Continue reading for an in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing. At the end of the report, the Glossary of Charts describes each chart and its measures. In addition, a chart title listed in red indicates that the index is signaling recession.

Read the full report

Weekly Energy Update (November 17, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(The Weekly Energy Update will not be published next week due to Thanksgiving.  The report will return on December 1.)

 Crude oil prices appear to be building in a base in the mid-$80s.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 5.4 mb compared to a 1.9 mb draw forecast.  The SPR declined 4.1 mb, meaning the net draw was 9.5 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.2 mbpd to 12.1 mbpd.  Exports declined 0.41 mbpd, while imports rose 0.3 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.5% to 92.1% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs later this month.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.  This week’s large draw is takes inventories back to the seasonal average.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2002.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $106.63.

 

Market News:

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  • For the most part, we view COP-27 as environmental theater since without an enforcement mechanism, environmental promises are just that. However, we do note that there has been some movement to reduce coal usage in power production.
  • California voters did not support a measure to fund EV charging stations by raising taxes on high-income citizens. Without this funding, it isn’t clear how the state will prepare to shift from gasoline to electric vehicles.
  • Meanwhile, China’s share of the global EV market continues to grow.
    • BMW (BMWYY, $29.46) is building a $1.4 billion operation to expand battery production in China.
  • As biofuel research expands, there is a growing concern that without regulatory guidance, the potential for the fuel source will be hampered by inconsistent standards.
  • Separating hydrogen from water creates a clean (“green”) product. Unfortunately, it is also energy intensive and expensive.  Four U.S. nuclear power reactors are part of a study to see if nuclear power can be used to generate green hydrogen.  Meanwhile, a raft of startups are trying to develop other ways to bring down the cost of green hydrogen.
  • The U.S. has blocked 1,000 shipments of solar energy components from China on grounds that the products were made by slave labor. There have been rising tensions between the solar installation industry and the non-Chinese solar component industry.  The former wants the cheapest product it can find, while the latter wants to compete with China, the world’s low-cost producer.  As U.S./Chinese relations deteriorate, the non-Chinese production industry is seeing an opportunity.
  • Leaded fuel was used to counter engine knock, though, unfortunately, lead is highly toxic so it was phased out of gasoline in the U.S. over three decades ago. However, small aircraft were excluded from the move to unleaded fuels but are finally making the switch.
  • One of the problems of solar and wind energy is that it’s unreliable, so as it expands, utilities must still keep conventional capacity available for periods when the power generated from wind or solar is lacking. The expansion of wind and solar in the western U.S. is leading to reliability issues.
  • We are still in the early stages of battery technology. The current industry standard for EVs, the lithium-ion battery, has some flaws as it’s prone to fires, it’s expensive to produce, and it doesn’t have a long life.  But, in its favor, it does recharge quickly and is lightweight.  The next new thing may be the sodium-ion battery.  It’s a bit heavier than the lithium-ion battery, and not as energy dense. New technology, though, is showing rapid improvement.  If it flies, it would dramatically reduce the cost of EVs and have much faster recharging capabilities.  Better and cheaper batteries are likely the key to widespread EV adoption.
    • Asian battery producers have been reluctant to invest in Australian mining that would provide raw materials for batteries, putting the makers at risk of supply shortages.
    • EV makers are looking to vertically integrate their operations with miners of key battery materials and with battery manufactures to create secure supply chains.
    • China uses lithium-iron-phosphate batteries which are cheaper but have less range than batteries that use nickel.

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Asset Allocation Bi-Weekly – The Impossible Trinity (November 14, 2022)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

The U.S. Dollar Index hit a 20-year high in September as the greenback gained against other global currencies. The climb in the U.S. dollar (USD) began in the post-pandemic recovery. Investors flocked to the greenback for safety as the U.S. economy outgrew its peers in the OECD. Aggressive policy tightening by the Federal Reserve accelerated the appreciation as U.S. dollar-denominated assets have become even more attractive for foreign investors. The strong pick-up in demand for the USD intensified inflationary pressures globally and could push other countries into recession.

