Daily Comment (October 30, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] It was a heavy weekend of news.  Let’s dig in:

Manafort, Gates indicted: Paul Manafort and his former business associate, Rick Gates, were indicted this morning and told to surrender to the FBI.  Latest reports indicate that Manafort and his former partner will face charges related to tax law, money laundering and disclosure of foreign lobbying.  The media over the weekend was frothy over who might get indicted, but Manafort has been on the special council’s radar for months.  The fact that we didn’t see anything beyond these two does suggest, at least for now, that the scope of the probe remains relatively narrow.  Gates remained with the Trump campaign until after the election, but Manafort was relieved months before November.  Because the indictments were narrow in scope, we doubt this news will have significant market impact, at least in the short run.

Realtor and home builders revolt!  The National Association of Home Builders and the National Association of Realtors have officially come out in opposition to the GOP tax plan despite the fact that the deduction for state and local property taxes was retained in the proposed tax bill.  The two groups wanted a homeowner tax credit in the bill as well, but bill writers scrapped the proposal.  Losing these two groups weakens the possibility of passing a tax bill; there is a realtor in nearly every congressional district and they will flood the airwaves with critical ads in the coming weeks.  It looks to us that if a bill is going to make it through the Senate, it will need to cut rates AND keep most deductions, meaning it will be a deficit builder.   In the coming weeks, we will have more to say about the impact of a larger deficit on the economy and financial markets.  In general, the risk of larger deficits is that it leads to higher inflation, but the effects are actually rather complicated.  This chart offers one clue.

This chart shows that since the late 1980s, the fiscal account scaled to GDP tracks the dollar and leads the forex rate by two years.  The correlation isn’t perfect but it does suggest that if we are right and the deficit does widen then the dollar could be vulnerable to a broader decline, but not until 2019-20.

The Fed chair this week: The money is on Powell.

(Source: Predictit.org)

The betting site Predictit.org is indicating a more than 80% chance that Jerome Powell will be the next Fed chair.  Again, we warn that the president is prone to change his mind and we may see a surprise.  We also want to reiterate the message of this week’s Asset Allocation Weekly (see below); the FOMC will be unusually hawkish next year regardless of who is chair.

Madrid takes control: Spain’s public prosecutor has accused the entire former government of Catalonia of rebellion, sedition and embezzlement and the deposed Catalan leader, Carles Puigdemont, is calling for civil disobedience.  The polling data doesn’t really favor independence.  In fact, there was a large anti-independence demonstration over the weekend in Barcelona.  The risk is that Rajoy’s crackdown will build sympathy for the independence movement and independence-supporting candidates will win when new elections are held in December.  Again, if Rajoy wants to look at a successful playbook, the way Ottawa has dealt with Quebec Separatists is perhaps the best.

Barzani resigns: A few weeks ago, Iraqi Kurds voted for independence.  Now, the man who led that vote, Masoud Barzani, has resigned as the Kurdish region’s president.  The move has clearly backfired as Iran, Turkey and Baghdad have moved to quash Kurdish independence.  The U.S. has negotiated a ceasefire, but we are hearing that oil flows from the region have been halted.

China breaks up plot to assassinate Kim Han-sol: [1] Kim Han-sol is the son of Kim Jong-nam, the older brother of Kim Jong-un.  Earlier this year, the “Young General” apparently had his older brother assassinated.[2]  According to reports, two agents of the DPRK are in custody in Beijing and are being interrogated.  Kim Jong-un is likely worried that China might consider overthrowing him and put a relative in place to maintain the dynasty.  Thus, the current DPRK leader has an incentive to kill any potential claimants to the throne.

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[1] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-30/china-breaks-up-plot-to-kill-kim-jong-un-s-nephew-report-says

[2] https://www.confluenceinvestment.com/wp-content/uploads/weekly_geopolitical_report_3_6_2017.pdf

Asset Allocation Weekly (October 27, 2017)

by Asset Allocation Committee

It is expected that over the next two weeks President Trump is going to appoint a new Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) chair and vice chair.  In this report, we will build scenarios of how policy could change depending upon whom the president appoints.

This spreadsheet details our estimate of policy preference, with one being the most hawkish and five the most dovish.

(Sources: Federal Reserve, CIM)

The first column shows the members of the FOMC with the chair in green and vice chair in blue.  We have Fischer still on the roster even though he is now leaving.  The “all” column lists our estimates of policy bias.  The Fed has eight permanent voters—the seven governors and the New York Federal Reserve Bank (FRB) president.  The other 11 regional FRB presidents rotate into a voting position roughly every two to three years.  The last row shows the average of our hawk/dove rankings.  The current voting roster is more dovish than the FOMC as a whole.  Scenario #1 assumes no changes to the chair and vice chair roles, although we know that Fischer is leaving so this scenario is purely hypothetical.  This is to show that even with no changes at the governor level, next year’s voting roster would have been markedly more hawkish regardless, with an average ranking of 2.70 compared to the current ranking of 3.20.

