Asset Allocation Weekly (May 27, 2016)

by Asset Allocation Committee

As promised, this week we will discuss how President Clinton’s policies would likely affect the financial markets.  It should be noted that, unlike Mr. Trump, Sen. Clinton has published most of her policy positions.  However, there have been apparent shifts in her policy positions as Clinton adjusts her campaign to react to changes in the election environment.

Sen. Clinton’s campaign is similar to that of a succeeding vice president: In 2008, when Clinton ran against Barack Obama, she framed him as an ephemeral dreamer who lacked the necessary experience to accomplish much.  Early in her 2016 campaign, she appeared to be distancing herself from the president.  For example, President Obama has characterized his foreign policy as “don’t do stupid s*@t.”  Clinton suggested that this sentiment wasn’t a working foreign policy stance for the world’s superpower.  Her comment raised expectations that she would triangulate a position different from Obama and her GOP opponent.

However, as it became apparent that she faced a legitimate primary threat from Sen. Sanders, Clinton, in an effort to secure the African American voter block, has completely embraced President Obama and has framed Sanders’s calls for new policies as a repudiation of Obama’s legacy.  This position has been very effective in securing African American votes and has also given her an edge in closed primaries, taking advantage of Obama’s popularity with most Democrats.  However, in open primaries, which allow independents to vote, and in areas with white voters, Sen. Clinton has underperformed Sen. Sanders.  While tying her fate to President Obama’s legacy has been mostly effective in winning the nomination,[1] Clinton’s positioning as essentially the third term of the Obama administration is a risky general election strategy as she will face the debate line, “if you liked the last eight years, you should vote for Hillary.”[2]

What can we expect from a Clinton administration?

Foreign Policy: This is one of the few areas where we would expect a Clinton government to differ significantly from the outgoing administration.  Clinton is much more hawkish than Obama and her positions are in direct opposition to the apparent populist mood of the nation.  During her time as secretary of state, she often favored a more hawkish foreign policy than the president, pushing for greater military involvement in the world.  Although she isn’t a neoconservative, she is about as close to one as this group can hope for among the remaining candidates.  In terms of Meade’s archetypes, she is Wilsonian.  Thus, we would not be surprised to see neoconservatives, who usually vote Republican, drift toward Sen. Clinton.

Domestic Policy: As noted above, she is proposing nothing more than maintaining and defending the Obama policy legacy.  That  policy means preserving Obamacare, holding tax rates at current levels or perhaps raising them modestly on the very wealthy, and expanding on the regulatory legacy started by President Obama.

Trade Policy: On trade, Clinton has generally supported free trade agreements.  She was originally in favor of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) before she turned against it.  We seriously doubt she actually opposes either this agreement or the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), but given the rising unpopularity of such agreements and the fact that both Sen. Sanders and Mr. Trump have made opposition to trade a major plank of their platforms, Clinton has been forced to tack left on this issue.  We think there is a chance that President Obama will try to get the TPP passed before he leaves office; in fact, he may accomplish this during the “lame duck” session after the November elections.  Although a President-elect Clinton would officially oppose this tactic, in reality, we suspect she would privately support it.

Immigration: The Democratic Party and, by extension, Sen. Clinton have generally supported easing restrictions on immigration and want to create a “path to citizenship” for illegal aliens living in the U.S.  This position will alienate her with white, working-class voters, perhaps putting swing states like Ohio and Pennsylvania in play, but could help Clinton wrest Arizona and Georgia from GOP hands.

Defense: We would expect Clinton to have a better relationship with the military than President Obama.  In fact, it would not be a surprise if she asked Ash Carter, the current secretary of defense, to stay on in her administration.  Given her foreign policy stance, the military would likely be utilized more often in her government.

Fiscal Policy: Clinton would likely run an orthodox fiscal policy with a modest tilt toward raising taxes.

Environmental Policy: Her policies will likely follow in the trends established by President Obama.  We would not expect anything as radical as Sen. Sanders’s bid to end fracking.  At the same time, her policies won’t revive coal and we would expect a steadily tightening regulatory environment for oil and gas producers.

The market impact from a Clinton presidency would be negligible.  Not only is she a solid member of the political establishment, but because she is running a campaign similar to a succeeding vice president, she will have virtually no political capital to bring “change” after gaining office.  Thus, the slow growth, low inflation economic environment would likely continue.  If markets fear a Trump presidency is likely and financial markets weaken into the election due to these fears, then a strong relief rally may ensue from a Clinton presidency, which is about the most notable market impact that would occur.