With limited options, central banks and governments were forced to take extreme actions to prevent their currencies from depreciating. Throughout 2022, investors have penalized countries that failed to prioritize fiscal and monetary austerity to contain inflation. Examples include a controversial tax plan in the U.K., the European Central Bank’s stealth quantitative easing to maintain sovereign spreads within the eurozone, and Japan’s insistence on yield-curve control, which led to nosedives in those countries’ respective currencies. The resulting depreciation has made dollar-denominated imports more expensive, adding to price pressures. As a result, inflation rose to an all-time high in the eurozone and to multi-decade highs in Japan and the U.K.

The exchange rate volatility reflects the limitations of central banks and governments when conducting monetary and fiscal policy. Typically, policymakers have three options with macroeconomic policy: fixed exchange rates, sovereign central bank policy, or open capital markets. It is impossible to do all three simultaneously as it creates a phenomenon known as the impossible trinity, or the policy trilemma. In other words, policymakers can opt for a fixed exchange rate only by either giving up monetary sovereignty or restricting capital flows.[1]  Post-Bretton Woods, most developed economies chose to solve the predicament by opting for floating exchange rates. This choice allowed policymakers to have open capital markets and monetary sovereignty.

The problem with the post-Bretton Woods arrangement is that exchange rate levels affect macroeconomic policy goals. For example, a weak exchange rate can be inflationary, while a strong exchange rate can act as unwelcome policy tightening. Thus, extreme moves in exchange rate levels may become counterproductive to policy goals and may require a response to change the trend in an exchange rate. Unfortunately for policymakers, this is where the impossible trinity becomes a problem. During currency crises, emerging nations are notorious for implementing capital controls. However, developed economy policymakers have generally shied away from such controls, and this reluctance leaves them with only one policy option: they must cede sovereignty. For instance, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, and the European Central Bank have all accelerated their respective paces of rate hikes to keep up with the Federal Reserve. As a result, the decision to raise rates in line with the Federal Reserve has calmed the nerves of investors while simultaneously hurting economic growth.

Although the impossible trinity does describe the problem facing policymakers in a single country, there are multinational solutions to resolve the issue. The 1985 Plaza Accord, the 1987 Louvre Accord, and the 1995 Halifax Accord are all examples of international cooperation to address exchange rate divergences. The Plaza Accord was an agreement to address dollar strength. European and Japanese policymakers were reluctant to follow Federal Reserve policy rates as the Fed was addressing a serious inflation problem, while the other central banks were not facing the same issue.[2] However, the Fed’s monetary policy led to capital inflows and the rapid appreciation of the dollar. By the mid-1980s, the dollar’s strength was making U.S. manufacturing uncompetitive and was lifting foreign inflation. And so, in September 1985, the G-5 nations agreed to a coordinated policy response to weaken the dollar. In addition to direct intervention to weaken the dollar, the Fed cut policy rates as the other countries’ central banks raised policy rates. The dollar then reversed its trend.

One could argue that the trilemma was not really resolved but simply managed during these accords. In the Louvre Accord, for example, the policy actions of the Plaza Accord were reversed to halt the dollar’s depreciation. In a sense, policymakers agreed to a certain policy direction and worked in concert to achieve a particular goal, which was a change in the trend in exchange rates. Strictly speaking, all the central banks sacrificed sovereignty to resolve an exchange rate issue.

Policymakers, therefore, resolved the trilemma by allowing exchange rates to float within unspecified boundaries. When those boundaries are hit, central bankers are forced to give up monetary sovereignty until the exchange rates adjust to acceptable levels. The question facing markets now is if there is consensus among developed-market policymakers that the USD is too strong. So far, that consensus hasn’t emerged, but it is clear that Japanese authorities are not happy with the yen’s exchange rate but are continuing to maintain monetary sovereignty through selective intervention. History suggests such unilateral actions slow the “direction of travel” but don’t reverse the trend. If the Europeans are unhappy with the euro rate, they haven’t yet made it public. And, with U.S. policymakers mostly concerned with inflation reduction, there is little incentive to pressure the FOMC to cut rates.

That doesn’t mean there isn’t collateral damage coming from the exchange rate markets. The USD’s rise slashed an estimated $10 billion from corporate earnings for Q3 2022. Much of this pain was concentrated on U.S. firms with foreign revenue exposure, specifically in the tech sector. But so far, weakness in the tech sector has not been enough of an issue to support a policy change. Until U.S. policymakers think they have inflation under control, foreign policymakers  have to choose whether to allow their exchange rates to weaken further or adopt the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve. Given the persistence of U.S. inflation, dollar strength is likely to continue.