Scenario #2 assumes Jerome Powell, a current governor, is appointed to chair with John Taylor as vice chair.  Powell’s seat is assumed to remain vacant for the foreseeable future, which leads to an even more hawkish FOMC, with an average of 2.33.

Interestingly enough, the FOMC voters are just about as hawkish under the next most likely scenario, with John Taylor as chair and Kevin Warsh as vice chair (Powell remains as a governor).  Finally, if Trump re-appoints Yellen but adds Taylor as vice chair, the average is 2.40; again, not a significant change in policy stance.

So, what is the most likely outcome?  Currently, Powell is considered the front-runner[1] and would be the safest candidate.  He is a moderate like Yellen and would probably maintain the current arc of policy.  According to reports, President Trump had a good meeting with John Taylor and he might select him for vice chair.  There is no indication at this point who would be selected to fill out the rest of the three open seats if Powell is appointed.  It’s possible that Kevin Warsh could be offered one as a consolation prize but, for now, we would not expect the remaining vacancies to be filled until much later in 2018.

The bottom line is that next year’s FOMC will take on a decidedly more hawkish stance due mostly to the hawkish lineup of regional bank presidents.  This is a factor that will affect our outlook for next year.

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[1] https://www.predictit.org/Market/3306/Who-will-be-Senate-confirmed-Fed-Chair-on-February-4%2c-2018

Daily Comment (October 27, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] As we detail below, Q3 GDP came in stronger than forecast.  And, yesterday’s spate of tech company earnings were quite solid.  Equities and the dollar continue to rally and interest rates are grinding higher.  Here is what we are watching:

A budget passes the House: As expected, the House passed a budget but the measure made it by a mere four votes.  The measure failed to attract any Democrat Party votes and GOP members from high income tax states tended to oppose the measure as well.  A tax bill could make it through the House over the next two weeks, but the Senate will be a different story.  If a deal does get passed (and we put the likelihood at a coin flip, at present), it won’t happen until probably late Q1 or early Q2 2018.  As the bill is developed, opposition will grow as lobbyists will try to preserve tax breaks.  At this juncture, the most controversial issue is the ending of State and Local Tax (SALT) deductions.  If this measure does pass, it could further polarize the nation politically and geographically.

Will repatriation occur?  One of the expected benefits of corporate tax reform is that money held overseas (which isn’t taxed under current law until it’s repatriated) will come flowing in, funding new projects and boosting the dollar.  Although a deal could bring the former, don’t count on the latter.  Brookings[1] notes that much of this money is already in the U.S.  Under American tax law, the earnings held overseas can be repatriated without triggering a tax event if it isn’t used for dividends, buying companies, loan collateral or making investments.  In other words, the money is already in the banking system but it is affecting the economy through bank lending, not through direct action by firms.  Thus, a deal to “bring back” the money will help stocks (we expect it to be used mostly for dividends and stock repurchases) but it won’t boost wages, investment (at current low interest rates, there is no legitimate investment project that isn’t already being made) or the dollar.

Catalonia: Catalan President Puigdemont was unable to convince his regional parliament to organize new elections and has moved to declare independence.  PM Rajoy will now almost certainly move to depose the Catalan government and take direct control of the province.  New elections will likely come in the next six months.  So far, the financial markets are taking all this tumult in stride.  Eurozone equities are higher this morning, although Draghi’s policy changes being taken as dovish and the weakness in the EUR are probably more than offsetting anything happening in Spain.  However, this drive to self-determination and the withdrawal from the center across Europe is a broader problem that will need to be managed in the future.

Will Venezuela default?  PDVSA, the Venezuelan state oil company, will need to make $985 mm in debt service payments today, and another $1.2 bn by next Thursday.  Although the country has used its 30-day grace period on some loans, these bonds don’t have this vehicle and so the money is due.  Default is looming if they fail to pay; if the debt is restructured, it would be one of the largest in history.  It is also possible that creditors will attempt to seize assets, including the Citgo refineries here in the U.S. (there are three, representing about 750 kbpd of capacity).  Although official reserves are $9.9 bn, it isn’t clear how much of that has already been pledged as collateral.  Credit default swaps put the odds of an official default at 75% over the next year.