In our asset allocation views, we have consistently held that inflation would remain low; we have tended to favor longer duration in fixed income and generally supported equities.  A Clinton presidency would maintain the status quo.  We would continue to closely monitor the evolution of populism in the U.S., which threatens the current low inflation environment, but we would not expect Clinton to support a populist agenda.  Bottom line: a Clinton presidency is a status quo outcome.

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[1] Although one could argue that she has barely been able to beat an elderly socialist.

[2] It should be noted that Gov. Reagan used a similar line against President Carter in a debate; some historians have argued that this phrase turned the election for Reagan.

Daily Comment (May 26, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] Last week, the finance ministers of the G-7 met; now the leaders are meeting.  There is no lack of topics for discussion.  Although China isn’t a member, there has been some discussion of China’s activity in the South China Sea.  China, of course, suggests that this isn’t a proper issue for G-7 discussion.  The G-7 apparently disagrees and says it will send a “strong message” on this issue.  Much of the discussion centered on the global economy.  President Obama took some time out of his schedule to make disparaging remarks about Donald Trump.  Probably the most important post-meeting issue will be Japan’s handling of the JPY.  We would not be surprised to see Japan take steps to weaken its currency in the wake of this meeting.

The FT reported on a Conference Board study that focused on weak productivity in the U.S.

This chart shows the annual change in real output per hour worked with the postwar average.  Clearly, since 2011, real output per hour work has slumped; it isn’t completely clear why.  Some of this could simply be that there is excessive productive capacity in the economy compared to demand, and so the economy may not be able to efficiently produce what we need.  A more likely reason is that workers are flooding the low productivity parts of the economy which pay little but are mostly protected from technology and globalization.  That would explain a good bit of the wage disparity.  Raising wages in these sectors will simply force these industries to deploy automation (in fact, a former CEO of a fast food firm warned today about lifting the minimum wage due to this threat).

Oil prices moved above $50 this morning.  Yesterday, the DOE reported that oil inventories fell 4.2 mb last week, more than the 1.6 mb decline expected.  It does appear that the Alberta fires probably cut imports and led to the bigger than expected decline (we participate in the various media surveys and were projecting a 3.0 mb draw).  Crude oil inventories remain elevated but are clearly in the seasonal liquidation period.

This chart shows the current level of stockpiles, along with last year’s storage level and the five-year average.

This year’s seasonal pattern is showing faster than normal withdrawals because of the unexpected drop in inventories recorded in early April.  Since then, stocks have been reacting fairly close to normal but have failed to narrow the gap.

Based on the average EUR exchange rate and current oil inventories, fair value for crude oil is $40.72.  Assuming a €/$ exchange rate of 1.133 (the current closing average, month to date), the current price has discounted oil inventories of approximately 480 mb, or 57 mb below current levels.  That would be a much faster decline in the inventory overhang than the current pattern would generate.  Although we are friendly to oil longer term, the oil market has already discounted a significant storage withdrawal that is probably not going to happen.  In other words, the current price is a bit rich based on the dollar and inventories.

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Daily Comment (May 25, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] It was another quiet night for news.  EU officials hailed a “breakthrough” in debt talks with Greece.  Officials met “into the wee, small hours of the morning”[1] and agreed to release €10.3 bn of new funds to Greece in recognition of the fiscal reforms already made by the country.  The EU did agree to offer debt relief in 2018, if necessary, to meet agreed upon criteria on its payment burden.  This deal is nothing more than political expediency and the continued process of extending and pretending.  The IMF was threatening to walk away from further involvement in the Greek situation.  For Eurozone leaders, IMF participation gives the negotiations an air of global involvement; without the IMF, the Eurozone/Greek problems are simply a European situation that requires a European solution.  The German translation of “European solution” is “Germany pays.”  Thus, the Germans are desperate to keep the IMF on board, and to do so Germany has to offer some promise of debt relief.  German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble wants to avoid any sort of debt relief to Greece before the 2018 German national elections.  Thus, he made vague promises of future debt relief after said elections and the IMF agreed to the deal.  Essentially, all that has occurred is that Greece will receive much-needed bailout funds and the Germans have delayed the likely necessary debt relief by two years.  When 2018 rolls around, we doubt Germany will be any more open to writing off the debt, which is deeply unpopular in Germany.  Still, this agreement will forestall any immediate crisis in Europe.