[1] Bretton Woods, which was a system of fixed exchange rates, solved the problem through restricting capital flows.

[2] In the early 1980s, German CPI was around 5%, while U.S. CPI was 14.5%.

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Weekly Energy Update (November 10, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices appear to be building in a base in the mid-$80s.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories rose 3.9 mb compared to a 0.3 mb build forecast.  The SPR declined 3.6 mb, meaning the net build was 0.3 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production rose 0.2 mbpd to 12.1 mbpd.  Exports declined 0.41 mbpd, while imports rose 0.3 mbpd.  Refining activity rose 1.5% to 92.1% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs later this month.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2002.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $105.36.

 

 Market News:

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

  • Cop-27 is underway this week. We won’t have much to say because we doubt anything binding will emerge.  We do note that the U.S. is proposing a system of carbon credits that can be purchased by firms.  Although the idea makes some sense, it should be noted that no accreditation process has been created, which means it could be merely a form of greenwashing.
  • Canada has ordered three Chinese firms to exit the lithium mining sector, citing national security concerns.
  • U.S. spending for wind and solar power has been weak this year.
  • Geoengineering is the process of directly acting to offset various climate issues. For example, one way to cool the planet is to inject aerosols into the upper atmosphere to reflect sunlight back into space.  Geoengineering is controversial because the potential side effects are hard to predict, and those side effects might be “levied” against those who don’t benefit from the action.  Despite the controversy, DARPA is quietly funding various projects probably because the government wants to know how they would work if we were to reach a situation where such measures became necessary.
  • There are a number of new nuclear technologies being developed. Here is a primer on molten salt reactors.
  • Researchers claim a breakthrough related to creating renewable jet fuel.
  • Similarly, researchers in Singapore note that they have made the process of pulling hydrogen out of water more efficient by using a procedure involving light. Meanwhile, researchers at Rice University have devised a way to pull hydrogen from hydrogen sulfide (rotten egg gas), which is an unwanted byproduct of desulfurization in refining and natural gas processing.
  • One of the problems with expanding solar and wind power is that it takes up lots of space and the least costly place to acquire that space is rural areas. However, residents are cooling to these facilities, worried about the impact on farming, ranching, and property values.
  • U.S. automakers are lobbying for the Treasury to widen the nations for which EV components can be imported and thus be eligible for subsidies. We suspect this is to leave room for China to participate.
  • The EU is growing increasingly upset with the Inflation Reduction Act’s EV subsidy rules that restrict payments to consumers only if they buy vehicles mostly constructed in the U.S. European automakers wanted carve outs so they could participate, but the U.S. countered with “make your own subsidies.”  We could see an EU trade retaliation, but we doubt this will change U.S. policy.
  • Last week, we noted that the EU voted to end the sale of internal combustion engines in Europe by 2035. As regulators tally up the potential job losses, there are new calls to delay that transition.

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Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report – Reflections on the 20th Party Congress (November 7, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady | PDF

(The Bi-Weekly Geopolitical Report will not be published in two weeks due to Thanksgiving.  The report will return on December 12.)

The Communist Party of China’s (CPC) 20th Party Congress has come to a close.  By all accounts, General Secretary Xi has tightened his grip on power.  Not only has he secured a third term, breaking the pattern of a two-term limit informally implanted by Deng Xiaoping, but he has also filled his inner circle, the Standing Committee of the Politburo, and the Politburo itself, with loyalists.

In this report, we will offer our take on the meetings, including an examination of key speeches and a rundown of the new Standing Committee of the Politburo along with important figures within the Politburo.  From there, we will examine our view of the possible direction of Chinese policy in General Secretary Xi’s third term.  As always, we will conclude with market ramifications.

View the full report

Don’t miss the accompanying Geopolitical Podcast, available on our website and most podcast platforms: Apple | Spotify | Google

Weekly Energy Update (November 3, 2022)

by Bill O’Grady, Thomas Wash, and Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

Crude oil prices appear to be building in a base in the mid-$80s.

(Source: Barchart.com)

Crude oil inventories fell 3.1 mb compared to a 1.5 mb build forecast.  The SPR declined 1.9 mb, meaning the net draw was 5.0 mb.