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[1] https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/10/25/repatriated-earnings-wont-help-american-workers-but-taxing-those-earnings-can/

Daily Comment (October 26, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] It’s a news-heavy morning.  Here is what we are tracking:

Yellen out?  Politico is reporting that the president has narrowed the field for Fed chair, eliminating Gary Cohn yesterday and also Yellen.  Although the source from Politico, Ben White, is generally reliable, in the same report, a source suggests that the president changes his mind often and so no one may really be out.  Still, Senate Republicans would like to have a Fed dominated by GOP members and therefore would prefer someone other than Yellen.  It is worth noting that the president recently visited with Senate Republicans and thus may have been swayed.  For the most part, we have seen this as a Powell/Taylor race for a while and, from our perspective, it’s really about who gets what seat.  Powell would be expected to be a continuation candidate; Taylor would likely be much more hawkish.  We note that some have argued that, theoretically, Taylor could be dovish.  The official Taylor Rule (different from the Mankiw Rule, which we detail often) is based on a formula that compares inflation to a target and GDP compared to potential GDP.  If Taylor were to conclude that the Trump administration’s deregulation and fiscal policies increase potential GDP, he could be dovish.  This was the argument Greenspan made in the 1990s; he believed that the tech revolution would boost productivity enough to offset rising wages.  Still, the Taylor Rule is widely calculated and if he were to manipulate the formula to justify current policy, the dream of “rules-based monetary policy” would be lost.  Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that if Taylor is chair, he will be hawkish.  The dollar rallied on the news.

ECB: The ECB generally did as expected; although rates remain unchanged, QE will be reduced from €60 bn per month to €30 bn per month, starting in January.  It will be extended to September.  In addition, the ECB will continue to reinvest maturing bonds, thus keeping the balance sheet level after QE ends.  Although this outcome was in line with expectations, European bond yields fell and the EUR dropped.  The ECB is intending to reduce accommodation but at a very slow pace.

Interest rates: We have seen interest rates rise recently.  It appears to us that the primary driver of this change has been expectations of tighter U.S. monetary policy.  This is coming from two sources.  First, the market is discounting that a new Fed chair will be more hawkish than Yellen.  Second, even if Yellen remains, the roster of next year’s FOMC will be decidedly more hawkish based on the policy stance of the regional presidents; this is the topic of tomorrow’s Asset Allocation Weekly.  We are seeing the deferred Eurodollar futures market implied yield rise to near-cycle highs.

If Yellen is reappointed, which would be a modest surprise, we would look for a retreat in the above yield but probably not below this year’s lows set in early September.  This would put some downward pressure on the dollar and probably lower 10-year Treasury yields.

Catalonia to hold elections?  The regional Catalan government is set to call elections in a bid to stall a takeover by Madrid.  If calling elections doesn’t placate Madrid, PM Rajoy will likely invoke Article 155 of the Spanish constitution, which allows the central government to take control of a province to maintain the governmental integrity of Spain.  Tensions remain high but Rajoy should probably allow an election to go forward because there is a good chance voters will want to stay in Spain.  This is the message that comes from Scotland and Quebec; areas may want autonomy but actually leaving is usually a minority idea in a region.

Energy recap: U.S. crude oil inventories rose 0.8 mb compared to market expectations of a 3.0 mb decline.

This chart shows current crude oil inventories, both over the long term and the last decade.  We have added the estimated level of lease stocks to maintain the consistency of the data.  As the chart shows, inventories remain historically high but have declined.  The impact of Hurricane Harvey is diminishing as refinery operations recover.  We also note the SPR fell by 0.3 mb, meaning the net build was 0.5 mb.

As the seasonal chart below shows, inventories rose modestly this week.  It appears that we are “skipping” the usual autumn inventory rebuild period.  We did see a strong recovery in production after a short hurricane disruption the previous week.  Oil imports rebounded as well.   Still, we usually see much higher inventory accumulation this time of year and so it should be supportive for prices if it remains slow.

(Source: DOE, CIM)
(Source: DOE, CIM)

Refinery operations rebounded last week in line with seasonal norms.  If this continues, and we expect it will, it should be bullish for oil prices.

Based on inventories alone, oil prices are undervalued with the fair value price of $53.76.  Meanwhile, the EUR/WTI model generates a fair value of $63.42.  Together (which is a more sound methodology), fair value is $59.80, meaning that current prices remain below fair value.  For the past few months, the oil market has not fully accounted for dollar weakness.  However, now the markets are not even taking tightening inventories into account.  In general, without the expected seasonal lift in crude oil inventories, oil prices at current levels are attractive.

In other oil news, Saudi Arabia and Russia appear poised to extend output constraints through 2018.  The official meeting is held on November 30.  The kingdom has been vacillating on where, when and if on the IPO of Saudi Aramco.  The leadership’s concern appears to be tied to the disclosure rules that New York and London would require.  The Royal Family essentially owns the state oil company and uses its revenue as the funding arm of the government.  Going public wouldn’t necessarily end that role but it would make the diversion public.  The FT reports this morning that the Saudi Stock Exchange, the Tadawul, may be the sole listing venue for Saudi Aramco.  We would assume that reporting requirements would be minimal.  However, listing exclusively on the Tadawul would likely reduce the value of the firm due to the expected lack of transparency.  On the other hand, it will allow the kingdom to raise funds in a manner it can control.

