Asset Allocation Weekly (July 2, 2021)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

(Due to the Independence Day holiday, there will not be an accompanying podcast and chart book this week. The multimedia offerings associated with this report will resume next week, July 9.)

The Wall Street Journal Dollar Index, which tracks the dollar’s value relative to seven major currencies, has fallen nearly 10% since March 2020. Generally, when the dollar weakens it leads to an increase in the price of U.S. imports and a decrease in the price of U.S. exports. The drop in export prices may be good for U.S. exporters in the long term, but the rise in import prices may have a negative impact on consumers. For example, the recent rise in gasoline prices can at least be partially explained by the depreciation in the dollar. The rise in import prices has posed a dilemma for many U.S. firms that rely on imports. They can choose to raise prices and risk losing market share or they can maintain prices and accept smaller profit margins. In this report, we discuss how a weaker dollar may contribute to inflationary pressures.

Most trade is contracted and settled in U.S. dollars. As a result, it is relatively easy for Americans to purchase foreign goods and services from abroad. In the year ended in March, the value of imported consumer goods, automobiles, and food and beverage was equivalent to more than a quarter of all U.S. consumption spending. That being said, this dynamic does not always favor U.S. trade partners. Because trades are primarily transacted in U.S. dollars, exporters to the U.S. bear most of the currency risk. This is especially true in the initial stages of currency depreciation as contracts prevent foreign exporters from adjusting their prices in response to the weakening dollar. Exporters are initially forced to absorb the currency depreciation through narrower profit margins, all else being equal. As sales are implemented over time, however, the foreign exporters are able to adjust their prices. In other words, import prices are sticky in the short-run but flexible in the long-run. The impact currency has on trade can be seen in changes to a country’s balance of trade.

In the initial stages of currency depreciation, U.S. importers are incentivized to buy more goods and services before the contract ends, thus leading to an increase in imports. At the same time, U.S. exports remain stable as it takes time for firms to expand production to meet the new demand. The trade balance therefore tends to weaken. Over time, however, the decline in the trade balance reverses as consumers find alternatives to the more expensive imports and exporters are able to expand their capacity to meet the increase of foreign demand. The initial decline followed by an upward swing in the trade balance is referred to as the J-curve effect.

Despite the correlation between the dollar and import prices, firms don’t always have the leeway to push the adjustment onto consumers. During the Great Recession of 2008-2009 and the period immediately following, merchandise import prices significantly outpaced the rise in consumer prices. The discrepancy is possibly related to economic conditions. In the months leading up to the recession, there weren’t many signs of significant supply chain disruptions. As a result, many firms were hesitant to push the increase in import prices onto their consumers out of fear of losing market share. Today, that isn’t the case. Supply chain disruptions and strong demand due to post-pandemic reopenings have made it easier for firms to push the rise in import prices onto their consumers. As a result, the rise in consumer prices closely matches the rise in import prices.

Although we are confident that the dollar’s depreciation has contributed to the rise in inflation, we still believe supply shortages and stronger demand are the primary drivers. However, if we are wrong, this would likely mean that elevated levels of inflation may be around longer than we have anticipated. In this case, the Fed would likely be forced to raise rates earlier than it has forecast, which would be bullish for the dollar and bearish for commodities.

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Business Cycle Report (June 30, 2021)

by Thomas Wash | PDF

The business cycle has a major impact on financial markets; recessions usually accompany bear markets in equities.  The intention of this report is to keep our readers apprised of the potential for recession, updated on a monthly basis.  Although it isn’t the final word on our views about recession, it is part of our process in signaling the potential for a downturn.

In May, the diffusion index rose further above the recession indicator, signaling that the recovery continues. In the financial markets, a sharp rise in inflation expectations led to a modest sell-off in equities in the middle of the month. Meanwhile, construction and manufacturing activity slowed as increasing costs for materials are becoming a problem for homebuilders and factories. Lastly, the labor market showed signs of strengthening as hiring increased and the unemployment rate dropped. As a result, eight out of the 11 indicators are in expansion territory. The diffusion index rose from +0.333 to +0.3939, above the recession signal of +0.2500.

The chart above shows the Confluence Diffusion Index. It uses a three-month moving average of 11 leading indicators to track the state of the business cycle. The red line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a contraction, while the blue line signals when the business cycle is headed toward a recovery. On average, the diffusion index is currently providing about six months of lead time for a contraction and five months of lead time for a recovery. Continue reading for a more in-depth understanding of how the indicators are performing and refer to our Glossary of Charts at the back of this report for a description of each chart and what it measures. A chart title listed in red indicates that indicator is signaling recession.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Mid-Year Geopolitical Outlook (June 28, 2021)

by Bill O’Grady & Patrick Fearon-Hernandez, CFA | PDF

(Due to the Independence Day holiday and a short summer hiatus, the next report will be published July 12.)

As is our custom, we update our geopolitical outlook for the remainder of the year as the first half comes to a close.  This report is less a series of predictions as it is a list of potential geopolitical issues that we believe will dominate the international landscape for the rest of the year.  It is not designed to be exhaustive; instead, it focuses on the “big picture” conditions that we believe will affect policy and markets going forward.  They are listed in order of importance.

Issue #1: A New Hegemonic Model

Issue #2: China Increasingly Dominating the Hong Kong Stock Market

Issue #3: China and Inflation

Quick Hits: This section is a roundup of geopolitical issues we are watching that haven’t risen to the level of concern described above but should be monitored.

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Asset Allocation Weekly (June 25, 2021)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

Every quarter, the Federal Reserve publishes the Financial Accounts of the U.S., previously referred to as the Flow of Funds report.  The report is huge and provides a balance sheet and income statement of sorts for the economy.  The data offer interesting insights into the financial situation of the economy.  In this week’s report, we will highlight some of our favorite charts.