In the details, U.S. crude oil production fell 0.1 mbpd to 11.9 mbpd.  Exports declined 1.2 mbpd, while imports were steady.  Refining activity rose 1.7% to 90.6% of capacity.

(Sources: DOE, CIM)

The above chart shows the seasonal pattern for crude oil inventories.  As the chart shows, we are past the seasonal trough in inventories and heading toward the secondary peak which occurs later this month.  SPR sales have distorted the usual seasonal pattern in this data.

Since the SPR is being used, to some extent, as a buffer stock, we have constructed oil inventory charts incorporating both the SPR and commercial inventories.

Total stockpiles peaked in 2017 and are now at levels last seen in 2002.  Using total stocks since 2015, fair value is $107.47.

The Diesel Scare:

A prominent news personality recently suggested that “the country will run out of diesel fuel by Thanksgiving,” leading to a steady stream of questions to our inbox.  So, here is our take…

Diesel is part of a family of fuels called “distillates.”  Other members of this family include heating oil (diesel with a higher sulfur content) and sometimes jet fuel.  In general, diesel for road use has a lower sulfur content (it’s cleaner, in other words) so other distillates can’t easily be substituted for the diesel.  In the weekly data, diesel demand isn’t broken out from overall distillate demand.  To create a standardized measure of inventory (a mere level won’t tell you how much you have relative to demand), we divide stockpiles into daily demand.  By dividing inventory into consumption, we determine how many days of supply are available given current demand.  We are hearing that there are 21 days of inventory available, but since we can’t confirm diesel demand separate from distillate demand, we can’t confirm that number, although we can say that distillate stocks are tight, around 27 days.

The above chart, which is weekly data going back to 1987, measures current distillate inventories compared to consumption.  As the chart shows, levels are around 25 days, which is “tight.”  On average, the “days to cover” is 35 days with a standard deviation of six days.  So, the current level of 27 days is in the “bucket” of two standard deviations below average.  At the same time, it is important to remember that this number tells us how many days we can go if our only source of distillate is inventory.  That would assume the U.S. refining industry would close, and we couldn’t import any fuel.  That isn’t the case.  It is strictly true that we could run out of distillate by Thanksgiving, but only if we closed the ports and stopped refining completely, which isn’t likely.  Simply put, conditions are tight but not dire.

Complicating matters is that Europeans are importing diesel as a backup fuel for electricity generation and heating, both at the utility level as well as the firm and household level.

This is why the administration has floated export controls to ensure domestic supplies.  The problem is that it will be hard to keep the EU supporting the war in Ukraine if Europeans are freezing because the U.S. won’t send diesel.  At the same time, it will be hard to maintain support for the war in the U.S. if tight diesel supplies lift overall inflation.  In the past, when diesel fuel stocks tightened, our exports were much smaller.  So, the export situation has complicated matters.

We do have some refining capacity to tap.  Currently, refinery capacity is running around 89%, so we could see increased production.  Unfortunately, U.S. refinery capacity has been declining for some time as about 3.0 mbpd of refining capacity has closed since 1993.

There is yet another complication.  The Northeast (PADD1) is facing a severe shortage of diesel.  This region uses both natural gas and heating oil for home heating (the rest of the country mostly uses natural gas or propane) and so tight supplies can be a real problem.  Due to the Jones Act, this region usually imports distillate from abroad because it is cheaper to use foreign shipping than higher cost U.S. shippers, who are protected by the act.  But currently, Europe is absorbing the global supplies that would normally end up on the Eastern Seaboard.  It is unclear how this situation will be resolved, but the overall tight distillate market is being exacerbated by the shipping situation to the Northeast.

We don’t expect that the trucking industry will “shut down” due to the lack of diesel; instead, diesel prices will likely rise, which will cause adjustments (more rail traffic, for example, as trains are much more efficient) and delays in shipping.  However, the situation isn’t good.  About the only silver lining is that for every barrel of crude oil refined, roughly a third is distillates and 55% to 60% is gasoline.  As refiners lift production to meet diesel demand, we will get more gasoline in the market.

We also note that a weaker economy will reduce energy demand.  Already, U.S. trucking firms are reporting that shipments are down and we note that European economies are slumping as well.