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Daily Comment (October 25, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] Financial markets are a bit weaker this morning—equities are signaling a softer opening while Treasuries are continuing to take on water.  There is a lot going on; this morning we are focused on the following issues.

Xi sets Standing Committee: The new Standing Committee of the Politburo is led by General Secretary Xi.  Only LI Keqiang was retained from the last committee.  The new members include Li Zhanshu, who was Xi’s chief of staff and a close ally.  He is considered an orthodox Marxist and will support Xi’s attempts to rekindle Marxist indoctrination.  Wang Yang is from the Youth League (the other main faction is represented by Xi—the “princelings,” or sons of the early revolutionaries) and was a target of discrimination by the disgraced Bo Xilai.  Wang Huning is a political theoretician who supports “neo-authoritarianism,” a platform that best exemplifies Xi’s governance.  Zhao Leji is perhaps the most obscure of the new members who has mostly had a competent, but uninspiring, career.  He replaces Xi loyalist Wang Qishan as head of the anti-corruption bureaucracy.  Han Zheng was a municipal administrator in Shanghai and rounds out the group.  Overall, there is no one on this roster who is a clear heir apparent for Xi, and none will be young enough in five years to serve a subsequent five years, a requirement for heir status.  As we noted earlier this week, Xi will be required to give up the presidency in five years due to term limit law.  However, he will very likely retain the position of general secretary.  We would view the group as mostly loyalists but all appear competent.  The fact that Xi didn’t pack the committee with diehard loyalists suggests he feels very confident in his power.

Ships at sea: Although they are not in position to conduct operations against North Korea, the U.S. is moving two carrier strike groups (CSG), the CSG Nimitz and CSG Theodore Roosevelt, into the western Pacific.  The Nimitz was in the Middle East (part of the U.S. 5th Fleet) but will be joining the 7th Fleet in the Pacific.  Although not entirely necessary, the U.S. usually prefers to have three carrier groups in a region if it is considering military operations because three can conduct round the clock sorties on a target.  We also note that North Korea has tested a solid fuel rocket engine; North Korea has tended to use liquid fuel missiles, which are easier to manage but are vulnerable to pre-emptive strikes during the fueling period.  Going to solid fuel allows North Korea to launch missiles with less preparation, reducing the chances of a “left of launch” strike.  Meanwhile, NBC[1] is reporting that Joseph Yun, the top U.S. diplomat to North Korea, is warning members of Congress that North Korea refuses to engage in talks, apparently upset by President Trump’s characterizations of Kim Jong-un.  Yun suggested that diplomatic efforts are on their “last legs” and told lawmakers the White House is unresponsive to his worries.  President Trump will make a visit to the region in early November, a 12-day trip.  He is creating something of a stir by refusing to attend the East Asia Summit on November 14th; U.S. presidents usually attend such events as a show of Pacific leadership.  Although the attendees of the summit will be disappointed, the other parts of the president’s visit should indicate that the U.S. remains a Pacific power.  We monitor the region closely; bringing three carrier groups together is a worrying development that may simply be a show of force.  Nevertheless, having these assets in place does give the president a platform to launch a war with North Korea.

Iraqi Kurds: On the one hand, the Iraqi Kurdish government has offered to freeze progress toward independence in a bid to ease tensions.  At the same time, Kurdish and Iraqi forces clashed yesterday.  Both sides accused the other of an ambush, although it does appear the Kurds got the better of Iraqi forces.

Fed update: In a meeting with the GOP senators yesterday, the president had a show of hands for the Fed chair position.  It appears that John Taylor was the preferred candidate, although Jerome Powell also received some votes.  Yellen noticeably did not.  However, we do note that President Trump may be Chair Yellen’s strongest advocate,[2] if for no other reason than the equity markets would cheer the decision.  President Trump has pointed to the strong equity markets as confirmation of his successful administration; if picking Taylor were to trigger a sell-off (and it very well could), then Trump would probably want to avoid this.  We still think this is a race between Powell and Taylor, but reappointing Yellen does hold some positive features for the president.

GOP mutiny: Senators Flake and Corker have indicated they won’t run for re-election and have come out with harsh criticisms of the president.  Flake was almost certain to face defeat in the primary.  The GOP is turning populist and establishment Republicans are being forced, at a minimum, to acquiesce to the president.  For senators, especially, criticizing the president looks like a path to becoming a private citizen.  The key unknown is how these senators will vote on taxes.  Corker is a deficit hawk and Flake probably leans that way, and there is little chance the tax plan (it’s no longer being called reform) will be revenue neutral.  If Flake and Corker decide to vote against the plan, the GOP is at 50/50 in the Senate.  Losing any other senators will doom the process.  If tax cuts fail to materialize, the failure could have significantly adverse effects on the GOP at the mid-term elections.