This first chart shows net saving for the economy.

Net saving is a balance sheet concept; saving in one sector must, by design, be offset by dissaving in another.  The pandemic has clearly led to a historic accumulation of household saving, mostly created by a similar increase in government dissaving.  How these household savings are used will be the key to the economy and markets for the next few years.  If it goes to consumption, inflation will likely accelerate.  It could also go toward debt reduction, which would lead to slower immediate growth but lay the groundwork for better future consumption.  It could also go to financial assets; later this month, the Fed will update the distribution data and we will update the allocation of this saving by income group.  Although the household saving and government dissaving does dominate the chart, the foreign and business saving data are also important.  Foreign saving is the inverse of the current account; since the U.S. runs a current account deficit, essentially, it is acquiring foreign saving.  That number has started to rise as well.  On the other hand, business saving has turned negative, which often supports increases in business investment.

This chart shows the shares of national income by capital and labor as a percentage of national income.   Since 1990, when communism fell, we have seen capital income rising against labor in each business cycle.  There is a tendency for labor to gain on capital during recessions, mostly because capital income tends to fall more than wages during recessions.  At some point, we suspect this trend will be reversed as it isn’t politically sustainable.  But that change probably won’t occur until much later this decade.

Finally, the last chart that caught our attention was one that shows we are nearing a normalization of housing finance.

This chart shows home mortgages as a percentage of the value of real estate.  At the peak of the housing crisis, home mortgages were more than 50% of the value of housing.  This was partly due to leverage and partly due to falling home prices.  The combination of conservative housing finance and rising home prices has led to rising home equity (and, consequently, lower leverage as this chart shows).  We are not at the level of the mid-1980s, but we are approaching it.  As home finance improves, it should bolster further expansion in the housing sector.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Geopolitics of the Colonial Pipeline Ransomware Attack: Part II (June 21, 2021)

by Bill O’Grady | PDF

In Part I, we provided an overview of the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, followed by reflections on organized crime and why ransomware has become so attractive to criminals.  We also described Darkside, the firm involved in the attack.  This week, we will conclude with a discussion of why this attack was a mistake and who will suffer from it.  As always, we will conclude with market ramifications.

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Asset Allocation Weekly (June 18, 2021)

by the Asset Allocation Committee | PDF

As the global economy begins to recover from the coronavirus, we’ve been warning that the apparent surge in price inflation may not be all that it seems.  Inflation is usually calculated as the percentage change over one year.  Since many consumer prices stagnated or fell at the start of the pandemic a year ago and only recently started to recover, “base effects” alone make it look like inflation is extraordinarily high.  In fact, the May consumer price index (CPI) was up 5.0% from one year earlier, marking its biggest annual gain since mid-2008.  To look through the unusual pandemic distortions and see where the trends really are, we’ve begun to focus more on the two-year rate of change.  As shown in the chart below, a comparison of the CPI in May 2021 versus the CPI in May 2019 would imply an average annual rise of just 2.5% over the last two years.  That’s still elevated compared with the recent past, but it’s only half as big as the inflation rate calculated over one year.

We’ve been arguing that these base effects will drop out of the calculation and result in more moderate inflation readings later this year, but the same can be said for many other economic indicators, even if they aren’t typically calculated on a year-over-year basis.  For example, the Federal Reserve’s index of manufacturing production for April (latest available data) was up an astounding 22.8% from April 2020.  However, that largely reflects base effects related to last spring’s sharp drop in output followed by a more recent recovery in production.  If we compare output in April 2021 to the output in April 2019, the average annual increase over the last two years comes to -0.9%.  In other words, factory production these days is actually a bit less than it was before the pandemic.

The concept of base effects may be especially important for stock investors as they look at corporate earnings.  In the first quarter of 2021, earnings per share (EPS) on the S&P 500 index will be up approximately 288.1% year-over-year, but that’s only because of the sharp drop in profits at the outset of the pandemic followed by a recovery in recent quarters.  As shown in the chart below, the expected EPS of $46.10 would only represent an average annual gain of about 14.7% over the last two years.  That’s better than the average annual EPS growth of about 8.4% over the last couple of decades, but it’s still weaker than the average gain of 16.2% over the most recent five years.  In sum, investors should be mindful of the big distortions that the pandemic has caused in all kinds of economic and financial data.  Looking at the two-year average changes may help investors gauge the true state of affairs more accurately.  While we still think equities can perform well in the near term, the gains may be much less dramatic than might be implied by just the year-over-year earnings growth.

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Weekly Geopolitical Report – The Geopolitics of the Colonial Pipeline Ransomware Attack: Part I (June 14, 2021)

by Bill O’Grady | PDF

On Thursday, May 6, 2021, hackers attacked the Colonial Pipeline, capturing data by infiltrating the company’s business software.  In response, the company closed its 5,500-mile pipeline to assess the damage and protect critical infrastructure.  Eventually, the company paid the ransom and service was restored.

Although a criminal event usually doesn’t have geopolitical ramifications, this one did, in our opinion.  The attack brought down a pipeline that connects refineries in Texas and Louisiana that provide petroleum products as far north as New Jersey.  The situation highlighted the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure, the nature of criminal ransomware enterprises, the role of cryptocurrencies in criminal transactions, and the problems of scale in criminal activity.

In Part I of this report, we will begin with an overview of the attack followed by reflections on organized crime.  We will also deal with the attractiveness and growth of ransomware.  Comments about the firm involved in the attack, Darkside, will follow.  Part II will discuss why this cyberattack was a serious mistake.  The subsequent discussion will focus on the parties that were adversely affected by this event and we will close with market ramifications.

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