China and the U.S. are holding talks on June 6-7, known as the “U.S.-China Strategic & Economic Dialogue.”  According to Bloomberg, Chinese officials are going to ask U.S. officials when the Fed is going to raise rates and by how much.  According to reports, Chinese officials are quite concerned about the Fed’s decision to raise rates because it will make managing the exchange rate more difficult.  Yesterday, we discussed a WSJ report that indicated the PBOC has abandoned the practice of allowing market forces to adjust the exchange rate.  Essentially, Chinese officials seem to back the idea of the market setting prices until the market does something these same officials don’t like.  Then, they intervene to get the outcome they want.  China does not want to see a weaker CNY because it fears that a rapidly weakening currency will trigger capital flight.  It appears that the PBOC is allowing the CNY to gradually weaken in anticipation of a rate move.

(Source: Bloomberg)

This chart shows a 10-year chart of the CNY/USD exchange rate on an inverted scale.  Note that the Chinese currency did appreciate earlier this year but has started to weaken again.  We suspect that if Chinese officials hear from U.S. officials that a hike will occur this summer, the PBOC will try to get in front of the move by gradually allowing the CNY to weaken further.  The hope is that when the rate hike occurs in the U.S. it won’t lead to a sudden weakening of the exchange rate, which would lead to panicky capital flight out of China.  Most likely, Chinese officials would prefer the Fed to keep rates steady; an appreciating dollar means that China must either maintain its loose peg, meaning its currency strengthens and undermines exports and growth, or allow the CNY to depreciate and risk capital flight.

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[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sqCLsp5owY8

Daily Comment (May 24, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] It’s another quiet morning in front of Chair Yellen’s speech on Friday.  Yesterday, Dallas FRB President Harker added to voices calling for a rate hike this summer.  Fed funds futures are putting the odds of a June hike at about 32%, but the odds are over 50% for July.

One of the comments we hear frequently is, “how can a mere 25 bps rate hike matter all that much?”  By itself, the small rate hike really doesn’t matter.  The greater issue is the projection of future policy.

This chart shows the implied three-month LIBOR rate from the Eurodollar futures market.  It is a reasonably good gauge of market expectations toward future short-term interest rates.  Note how the implied rate was running around 40 bps when then-Fed Chair Bernanke began to talk about “tapering” the pace of the Fed’s balance sheet expansion in Q2 2013.  This decision marked, in our opinion, the beginning of the FOMC’s tightening cycle.  Implied rates rose nearly 160 bps.  A 200 bps reading on three-month LIBOR is consistent with a fed funds target of 175 bps.  As the FOMC raised the policy rate to a range of 25-50 bps last December, the implied LIBOR rate jumped about 50 bps.  It is interesting now that, even with rate hike expectations rising, the implied LIBOR rate has not increased by a lot.  The current reading discounts a fed funds target of roughly 100 bps two years from now.

If the implied LIBOR rate remains low, it would suggest that the market doesn’t expect the Fed to raise rates very much and thus, the financial market impact from a summer rate hike probably won’t be as bearish of an event as we saw in Q1.  Of course, the tenor of the Eurodollar market could change over time.  Nevertheless, based on what we know right now, the effect of a summer tightening probably won’t be all that extreme.  We will continue to closely monitor the deferred Eurodollar futures for clues about market expectations toward monetary policy.

The GBP is higher this morning after recent polls in the U.K. showed that the vote in favor of remaining in the EU holds a 13-point lead over those who support leaving.  We generally expect the U.K. to remain in the EU.  The economic benefits are high.  However, one issue we are watching closely has to do with the reliability of polling.  It is quite possible that voters polled may be lying about saying they will vote to remain.  Why?  Because establishment opinion clearly supports the campaign to stay and is painting those who want to leave as economically illiterate xenophobes.  Admitting to a pollster that one is such a person might be hard.  If the actual vote turns out to be much closer than these polls signal, it will offer us some insight into U.S. polling.  More specifically, it may be difficult for voters to admit they support Donald Trump and thus polls may be underestimating his popularity.  If the Brexit polling turns out to overestimate the support for remaining in the EU, then it may also be a harbinger of similar circumstances for Donald Trump.