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[1] https://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/lack-talks-north-korea-sounds-alarms-capitol-hill-n813951?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report

[2] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-24/yellen-is-said-to-find-unlikely-advocate-at-white-house-trump

Asset Allocation Quarterly (Fourth Quarter 2017)

  • Our inflation outlook remains benign and economic data continues to be modestly positive.
  • We do not anticipate a recession in the near term.
  • Though the composition of the Fed will change over the next four months, we expect policy to continue toward tightening through increases in the fed funds rate and a reduction in the size of the Fed’s balance sheet.
  • The larger allocation to intermediate-term investment grade bonds remains intact. However, we reduce exposure to speculative grade bonds due to spreads grinding to their tightest post-recession levels.
  • Our growth/value even weight of 50/50 remains unchanged.
  • We increase our exposure to non-U.S. developed and emerging market equities, the former with a tilt toward Europe, due to expectations for continued U.S. dollar softness and attractive valuations overseas.

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ECONOMIC VIEWPOINTS

There are a number of potential pending changes to the policy and complexion of the U.S. Federal Reserve as of this writing. First, there are currently three, and soon to be four, open positions on the Board of Governors, the most important of which is the Fed chair. Though we are not expecting a dramatic near-term shift in the trajectory the current Fed has taken, the new arrangement could alter its policies as it is absorbed over the next few quarters. Second, the process of normalizing the nearly $4.5 trillion balance sheet is expected to commence in October as the Fed begins to slowly stop reinvesting the proceeds it receives from maturing bonds. Though the Fed stated it will start with a reduction of just $10 billion a month, over the next year the Fed’s current intention is to increase the amount to $50 billion each month. As this chart illustrates, a level of $50 billion each month will soon have the effect of shrinking the balance sheet.

With the recent publication of the Fed’s minutes from the September meeting, the near-term trajectory seems fairly certain with expectations for another hike in the fed funds rate in December already priced into the market. Fed fund futures currently have an implied 80% probability of  a December rate hike. However, the prospect for increases in the rate through 2018 as well as further implementation of quantitative tightening through the reduction in the balance sheet are dependent upon the composition of the Fed’s board. Given the Trump administration’s desire to strike a more populist appeal, it would not be surprising if the Fed adopts a more dovish posture in 2018. Such a pose would imply an extension of softness for the U.S. dollar versus other currencies.

Regarding other domestic economic themes, inflation and unemployment remain at low levels, while consumer and business sentiment are elevated. Although the effects of the disastrous hurricane season and wildfires in northern California will likely weigh on GDP and employment over the next several quarters, we believe the dislocations will prove temporary.

Outside the U.S., the European Central Bank (ECB) announced its intention to begin tapering the amount of its bond purchase program, but also indicated it would be extended further by nine months. We view this as the ECB maintaining its accommodative positioning while recognizing the strength in the underlying economy. It also underscores the ECB’s caution toward the myriad political developments in Europe, including Brexit, German and Austrian election results, the separatist movement in Spain and Italian elections in early 2018. The consequent economic impact holds a large degree of uncertainty, leading the ECB to lengthen its stimulus timeline.

In the realm of geopolitics, though concerns attract headlines, we do not think the current issues hold meaningful implications for asset prices. Naturally, the prospect of armed conflicts with North Korea and/or Iran, or a complete revision of NAFTA, would have tremendous economic impact, but at this stage we do not find reason to be less than sanguine. Accordingly, our allocation of assets among each of the strategies currently reflects an accommodation of risk.

STOCK MARKET OUTLOOK

The benign inflationary environment has been a positive backdrop for equity valuations and our expectations are that it should remain favorable. Though this year’s equity market advances thus far have been stronger than many experts expected,  we remain positive on the outlook for equities over the forecast period absent an exogenous event or a surprising change in inflation expectations. While we recognize that equity pricing, particularly in large caps, remains close to historical highs as measured by traditional valuation metrics of Price/Earnings, Price/Book and Price/Cash Flow, we remain optimistic over the near term. Moreover, we harbor some concerns that equity markets could exhibit a “melt up” over the next 1-2 years as investors who have remained on the sidelines since the beginning of this bull market capitulate and put their excess cash to work, thereby fueling demand for equities and inflating prices further.

As we recently published in our Asset Allocation Weekly (10/13/17), the parameters surrounding long-term S&P 500 trends remain supportive. Although a recession or geopolitical event would carry consequent risk to equity prices, the regression trend lines on the accompanying charts indicate that the S&P 500 is trading within one-half standard error of the 6% average yearly trend. For context, the top chart displays log-transformed weekly Friday closes of index data since 1929, while the lower chart shows a more recent period beginning in 1990. The same regression trend lines are used on both charts.