 Natural Gas Update:

Natural gas prices have been weak lately as the storage injection season is near its end, the tropical storm season spared the oil sensitive regions of the Gulf of Mexico, and so far, temperatures have been mild.  For the most part, the trends in supply and demand are balanced.

On a rolling 12-month basis, there is a modest level of excess demand.  Meanwhile, inventories appear to be in balance.

With supply and demand nearly in balance and inventories in line with seasonal norms, the direction of prices going forward will mostly be a function of temperature.  The official NOAA forecast suggests that most of the nation’s major population centers will be normal to warmer-than-normal this winter.

Of course, even in an otherwise mild winter, a cold snap can have important effects on demand and natural gas prices.  Overall, though, the forecast does offer hope that home heating costs will be manageable.

Market News:

  • In the latest IEA annual report, one of the more important assertions is that fossil fuels are approaching peak demand, in part driven by the war in Ukraine. We have doubts that this forecast is correct, but the fact that it exists will tend to affect investment decisions.  In other words, if investors believe peak demand is on the horizon, there will be less incentive for investment, which will tend to crimp supply and lift prices.
  • Major oil companies are reporting record-breaking profits. President Biden is floating a windfall profits tax, accusing the oil industry of war profiteering.  In general, such taxes are counterproductive.  If the goal is to increase supply, taxing it works against that outcomeIf production remains low, the case for higher taxes on energy companies will become more compelling.  However, unless the tax is crafted to offer exemptions for increased production, this tax won’t increase production.  And, given the near certainty that the government will be divided after next week’s elections, the White House would have to put the tax through in the “lame duck” session.
  • It looks like the price cap idea on Russian crude oil is slowly unraveling. It has been arduous to get enough nations on board with the plan, leading the U.S. to lift the proposed price cap.  At the same time, it may be difficult for Russia to overcome the looming insurance ban, since the country may not have enough ships to avoid reducing exports.
  • Although the U.S. is the world’s largest oil producer, it is also a major consumer as well. Complicating matters is the mismatch between what U.S. drillers produce and what refiners use.  The U.S. tends to produce more sweet/light oil, whereas U.S. refiners prefer sour/heavy crudes.  Thus, the U.S. tends to export the former and import the latter to make the adjustment.  There are two nearby producers that generate sour/heavy oils: Canada and Venezuela.  The former is a major exporter to the U.S.  However, recent prices suggest that Canada could export even more to the U.S. if pipeline constraints were relieved.
  • In recent reports, we have discussed how the SPR is evolving from a strategic reserve to a buffer stock. It seems that others are also thinking in a similar fashion.  Buffer stocks in commodities have operated to the benefit of both consumers and producers, but they have a long history of failure.  Scenes of blocks of processed cheese being tossed to the crowds from the back of trucks in the 1980s were the result of a buffer stock of dairy products that were used to keep milk prices above their market-clearing level.  In our current situation, the failure point for the SPR is that there will never be a price low enough to trigger buying for the reserve.  That’s because consumers really like free goods, and once you start buying for the SPR, you are setting a floor price.

(Source: Bloomberg)

  • The current spread of Western Canadian Select and WTI is nearly $30 per barrel, nearly double the average of $16.  Unfortunately, expanding pipelines is difficult, since local opposition tends to be high, and environmentalists have targeted pipeline construction as a way to reduce oil and gas production.  So, instead, the administration is considering easing sanctions on Venezuela.  Caracas has been under sanctions for its repressive tactics and support of drug trafficking.
  • After prompting OPEC+ to cut production targets recently, the Saudi oil minister suggested that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) might be willing to lift output if the energy crisis worsens. He also suggested that the recent cuts had more to do with maintaining a supply buffer than lifting prices.
  • Recently we have reported that LNG tankers are sitting off the Iberian Peninsula waiting to disgorge their cargos. Initially, it seemed they lacked a space to dock and regassify.  However, recent indications suggest it may be more about waiting for higher prices.  After all, as we noted last week, prices for prompt natural gas briefly turned negative due to weak prompt demandWeaker EU demand relative to supply is creating a game of “chicken” for buyers and sellers.  Current sellers who are hedged have to deliver the gas, and if they can’t, they must either take a lower price or offset the position but pay to store the gas on a tanker, which isn’t cheap.
  • COVID infections are disrupting China’s coal industry.

 Geopolitical News:

 Alternative Energy/Policy News:

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