The WSJ grabbed a major scoop yesterday when it ran a story suggesting that the Xi government is only giving lip service to the idea that financial markets are allowed to set exchange rates, and that stability is the primary goal of the regime, not clearing markets.  According to the report, in early January, the PBOC jettisoned the market-based mechanism; this change was unannounced.  Instead, the central bank now adjusts the CNY’s daily value based on directives from Beijing.  There is an old adage in economics that fixing one price forces other markets to experience higher volatility.  Fixing the exchange rate gives the illusion of stability that should ease the incentive for capital flight.  On the other hand, it makes China’s export sector more vulnerable to Fed tightening; if the dollar rallies, the CNY will appreciate as well.  It will also slow the drive to make the CNY a widely used reserve currency as history shows that fixed exchange rates eventually become unpegged, and the shifts tend to be violent when they lose their anchorThe fact that the WSJ nabbed this report is, in itself, an interesting part of the story too.  It suggests the Xi government wants to signal to the world that it is re-pegging its currency and wants this information to be distributed by an unimpeachable source.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – Sykes-Picot: 100 Years Later (May 23, 2016)

by Kaisa Stucke, CFA

Last week marked the 100th anniversary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the disintegrating Ottoman Empire territories in the Middle East into British-controlled and French-controlled areas following WWI.  One hundred years after the agreement, the effects of the borders established by these European powers continue to reverberate as the region remains unstable.  The Middle East has a rich and complex history that could fill several volumes of books.  Although we will give a condensed overview of the long history in the region, we will focus on the WWI time period, specifically the circumstances that led to the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

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Daily Comment (May 23, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] The G-7 meeting ended with a reaffirmed pledge not to weaken currencies.  Japanese Finance Minister Aso said that the country will not be delaying a planned sales tax hike.  Additionally, BOJ Governor Kuroda indicated that the central bank is ready to use additional monetary stimulus as soon as this summer if conditions warrant.

Japanese and European PMI were generally soft, although the reasons seem to be temporary rather than indications of longer term trends.  Japanese manufacturing PMI remained below the expansionary line and also weakened from the month before.  Eurozone aggregate manufacturing disappointed, but remained above the expansionary line.  France’s manufacturing remained in contractionary territory, while Germany’s manufacturing was stronger than forecast (see table below in Foreign Economic News).

Expectations for a rate hike this summer are rising as Fed speakers indicate willingness to hike either at the June or July meeting.  Yellen’s speech on Friday was instrumental in shaping market expectations.

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Asset Allocation Weekly (May 20, 2016)

by Asset Allocation Committee

As promised, this week we will discuss how President Trump’s policies would likely affect the financial markets.  It should be noted that Mr. Trump has not published any clear policy papers, so our descriptions are based on his public comments.  Next week, we will discuss the expected policies and financial market effects from President Clinton.

Trump is a right-wing populist.  This means we would expect him to support the following list of policies:

Immigration: Immigration is perhaps the most ancestrally common experience of most Americans.  The acceptance of people from other places makes the U.S. unique.  In the U.S., if you pass the citizenship exam and take the oath, you are an American.  However, in most European nations, becoming a citizen does not make one “French” or “Italian.”  Despite this commonality of experience, immigrants have not always been welcomed.  The “Know-Nothings” in the 1850s opposed the influx of Irish and German Catholics to America, fearing they would undermine American values.  Often, lower skilled workers face competition from immigrants which drives down wages in certain parts of the job market.  Compounding the problem is that approximately 10 to 12 million foreigners are in the U.S. illegally, signaling a lack of border control.  The political establishment tends to turn a “blind eye” to illegal immigration; for the right-wing establishment, this form of immigration provides a steady supply of low wage workers.  For the left-wing establishment, a “path to citizenship” would be expected to create new left-wing voters.  Trump has appealed to right-wing populists who likely face, or perceive that they face, wage competition from illegal immigration.  Thus, Mr. Trump’s “build the wall” message raises the hopes of lower income workers that wages could rise.

Defense: Although Mr. Trump has campaigned on making a strong military, his positions are actually more nuanced than they first appear.  Specifically, he has adopted positions similar to Sen. McCain (R-AZ) on many spending programs, which is to hold a skeptical eye toward spending programs.  For example, Trump appears to oppose the F-35 and suggests that spending more on existing platforms makes better sense because of the inadequacies of the newer aircraft.  This will infuriate the establishment on both wings who tend to support newer systems that bring money to their states and districts.  Trump has promised to let the military choose what weapons it wants and threatens the infamous “military-industrial complex.”

Foreign Policy: As noted last week, Trump is a classic Jacksonian based on the Meade archetypes.  This characterization means he will run an isolationist foreign policy, although he will tend to overreact to perceived slights.  In other words, he may allow Iraq to crumble and not oppose Japanese remilitarization.  He has made it abundantly clear that he won’t act as the “world’s policeman.”  On the other hand, we would expect him to react strongly to Russian “buzzing” of U.S. Navy vessels or hostage-taking by terrorist groups.  Postwar treaty organizations, like NATO, or other bodies like the U.N., will probably be ignored or allowed to deteriorate.