The Confluence Asset Allocation Committee recognizes that the U.S. economy is well advanced in terms of the economic cycle. In fact, the end of October will mark the 100th month for the current economic expansion, making this the third longest on record. However, economic conditions and associated market values fail to conform to the rigor of a calendar. We remain cognizant of the length of the expansion and are wary of the potential of a slowdown in economic growth over the forecast period.  Nevertheless, as equity markets continue to advance, the Confluence Cyclical Asset Allocation strategies retain their historically high allocations to equities, inclusive of non-U.S. equities. It should be noted that this quarter’s rebalance further increases non-U.S. equity exposure, owing to the committee’s prevailing view that there is a likelihood of continued softness in the U.S. dollar coupled with favorable non-U.S. equity valuation metrics as compared to U.S. counterparts.

Within U.S. large caps, we favor energy, health care, industrials and materials and underweight telecom, utilities and consumer staples. We maintain a neutral growth/value style bias.

BOND MARKET OUTLOOK

Despite the Fed’s decision to leave the fed funds rate unchanged at its September meeting, the probability for a 0.25% hike in December has increased. Over the forecast period, we envision the terminal rate of fed funds to be between 1.75% and 2.50%, with the differential dependent upon the make-up of the Fed’s Board of Governors and overall economic conditions. Given these expectations, there is the increased likelihood of a continued flattening of the Treasury yield curve due to tighter monetary conditions. Among corporate bonds, spreads for both investment grade and speculative grade bonds versus maturity equivalent Treasuries have tightened to post-recession lows.

Considering current conditions and expectations, we lengthen the overall duration slightly, though with an increase in Treasury exposure and a continued concentration in the intermediate segment of the yield curve. In addition, we decrease the overall exposure to speculative grade bonds, a position we find appropriate given tighter spreads and as the Fed embarks upon normalizing its balance sheet.

OTHER MARKETS

Similar to last quarter, we determined that commodities do not hold near-term appeal. Commodities can be helpful to a diversified portfolio in an environment of faster economic growth and/or a surge in inflation expectations; however, as these conditions remain absent, commodities are not currently represented in the strategies.

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Daily Comment (October 24, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] Here is a recap of what we are watching this morning:

Xi elevated: Although the news is rather obscure to Western eyes, “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” was added to the Chinese constitution today.  Such thoughts, such as Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” or Deng’s “Theory on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” are also part of the constitution.  For the first time since Mao, such theories have been added to the constitution for a sitting general secretary.  Essentially, this elevates Xi to the same level as Mao in terms of leadership status.  Deng Xiaoping wanted to ensure that China would never have to deal with a cult of personality like Mao had created and thus built a consensus leadership structure that elevated the Standing Committee of the Politburo to the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the general secretary was primus inter pares (first among equals).  This pronouncement about Xi suggests that the Deng era is now over.  As we noted yesterday, Xi’s speech jettisoned Deng’s concept of a quiet rise of China; instead, Xi is now signaling that China intends to act as a major power on the world stage.  How this actually plays out will be something to watch.  History isn’t encouraging.[1]  We will get the Standing Committee announcement around 11:45 EDT.  However, with this announcement, it doesn’t really matter who is on the committee.  We don’t expect a successor to be established and our operating assumption is that Xi will remain general secretary until late next decade, although he will legally be required to give up the president title.

EU labor rule change: Currently, within the EU, a worker from a poorer part of the union can take a job in a richer part but accept less pay than the prevailing wage in the richer nation.  These are known as “posted jobs.”  Posted jobs give “imported” labor an advantage in the richer parts of Europe.  The issue has divided the EU.  Not surprisingly, the richer nations, led by France, want to cap the time a posted worker can accept lower pay to 18 months.  Transportation would not be part of the agreement.  Needless to say, the EU’s periphery nations aren’t happy about the proposed changes, while the core of the EU (Germany, Netherlands, France) support them.  Meanwhile, Hungary’s PM Viktor Orban praised Central Europe as a “migrant-free zone.”

Merkel and the U.K.: We noted last week that Chancellor Merkel seemed to turn dovish on Brexit.  Germany apparently has discovered that it runs a large trade surplus with the U.K.; some €50.4 bn last year, or about 1.6% of Germany’s GDP.  This is the largest bilateral surplus with any other nation, even exceeding the U.S.  Merkel seemingly wants to avoid a sudden shock of disrupting trade flows.  In addition, because of the CDU/CSU’s lackluster showing in the last elections, Merkel will be forced to engage in fiscal spending or tax cuts to gain coalition partners.  Thus, Germany will be less able to spend on EU goals and thus can’t easily fill a gap if the U.K. decides to stop paying its EU contributions.  Consequently, Merkel has decided that if the U.K. will pay a fair share of its EU obligations then she will give May some slack in trade negotiations.  As a side note, coalition-building fiscal spending will tend to turn the ECB hawkish sooner than it otherwise would have and thus is EUR bullish.

Differences in vision: Over the past week, we have seen two ex-presidents offer thinly veiled criticisms of the current president.  The criticism was fairly wide-ranging but included the foreign policy of this president, which can be both interventionist and isolationist at the same time.  As we have discussed before, the Trump policy model is Jacksonian.[2]  Jacksonians shun the global policing role of a superpower.  They only go to war when honor is besmirched or when an existential threat to the homeland develops.  Yesterday, at the Hudson Institute, Gen. David Petraeus and Steve Bannon offered dueling visions of American foreign policy.  At heart, however, is a key difference of opinion on policy—Petraeus is defending the traditional superpower role while Bannon is wanting to jettison those burdens.  We suspect Bannon’s position is becoming increasingly dominant.[3]

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[1] https://www.amazon.com/Destined-War-America-Escape-Thucydidess-ebook/dp/B01IAS9FZY

[2] https://www.confluenceinvestment.com/weekly-geopolitical-report-april-4-2016/ and https://www.confluenceinvestment.com/weekly-geopolitical-report-president-trump-preliminary-analysis-november-14-2016/

[3] https://s2.washingtonpost.com/camp-rw/?e=Ym9ncmFkeUBjb25mbHVlbmNlaW0uY29t&s=59ef2311fe1ff6159ed3f073

Weekly Geopolitical Report – North Korea and China: A Difficult History, Part II (October 23, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady

Last week, we examined the Minsaengdan Incident and the onset of the Korean War.  This week, we will discuss the final phase of the Korean War, the ceasefire, the introduction of Juche and the impact of the Cultural Revolution.

The Korean War: The Latter Stages of the War and the Ceasefire
Among the issues that caused tensions between China and Korea was the management of the railroads during the war.  Chinese troops encountered difficulties when using roads to supply their forces.  The roads were not in good shape and their war materials were vulnerable to American air attacks.  Given that most of the rolling stock and crews were Chinese, Chinese Volunteer Army (CVA) Commander Peng Dehuai wanted to gain control over the railroads to deliver war materials.  However, Kim Il-sung didn’t want China to take over North Korea’s rail system for two reasons.  First, the regime was trying to start reconstruction and didn’t want to divert rolling stock for war materials, and second, Kim was offended by the loss of sovereignty.  Nevertheless, China and the U.S.S.R. coerced the North Koreans into giving up control of their railways to China for the duration of the war.

The final indignity the Kim government had to face was the ceasefire determination.  Stalin and Mao wanted to keep the war going.  Both wanted to keep the U.S. occupied with the fighting in Korea as this would reduce America’s ability to defend other parts of the world.  In addition, Mao was receiving military aid from the Soviets and feared that the war’s end would end the flow of aid.  On the other hand, Kim wanted a ceasefire.  His country was being steadily bombed by the U.S. and North Korea couldn’t really begin reconstruction without an end to hostilities.

A second issue involved prisoners of war (POWs).  Chinese troops didn’t aggressively capture POWs.  Their military experience was mostly derived in the Chinese Civil War where they didn’t pursue POWs and they continued that behavior during the Korean War.  On the other hand, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) tried to capture as many prisoners as they could with the idea that they would be used as forced labor for reconstruction.[1]  Thus, the sides couldn’t agree on how to resolve the return of POWs; it wasn’t important for China, but it was critical for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

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[1] Zhihua, S. (2004.) Sino-North Korean Conflict and its Resolution during the Korean War. Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Winter/Spring (Issue 14/15), page 20.

Daily Comment (October 23, 2017)

by Bill O’Grady and Thomas Wash

[Posted: 9:30 AM EDT] There was (and is) lots of news.  Let’s dig in:

Abe in a landslide: PM Abe’s gamble to call early elections looks like a winner.  The LDP and the rest of Abe’s ruling coalition will take 313 seats, giving him a “supermajority” of more than 310 seats, which is the level that will allow him to make changes to the constitution.  Japanese equities rose on the news and the JPY declined modestly (it has been weaker on expectations that Abe would prevail and thus Abenomics would continue).  However, on the economic front, we don’t see much more from Abenomics.  The “three arrows” were really all about a weaker JPY; that has been achieved and it’s probably not possible to weaken the currency much further without prompting a negative reaction from Washington.  BOJ Governor Kuroda will probably get reappointed.  We look for Abe’s focus to shift toward adjusting the constitution to allow Japan to project military power.  As U.S. isolationism develops, this is a necessary step to deal with a growing Chinese threat.