Trade Policy: Trump sees himself as a deal maker.  He wants to renegotiate existing agreements and get better deals on pending ones.  He has strongly opposed outsourcing and has threatened trade retaliation against China.

Fiscal Policy: Trump promises to maintain middle class entitlements, namely, Social Security and Medicare.  He has promised to replace Obamacare but the details on its replacement are not clear.  His tax policy would lead to significantly higher deficits, even when using “dynamic scoring,” which accounts for the revenue impact of higher economic growth.  His comments on Treasury debt have been interesting—he has suggested that Treasury debt could be restructured, but reversed himself when he apparently discovered that restructuring would not be necessary since the U.S. prints the money required to service the debt.  Although it is difficult to determine with certainty, Trump could prove to be more amenable to heterodox economic policies, e.g., “helicopter money,” if a recession were to develop.  In any case, there is nothing to suggest that Trump is a deficit hawk.

The market impact of a Trump presidency could be significant; at the same time, it is always important to remember that the structure of the American government tends to restrain aggressive policy changes.  Rahm Emanuel’s famous quote of “you never let a serious crisis go to waste” reflects the structure of American government in that major changes usually only occur when conditions are bad enough to force the change.  Newly elected, first-term presidents are at the peak of their political capital early in their terms; we expect President Trump’s first priority will be immigration.  Beyond that, he may find some support for his anti-trade policies and Congress can’t force the president to intervene abroad.

There are two key changes that we see from a Trump presidency.  Domestically, Trump’s policies are essentially reflationist.  His opposition to globalization by interfering with trade and immigration will likely make the economy less efficient and lift price levels.  For Trump’s constituents, it’s a mixed bag.  Although higher prices will undermine their buying power, the likelihood of them getting jobs, at least at first, will rise.  Eventually, those jobs may face automation pressures, but that will take some time.  For the establishment, the outcome is unequivocally negative; rising inflation will raise interest rates, narrow profit margins and compress price/earnings multiples.

The second major change from a Trump presidency is the end of Pax Americana.  As noted above, Trump has made it clear that he wants to end the U.S. role of world policeman.  Without American leadership, the world will devolve into regional power centers with competing hegemonic powers; in other words, China will square off against Japan and India, Russia and Germany could be at odds again and Saudi Arabia and Turkey could line up against Iran.  These policies will certainly lead to deglobalization and cut global supply chains, leading to less efficiency and exacerbating the already inflationist tendencies of Trump’s immigration and trade policies.

In our asset allocation views, we have consistently held that inflation would remain low; we have tended to favor longer duration in fixed income and generally supported equities.  A Trump presidency would likely be a harbinger of inflation which would lead us to adjust these positions.  Rising inflation coupled with deregulated financial markets will almost certainly lead to higher long-term interest rates.  Equity markets will face pressures as well.  On the other hand, commodity prices will tend to rally if real interest rates turn negative.  The impact on the dollar is more mixed.  We really have no historical instance where the primary reserve currency is running protectionist trade policies.  Because there is built-in demand for the reserve currency and protectionism blocks the traditional path for other countries to acquire the reserve currency, the dollar would become scarce.  Paradoxically, Trump’s policies could lead to a significantly stronger dollar as other nations take steps to reduce costs and the prices of their exports to offset tariffs and other trade barriers.  Although it would seem that Trump’s policies would spell the end of the dollar’s reign as the primary reserve currency, there is no obvious replacement to the dollar.  In addition, we would expect the Federal Reserve, assuming it remains independent, to raise rates to contain rising price levels, giving a further boost to the dollar.  Although Congress will act as a restraint on Trump, as the current president has shown, some of these constraints can be evaded through regulatory policy and executive orders.  Bottom line: a Trump presidency will likely bring higher inflation, reversing 36 years of disinflationary policies.