Xi and the Party Congress: Today, we expect Chairman Xi to reveal the new members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the most powerful body in China.  But, for now, the real story is that Xi is ending Deng’s foreign policy.  The PRC’s foreign policy has evolved, starting with Mao, who was essentially isolationist.  He turned the nation inward to stabilize the persistent tensions between the insular interior and the cosmopolitan coasts.  This led to unity and income equality with weak economic growth.  Deng allowed the coasts to flourish to lift the economy at the expense of regional divergence and rising income inequality.  Deng called for China to avoid projecting power globally to allow for uninterrupted economic development.  Because the economic development was based on export promotion, workable relations with the U.S. were imperative.  The 2008 Great Financial Crisis and uncertainty about the U.S. role in the world has led Chinese leaders to sense a vacuum, and Xi has indicated over this Congress that he wants China to fill it.  China is facing the problems of the late stages of a “high growth/low cost nation,” which are unbalanced development (too much productive capacity with inadequate household share of GDP) and too much debt.  Xi is making it clear he intends to follow imperialism to resolve this problem, the paths the British and the Dutch took when they faced this point in their development.  The problem for China is that it doesn’t have the military power to pull this off; thus, it must try to develop economic colonies under the protection of the U.S. military.  When Japan faced this issue in the 1930s, it invaded China and eventually bombed Pearl Harbor.[1]  An assertive China is going to be a growing problem for global stability.

Spain: PM Rajoy appears poised to take direct control of Catalonia.  If the current provincial leadership declares independence, they may all end up in jail.  Rajoy has the state apparatus to take control; what he doesn’t have is the political legitimacy to enforce his will.  In other words, he will find that it’s one thing to establish control but it’s another to maintain it.  Rajoy will face overt and covert opposition to taking away Catalan autonomy and disruption will prove to be costly given that the province represents 20% of Spain’s GDP.

Another populist win: As we noted last week, the Czech Republic has elected a populist slate of candidates, with the Ano Party winning nearly 30% of the vote, almost 20 points higher than the closest rival.  The Social Democrats, the center-left, saw their support collapse from 20.5% to 7.3%.  It should be noted that the next largest parties in this vote lean Euro-skeptic, suggesting that the EU is becoming rather unpopular.  Along with recent elections in Austria and the rise of the AfD in Germany, we are seeing a nationalist, anti-immigrant surge in Europe.  Meanwhile, we note that Lombardy and Veneto, regions in Italy, have voted for more autonomy from Rome.  Although neither are pushing for independence, Europe appears to be moving away from centralization, which has been the primary trend in Europe since WWII.

Iran: SOS Tillerson has warned European firms that doing business with Iran might be risky as new U.S. sanctions are being considered.[2]  This move by the Trump administration comes with evidence that the Iranian government has used the removal of sanctions to undermine the economic power of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC).[3]  During sanctions, the IRGC took over large swaths of the economy to maintain growth and evade sanctions.  This allowed the IRGC to develop power independently of the clerical government.  President Rouhani and the Ayatollah Khamenei have been trying to weaken the IRGC’s economic power to prevent them from becoming a political threat.  If the Trump administration puts sanctions back in place, Iran will have no recourse other than to allow the IRGC to resume its activities.

Jimmy to the rescue?  In a curious op-ed in the NYT, Maureen Dowd interviewed former President Jimmy Carter.  The interview was wide-ranging but a couple of items stick out.  First, the former president would be willing to help negotiate with the North Koreans.  He is credited with the 1994 Agreed Framework, which diffused a crisis over North Korea’s nuclear program, although we now know Pyongyang simply moved to another method to attain a nuclear weapon.  Still, Carter did likely prevent a war on the peninsula.  Essentially, it appears Carter is sending a signal to the Trump administration that he is available.  We note Carter said some rather flattering things about the president and also that he didn’t vote for Mrs. Clinton during the primary (he voted for Sen. Sanders).  Second, there is a clear element of animosity in his tone toward the Clintons and Obama.  We are not sure what exactly is going on there but Carter may be one to watch.  Trump likes unconventional “out of the box” surprises.  Nothing would be closer to an unexpected outcome than sending Carter to North Korea.  This is happening as we are hearing reports that the U.S. is considering the involuntary call-up of reserve pilots.[4]

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[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yKHUGvde7KU

[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/22/world/middleeast/tillerson-iran-europe.html?emc=edit_mbe_20171023&nl=morning-briefing-europe&nlid=5677267&te=1

[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/21/world/middleeast/iran-revolutionary-guards.html

[4] http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/10/21/air-force-could-recall-up-to-1000-retired-pilots-after-trump-order.html?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report and http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2017/10/exclusive-us-preparing-put-nuclear-bombers-back-24-hour-alert/141957/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=%2ASituation%20Report