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Daily Comment (May 20, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] Markets were quiet overnight.  The G-7 meeting, being held in Japan, is probably the most important event going on at the moment.  So far, Japan has been politely discouraged from using tools to weaken the JPY.  We suspect that after this meeting ends, Japan will take steps to weaken the currency regardless of G-7 opposition.  We believe we are in a world where every nation wants a weaker currency.  Since that is mathematically impossible, those nations with the potential for currency strength, such as the U.S., are trying to use moral suasion to discourage other nations from using policy to create currency depreciation.  Since the Fed appears ready to lift rates, don’t be surprised to see the dollar strengthen over the next few weeks.  A stronger dollar would weigh on commodity prices and emerging markets.  In fact, a rising currency tends to act as a form of monetary policy tightening, so if we are right about a recovery in the greenback, it would act as a force multiplier to any Fed action to lift rates.  We don’t expect anything of substance to emerge out of the communiqué at the end of the G-7 meeting tomorrow.  However, we will be watching Japan closely after the meeting ends and expect some moves to weaken the JPY.

It appears that the EU will extend Russian sanctions.  We expected Putin to work harder to get sanctions lifted, but he may be facing a bandwidth problem.  Because he doesn’t seem to delegate well, he probably was so consumed with the Syrian operation that he was unable to take the time to woo EU governments to change their stance on sanctions.  At the same time, the EU is usually plagued with inertia.  It was difficult to get sanctions in place to begin with and, once in place, it takes almost the same effort to end them.  Continued sanctions will keep pressure on the Russian economy and leave it at the mercy of oil prices.

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Daily Comment (May 19, 2016)

by Bill O’Grady and Kaisa Stucke

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] The FOMC minutes were more hawkish than the market expected.  In fact, in the minutes, the members expressed concern that the financial markets are underestimating the likelihood of a rate move.  The committee felt that foreign risks have lessened and several suggested that the balance of risks between inflation and recession are “balanced,” although this sentiment did not make it into the statement.  This signals that the balance of risks sentiment was not universal.  The minutes now indicate that June is a live meeting.

This morning, we are seeing markets move to discount a hike this summer.  Fed funds futures now put the odds of a June meeting hike at 30%, which are up from 4% last week.  The odds for July are up to nearly 48%.  Short-term interest rates are reflecting this change in sentiment as well.

(Source: Bloomberg)

This chart shows the two -year Treasury yield.  This yield, which is very sensitive to the policy rate, is moving rapidly higher and rose further in light of the minutes.

There were other interesting tidbits in the report.  The staff presented papers about using “macroprudential measures” to deal with financial market distortions and generally came down on the side that regulation will tend to not work as well as needed.  This is the position of Vice Chair Fischer.  This means that if markets become askew and overvalued, tightening might be necessary and cuts might be in order if they get panicky.  Chair Yellen’s public comments suggest she believes macroprudential measures can be deployed successfully to deflate bubbles; she may be a minority on this issue.

We have noted our worries recently about how one-sided the financial markets have become on monetary policy, essentially almost ruling out any rate hikes this year.  That position may end up being accurate, given the uncertainty this election cycle could engender.  Nevertheless, it is clear from the minutes that the Fed is leaning toward raising rates at some point this year.  We see yesterday’s comments as a bit negative for equities and bonds.  The market with the most potential to move is probably the dollar.

The U.S. inventory situation unexpectedly worsened last week as inventories rose by 1.3 mb when a decline was forecast.  Current stockpiles are 541.3 mb.  We expect that the April high of 543.4 mb will prove to be this year’s peak.

Historically, inventories remain elevated, but they are clearly lagging the usual seasonal pattern.

It is important to remember that the dollar is playing a bigger role in determining oil prices.

5-19-16 daily4

Based on inventories alone, oil prices are profoundly overvalued with a fair value price of $25.36.  Meanwhile, the EUR/WTI model generates a fair value of $53.49.  Together (which is a more sound methodology), fair value is $40.59, meaning that current prices are a bit rich.  Still, for those interested in oil, the Fed is arguably more important for the future of oil prices than the DOE inventories, and the Fed minutes are bearish for oil prices.  Simply put, a rate hike in June would likely lead to a much stronger dollar and weaker oil prices.  For example, a $1.100 EUR/ USD would generate a fair value for oil at $34.53, assuming current inventories.  We don’t expect the FOMC to move rates higher next month, but it is a risk to oil prices.

In other news, we are monitoring news on EgyptAir Flight 804, which apparently crashed this morning.  If it turns out to be a terrorist event, it will tend to boost nationalist fervor and likely help Candidate Trump.  On that topic, today’s FT reports that business lobbying groups prefer Senator Clinton to Donald Trump by a ratio of 2:1.  Although this position is different from what we have seen in the past, as the GOP has been considered the party of capital, Trump is running as a nationalist-leaning populist.  Given the choice between the establishment and populism, business will tend to lean toward the former.

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